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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Microeconomic Theory
by
Geyu Yang
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Brian Rogers, Chair
This dissertation consists of three chapters on topics in microeconomic theory. In Chapter 1,
I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between
a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be
a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The
modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure.
The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation
building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals
and the long-run player’s strategy. Thus the long- run player may not have the ability to
establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot sta-
tistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results
break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run
player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff
is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed. In Chapter 2, I study a
bounded rationality model of opinion formation in which there are two different types of
agents: naive agents and sophisticated agents. All agents update their opinions by taking
viii
weighted averages of neighbors’ opinions. Naive agents truthfully report their opinions, but
sophisticated agents can strategically report opinions to manipulate naive agents. I show
that the limiting opinions are completely determined by sophisticated agents’ biases and
the structure of the network and that, generically, there is no consensus. I analyze how
disagreement is affected by the intensity of lying cost, diverging interests, and the structure
of the social network. I also show that naive agents do not have any social influence and
sophisticated agents’ social influence can be decomposed into two separate factors: direct
influence and indirect influence. In Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Pinar Yildirim, we
investigate the impact of informal lending on the types and terms of contracts offered by
formal banks, considering factors that facilitate informal lending activity such as social ties
among consumers. The density of the connections among consumers represents the degree
to which those with and without wealth mix, indirectly capturing the degree of inequality
in a society. We develop a model which relates the density of social connections to the
availability of informal lending activity. We show that a low to moderate degree of informal
activity in a market can help poor entrepreneurs because it motivates the bank to compete
by cutting down the interest rate of unsecured loans offered to these consumers. In turn,
the bank faces an overinvestment problem when financial inclusion is higher. As informal
borrowing opportunities increase further, the bank’s benefit from increased access to credit
di- minishes. It earns higher rents by increasing the rates on wealthy low-risk consumers who
can informally lend to their social contacts. As a consequence, the overinvestment problem
is replaced by an underinvestment problem, and creditworthy entrepreneurs are deprived
of loans from the bank. We argue that although the entrepreneurial investment shrinks,
only those projects with the best return are awarded financing, implying that the average
ix
investment in the market is now more attractive.
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Chapter 1: Robustness of Reputation Effects under Un-
certain Monitoring
1.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that reputation is an important dimension of long-run relation-
ships. In the canonical reputation model (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992; Gossner
2011), a long-run player (Player 1, he) faces a sequence of short-run players (Player 2, she).
There is incomplete information about the type of the long-run player. He can either be
of a simple commitment type who plays a fixed (possibly mixed) action at every period or
of a normal type who acts strategically. The introduction of incomplete information affects
dramatically the equilibrium payoffs and behaviors in the game because the long-run player
has the option to build a reputation of commitment by mimicking the commitment type.
The differences between the equilibria in the games of incomplete and complete information
are known as the “reputations effects”.
In this paper, the reputation effect I focus on is the lower bound of the equilibrium
payoffs to the normal type long-run player . In the canonical reputation model, when the
long-run player is sufficiently patient, he can be assured of at least a payoff arbitrarily close
to his commitment payoff at every equilibrium. Intuitively, normal type Player 1 can always
deviate to mimic the commitment type player. Eventually, he can build a reputation for
always playing the commitment action. Therefore, Player 2 eventually plays a best response
to it, and Player 1 can obtain the commitment payoff. This reputation effect applies even
when Player 2 can only observe some signals generated by Player 1’s actions instead of his
1
actions.
Despite the vast literature on reputation effects, the studies in this area all focus on the
case in which the monitoring structure is common knowledge. In some cases, this assumption
may seem too strong. Consider the following example. An individual is planning a trip to
a new city and want to book a hotel. Before doing so, he/she may read the reviews on Tri-
pAdvisor or Expedia. The assumption that the monitoring structure is common knowledge
means that consumers know the exact probability of a good review given that the hotel tries
to provide good service.
However, there are two issues here. First, numerous studies have documented the ex-
istence of fake reviews (e.g., Luca and Zervas 2016; Mayzlin et al. 2014). Mayzlin et al.
(2014) examine differences in the reviews posted on TripAdvisor and Expedia for different
types of hotels and show that different types of hotels have different incentives to create
fake reviews. Therefore, two hotels with very different qualities may have the same review
score. Second, different people may have different tastes. Even if the reviews are good and
accurate, it does not necessarily mean that the individual will like it. As a result, consumers
cannot accurately monitor the actions of the hotels; they may still know that, when the hotel
exerts high effort, the outcomes are more likely to be good but nothing more. Then it is
much harder for the hotels to build a good reputation. In this situation, does the hotel still
try to build a good reputation? Are reputation effects still robust in the presence of this
uncertainty?
This paper addresses these questions. I study a repeated game of incomplete information
between a long-run player (Player 1, he) and an infinite sequence of short-run players (Player
2, she). Player 1 is either a normal type who maximizes his discounted payoff or is committed
2
to playing a fixed action at every stage of the game. Player 2 observes only past signals and
updates her belief. The key modeling innovation is that there is incomplete information
about the monitoring structure. Formally, at the beginning of the game, a state of the
world is realized. The state consists of two parts: the type of Player 1 and the monitoring
structure. A monitoring structure is a mapping from the set of Player 1’s action to the set
of distributions of signals. Only Player 1 knows the true state. Player 2 has a prior belief
about the state. I assume that the prior belief distribution has full support. To focus on the
uncertainty about monitoring structure, I assume that there is only one commitment type.
I relax this assumption in Section 1.4.
One new challenge introduced by uncertain monitoring is that Player 2’s prediction of
the distribution of signals is no longer directly linked to her prediction of Player 1’s strategy.
Then even if we show that with high probability, Player 2’s prediction of the distribution of
signals is almost correct in most periods, we still know little about her prediction of Player
1’s strategy, not to mention her strategy.
I focus on the case in which the set of monitoring structures is finite, while an infinite set
is discussed in Section 1.5. I first provide sufficient conditions under which the reputation
effects on Player 1’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. A key step is to
introduce the set of all the “well-behaved” monitoring structures with respect to the realized
monitoring structure. The commitment strategy under the realized monitoring structure
generates a certain distribution of signals. I call a monitoring structure “well-behaved” if it
satisfies the following: for any strategy under this monitoring structure that can generate
the same distribution, Player 2’s best response to it is the same as her best response to
the commitment action. In Theorem 1.1 and Proposition 1.1, I show that if all monitoring
3
structures are “well-behaved” or if Player 2’s prior belief about Player 1 being normal and
the monitoring structure not “well-behaved” is sufficiently small, then normal type Player 1
can still be assured of his commitment payoff. The assumptions may seem restrictive, but
I give an example to show that they actually cover most cases. I also examine the case in
which the commitment payoff is the highest payoff Player 1 can get from the stage game.
I show in Proposition 1.2 that if for any monitoring structure, all monitoring structures
with higher subscripts are “well-behaved” then normal type Player 1 under all monitoring
structures can be assured of his commitment payoff. The conditions are significantly more
mild than the conditions in Proposition 1.1, especially for monitoring structures with large
subscripts. I give an example to show that this proposition is extremely useful when the
cardinality of the set of Player 1’s actions is two.
I then provide sufficient conditions for the existence of “bad” equilibria in which the
payoff of Player 1 is strictly lower than the commitment payoff. In Proposition 1.3, I show
that if there is a “bad” equilibrium of complete information stage game, and Player 2 cannot
statistically distinguish commitment strategy from the “bad” strategy forming the “bad”
equilibrium, then there exists a Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) in which Player 1’s payoff
in the equilibrium is strictly lower than the commitment payoff. The intuition is as follows.
Suppose normal type Player 1 always plays the “bad” strategy under all monitoring struc-
tures. Because Player 2 cannot statistically distinguish it from the commitment strategy,
Player 2’s posterior belief about Player 1 being normal is bounded by her prior belief. Then
if Player 2’s prior belief about Player 1 being normal is sufficiently strong, no matter the his-
tory, she always chooses a best response to the “bad” strategy, so Player 1’s payoff is strictly
lower than his commitment payoff. When the “bad” equilibrium is a mixed-strategy Nash
4
equilibrium, reputation building may fail under different conditions, as shown in Proposi-
tion 1.4. The intuition is similar. The difference is that the normal type Player 1 can play
different strategies under different monitoring structures. I give an example to show that
Proposition 1.4 may relax dramatically the requirements on monitoring structures in Propo-
sition 1.3, and in some cases the conditions in Proposition 1.4 are (almost) sufficient and
necessary.
I next examine the case in which there is more than one commitment type. In Proposition
1.5, I show that if Player 2 can statistically distinguish different commitment strategies then
the main results can be extended. The intuition is as follows. Suppose Player 1 deviates to
mimic one of the commitment types. With high probability, Player 2 can learn eventually
that Player 1 is either the normal type or the commitment type that he is mimicking.
Therefore, introducing other commitment types does not affect Player 2’s strategy and also
does not affect Player 1’s payoff.
Finally, I investigate the case in which the set of monitoring structures is a continuum.
The model becomes much more complicated, so I focus on the “product-choice” game. There
are only two actions and the commitment strategy is pure. Negative results can be extended
easily. In contrast, positive results are much harder to extend because the proofs rely on the
assumption that the set of monitoring structures is finite. I can only prove a weaker version
here.
My paper relates to an extensive literature on the adverse selection approach to rep-
utation effects. The idea was introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) in the context of finitely repeated games. Fudenberg and Levine (1989,
1992) discussed reputation effects in infinitely repeated games. They showed that a suffi-
5
ciently patient long-run player can obtain a payoff that is at least as much as the payoff he
could obtain by committing publicly to playing any of the commitment strategies. Gossner
(2011) introduced entropy techniques to this literature and greatly simplified the proof of
the above.
Some interesting variations of the canonical reputation model have been studied. Wise-
man (2008) and Ekmekci et al. (2012) studied models with unobservable stochastic re-
placements for the long-run player and showed that the long-run player could establish a
reputation for commitment. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) studied a similar model, but
they focused on a different kind of reputation. They provide conditions under which the
long-run player could establish a reputation for not being the commitment type.
Liu (2011) investigated a model in which short-run players must pay a cost to observe
past signals. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) discussed the case in which short-run players have
limited records. They both focus on the reputation dynamics instead of payoffs.
Jehiel and Samuelson (2012) studied a model of boundedly rational short-run players.
They provided a characterization of both equilibrium payoffs and equilibrium behavior. They
showed that the payoff bound for the rational long-run player can be strictly larger than the
commitment payoff.
Pei (2018) investigated a model in which Player 1 has persistent private information that
matters for Player 2’s payoffs and provided a sufficient and (almost) necessary condition
under which reputation effects can be extended.
The model most similar to this paper is by Deb and Ishii (2018). They also studied a
variation of the canonical reputation model in which the long-run player is privately informed
about the monitoring structure. They also investigated the robustness of reputation effects.
6
The main difference is that they assumed that there is a set of nonstationary commitment
types who switch infinitely often between “signaling actions” that help the consumer learn
the unknown monitoring state and “collection actions” that are desirable for payoffs, while
I maintain standard assumptions.
1.2 Model
One long-lived Player 1 (with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1)) interacts with a sequence of short-
lived Player 2. In each period, two players play a simultaneous move game. Player 1 chooses
a (possibly mixed) action αt1 ∈ △ (A1) and Player 2 chooses a (possibly mixed) action
αt2 ∈ △ (A2). Both A1 and A2 are finite sets. A signal yt is drawn from a finite set Y .
The probability that y is realized depends on Player 1’s action at1 ∈ A1 and the monitoring
structure. Let D be the set of monitoring structures, with d : A1 →△(Y ) a typical element.
Denote the distribution of signals by ρd, at1(·) ∈ △(Y ).
Player 1 is either a normal type who maximizes his discounted payoff or is committed
to playing a fixed action at every stage of the game. For expositional clarity, in most of the
paper, I assume that there is only one commitment type. Let Ξ = {ξ0, ξ(αˆ1)} be the set
of types, in which ξ0 is a normal type and ξ(αˆ1) is a commitment type who always plays
αˆ1 ∈ △(A1). Let Θ = Ξ×D be the set of states, with a typical element θ = (ξ, d) ∈ Θ. At
the beginning of the game, a state is realized and only Player 1 observes the state. Player
2 has a prior belief of the states which is given by pi0(·) ∈ △(Θ). I assume that pi0 has full
support. Abusing notation, denote Player 2’s prior belief about Player 1 being normal and
monitoring structure being d by pi0(ξ0) and pi0(d) , respectively.
7
I assume that Player 2 only observes past signals, so the set of histories for Player 2 in
period t is H t2 = (Y )t−1 and H 2 = ∪∞t=1H t2 is the set of all histories for Player 2. Player 1,
on the other hand, knows everything. Let H t1 = (A1 ×A2 × Y )t−1, then the set of histories
for Player 1 in period t is Θ×H t1 and H 1 = ∪∞t=1
(
Θ×H t1
)
= Θ× ∪∞t=1H t1 is the set of
all histories for Player 1.
A strategy for Player 1 is a mapping
σ1 :H 1 → ∆(A1)
which satisfies that for any ht1 ∈ H t1 and any d, σ1((ξ(αˆ1), d), ht1) = αˆ1. A strategy for
Player 2 is a mapping
σ2 :H 2 → ∆(A2)
Let Ω = Θ × (A1, A2, Y )∞ be the set of outcomes and P ∈ △ (Ω) be the probability
measure induced by the strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) and the probability distribution of states
pi0. Denote the event that the state is θ by {θ}. Let Qθ(·) = P (·|{θ}) be the probability
measure on the set of outcomes given that the state is θ, then
P (·) =
∑
θ
pi0(θ)Qθ(·)
Let F t be the σ-algebra generated by H t1, Fˆ t be the σ-algebra generated by H t2, and F
be the σ-algebra generated by Ω. Then (Ω, F , P ) is a probability space, both {F t : t ≥ 0}
and {Fˆ t : t ≥ 0} are filtrations on this probability space, and Fˆ t ⊆ F t. Player 2’s posterior
belief in period t that the state is θ is the Fˆ t-measurable random variable pit(θ) = P ({θ}|Fˆ t).
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The stage-game payoff functions are u1 for normal type player 1, and u2 for player 2.
The expected payoff for Player 2 in period t is
EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | Fˆ t
)
and the expected payoff for normal Player 1 in state θ = (ξ0, d) is
EQθ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
Let
uαˆ1 = min
α2∈BR2(αˆ1)
u1(α1, α2)
It is the least payoff Player 1 obtains when choosing αˆ1, and Player 2 always plays a best
response which is called the “commitment payoff.”
The solution concept is Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE).
1.3 Main Results
In this section, I analyze how uncertain monitoring affects the standard reputation effects of
the long-run player’s payoffs. I provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects
hold, and I also characterize the conditions under which reputation effects break down. I
focus on the case in which the cardinality of Θ is finite, while an infinite states set is discussed
in Section 1.5. Let |D| = N and D = {d1, ..., dN}, then |Θ| = 2N .
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1.3.1 Robustness of Reputation Effects
I first provide sufficient conditions for the robustness of the reputation effects. I extend the
notion of ε-confirming best responses of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) to this framework.
Define the d-weak-ε-confirming best response as follows.
Definition 1.1. α2 ∈ ∆(A2) is a d-weak-ε-confirming best response to αˆ1 ∈ ∆(A1) if there
exist
(
α′1,1, ..., α
′
1,N
) ∈ (∆(A1))N and (pi′(d1), ..., pi′(dN)) ∈ RN+ such that
1. ∑Ni=1 pi′(di) = 1;
2. α2 is a best response to
∑N
i=1 pi
′(di)α′1,i;
3. pi′(di)||ρdi, α′1,i − ρd, αˆ1||∞ < ε , ∀di ∈ D.
The set of d-weak-ε-confirming best responses to α1 is denoted by Bw,dε (α1). Let
vw,dα1 (ε) = min
α2∈Bw,dε (α1)
u1(α1, α2).
Then the following proposition provides a lower bound for the payoff of normal type of Player
1.
Theorem 1.1. For any realized monitoring structure d and every ε > 0, there is an M such
that, for all δ, normal type Player 1’s payoff under monitoring structure d is greater than or
equal to
(1− ε)δMvw,dαˆ1 (ε) + (1− (1− ε)δM) min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2)
in any BNE.
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The main idea of the proof of Theorem 1.1 follows the classical argument of Fudenberg
and Levine (1992) and Sorin (1999). I also calculate normal type Player 1’s payoff when
mimicking the commitment type. One new challenge introduced by uncertain monitoring
is that Player 2’s prediction of the distribution of signals is no longer linked directly to her
prediction of Player 1’s strategy. Suppose that we do not know Player 2’s posterior beliefs
on monitoring structures. Then even if we show that with high probability that Player
2’s prediction of the distribution of signals is almost correct in most periods, we still know
little about her prediction of Player 1’s strategy. To overcome this challenge, I provide a
more detailed analysis of Player 2’s posterior beliefs. I show that if the realized monitoring
structure is d and normal type Player 1 mimics commitment type, with high probability,
Player 2’s strategy is a d-weak-ε-confirming best response to αˆ1, except for a fixed number
of periods. The idea is that Player 2 learns eventually that the real distribution is ρd, αˆ1 and
Player 1 always plays some strategy that generates the same distribution as ρd, αˆ1 .
Theorem 1.1 provides a lower bound (vw,dαˆ1 (ε)) to the payoff of normal type Player 1, the
problem is that vw,dαˆ1 (ε) may not be a good lower bound. Consider the following example.
Example 1.1. Consider the following “product-choice” game. It involves one long-lived
Player 1 and a sequence of short-lived Player 2. Player 1 plays either H or L and Player 2
plays either c or s. The payoffs are shown in the following payoff matrix:
Player 2
c s
Player 1
H 2,3 0,2
L 3,0 1,1
Suppose αˆ1 = H. Player 1’s actions are monitored via a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}. Then
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d = di represents the following monitoring structure:
ρdi, H(y) =

ρdi1 y = y¯
1− ρdi1 y = y
ρdi, L(y) =

ρdi2 y = y¯
1− ρdi2 y = y
Suppose ρd22 = ρd11 . Consider the case in which the realized monitoring structure is d1.
Then, for any ε > 0 and any 0 < εˆ < ε, in the definition of the d-weak-ε-confirming best
response, let pi′(d2) = 1− εˆ, pi′(di) = εˆN−1 ∀i ̸= 2, α′1,2 = L, and α′1,i = H ∀i ̸= 2. When εˆ is
sufficiently small, s is a best response to ∑Ni=1 pi′(di)α′1,i, so s ∈ Bw,d1ε (H) and vw,d1H (ε) = 0.
The next question is: when will vw,dαˆ1 (ε) be a good lower bound? Let D˜1i = {d ∈ D :
for any α1 ∈ △(A1), if ρdi, aˆ1 = ρd, α1 , thenBR2(α1) = BR2(αˆ1)}, D˜1−i = D\D˜1i , Θ˜1i = {θ ∈
Θ : d ∈ D˜1i , ξ = ξ0}, Θˆ = {θ ∈ Θ : ξ = ξ(aˆ1)}, and Θ˜1−i = {θ ∈ Θ : d ∈ D˜1−i, ξ = ξ0}.
The following Proposition shows the sufficient conditions under which vw,dαˆ1 (ε) is a good lower
bound.
Proposition 1.1.
1. For any realized monitoring structure di, if D ⊆ D˜1i , then for any ε > 0, there exists δ∗
such that for any δ > δ∗, normal type Player 1’s payoff under the monitoring structure
di is greater than or equal to uαˆ1 − ε in any BNE.
2. For any realized monitoring structure di and any ε > 0, there exists δ∗and η∗ such that
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if for any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i, pi0(θ) < η∗, and δ > δ∗, then normal type Player 1’s payoff under
the monitoring structure di is greater than or equal to uαˆ1 − ε in any BNE.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose normal type Player 1 mimics the commitment type.
As I discussed above, Player 2 learns eventually that the real distribution is ρd, αˆ1 , and Player
1 always plays some strategy that generates the same distribution as ρd, αˆ1 . If D ⊆ D˜1i , then
Player 2’s best response to any convex combination of such strategies is the same as her best
response to αˆ1. Then, eventually, normal type Player 1 receives uαˆ1 in every round of the
game. In this sense, for any realized monitoring structure di, D˜1i can be viewed as all of the
“well-behaved” monitoring structures with respect to di.
IfD * D˜1i , we do not have a clear prediction for Player 2’s strategy. If Player 2’s posterior
belief about the state belonging to Θ˜1−i is large, she may think that Player 1’s action is
completely different from αˆ1, and then her best response may also be different. Fortunately,
Player 2’s posterior belief is bounded by her prior belief in some sense. Therefore, when
Player 2’s prior belief about the state belonging to Θ˜1−i is sufficiently small, we can still
obtain a good lower bound. The assumptions in Proposition 1.1 may seem restrictive, but
D˜1i actually cover most cases, as shown in the following example.
Example 1.2. Consider the same “product-choice” game as in Example 1.1. I still assume
αˆ1 = H, and Player 1’s actions are monitored via a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}. Then, d = di
represents the following monitoring structure:
ρdi, H(y) =

ρdi1 y = y¯
1− ρdi1 y = y
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Figure 1: ”Well-behaved” monitoring structures example 1
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ρdi, L(y) =

ρdi2 y = y¯
1− ρdi2 y = y
Suppose that
ρd1, H(y) =

3
4
y = y¯
1
4
y = y
and ρd1, L(y¯) ̸= 34 .
What is D˜11 in this example? Let us first consider the set of monitoring structures in
which either ρd,H(y¯), ρd, L(y¯) > 34 or ρd,H(y¯), ρd, L(y¯) < 34 , as illustrated in Figure 1.
For any monitoring structure d belonging to this set and any α1 ∈ △(A1), it is easy to
check that ρd, α1(y¯) ̸= ρd1, H(y¯). According to the definition of D˜1i , this set is a subset of D˜11.
What about a monitoring structure d outside the shaded region? It is possible that there
exists α1 = (γH, (1− γ)L) ̸= H, such that ρd1, H = ρd, α1 . Then
γρd,H(y¯) + (1− γ)ρd, L(y¯) = 3
4
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Figure 2: ”Well-behaved” monitoring structures example 2
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so
γ =
3
4
− ρd, L(y¯)
ρd,H(y¯)− ρd, L(y¯)
and
BR2(α1) = {c}
⇐⇒1
2
< γ ≤ 1
⇐⇒ρd,H(y¯) + ρd, L(y¯) < 3
2
, ρd, L(y¯) <
3
4
and ρd,H(y¯) ≥ 3
4
orρd,H(y¯) + ρd, L(y¯) >
3
2
, ρd, L(y¯) >
3
4
and ρd,H(y¯) ≤ 3
4
.
Taking the union of this set with the set discussed above, we obtain D˜11, as illustrated in
Figure 2.
The conditions in Proposition 1.1 can be relaxed if uαˆ1 is the highest payoff Player 1
can obtain from the stage game. Let u¯1 = max
a1,a2
u1(a1, a2) and D˜2i = {d ∈ D : for any α1 ∈
△(A1), if ρdi, αˆ1 = ρd, α1 , then for any a2 ∈ A2, u¯1 > u1(α1, a2)}.
15
Proposition 1.2. If the stage game payoff satisfies uαˆ1 = u¯1 and, for any i, {di, ..., dN} ⊆ D˜1i
and {d1, ..., di−1} ⊆ D˜1i ∪ D˜2i , then for any realized monitoring structure di and any ε > 0,
there exists δ∗ such that, for any δ > δ∗, normal type Player 1’s payoff under the monitoring
structure di is greater than or equal to uαˆ1 − ε in any BNE.
It is easy to check that if there exists a permutation of {1, ..., N}, denoted by µ, such
that for any i, {dµ(i), ..., dµ(N)} ⊆ D˜1µ(i) and {dµ(1), ..., dµ(i−1)} ⊆ D˜1µ(i) ∪ D˜2µ(i), then the
results in Proposition 1.2 still hold. Because u¯1 = max
a1,a2
u1(a1, a2), {d1, ..., di−1} ⊆ D˜2i is
a very mild condition. Therefore the conditions in this proposition basically are that for
any i, any monitoring structure with a higher subscript is “well-behaved.” The conditions
are significantly more mild than the conditions in Proposition 1.1, especially for monitoring
structures with large subscripts.
The intuition is as follows. For i = 1, {di, ..., dN} ⊆ D˜1i =⇒ D ⊆ D˜1i , I can apply
Proposition 1.1. Now let us consider i = 2. I still consider the deviation that normal
type of Player 1 always plays αˆ1. As discussed above, Player 2 learns eventually that the
real distribution is ρd2, αˆ1 and Player 1 always plays some strategy that generates the same
distribution as ρd2, αˆ1 . Since {d2, ..., dN} ⊆ D˜12, the only possibility for Player 2 not choosing
an action belonging to BR2(αˆ1) is that her posterior belief about the state being (ξ0, d1) is
sufficiently large and that d1 /∈ D˜12, then d1 ∈ D˜22. This also implies that, in equilibrium,
normal type Player 1, under the monitoring structure d1, almost always plays α1,1 ∈ △(A1),
such that ρd2, αˆ1 = ρd, α1,1 . When Player 1 follows this strategy, Player 1’s payoff under the
monitoring structure d1 is strictly below u¯1. However, when the monitoring structure is d1,
Player 1 can always obtain u¯1 by mimicking ξ(αˆ1), which leads to a contradiction. The same
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logic applies when we consider i > 2.
This proposition is extremely useful when |A1| = 2 as shown in the following example.
Example 1.3. Consider the following “battle of the sexes” game. It involves one long-lived
Player 1 and a sequence of short-lived Player 2. Player 1 plays either H or L, and Player 2
plays either c or s. The payoffs are shown in the following payoff matrix:
Player 2
c s
Player 1
H 3,1 0,0
L 0,0 1,3
Suppose αˆ1 = Hand that Player 1’s actions are monitored via a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}.
Then, d = di represents the following monitoring structure:
ρdi, H(y) =

ρdi1 y = y¯
1− ρdi1 y = y
ρdi, L(y) =

ρdi2 y = y¯
1− ρdi2 y = y
As proved in the Appendix, if for any di ∈ D, ρdi1 > ρdi2 , then for any ε > 0, and any
di ∈ D, there exists δ∗ such that for any δ > δ∗, normal type Player 1’s payoff under the
monitoring structure di in any BNE is greater than or equal to uαˆ1 − ε.
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1.3.2 Failure of Reputation Building
I next provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects break down. Let Γα =
{ρd, α(·); d ∈ D} and let Dρ, α = {d ∈ D : ρd, α(·) = ρ}. Γα is the set of distribution of signals
induced by α and Dρ, α is the set of monitoring structures under which the distribution of
signals induced by α is ρ. The following proposition shows that uncertain monitoring may
cause a failure of reputation building.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose there exist α˜1 ∈ △(A1) and a˜2 ∈ A2 such that (α˜1, a˜2) is a Nash
equilibrium of complete information stage game, u2(α˜1, a˜2) > u2(α˜1, a2) for all a2 ̸= a˜2,
u1(α˜1, a˜2) < uαˆ, and Γαˆ1 ⊆ Γα˜1. There exists a Lˆ > 0, such that if Player 2’s prior belief
pi0(·) satisfies that
min
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)
max
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)
≥ Lˆ,
then for any δ, there exists a BNE such that normal type Player 1 always plays α˜1 and Player
2 always plays a˜2.
It is easy to check that Player 1’s payoff in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1.3 is
strictly lower than the commitment payoff, so this proposition shows that reputation effects
are not fully robust when there is uncertainty about the monitoring structure. The proof
of Proposition 1.3, as well as all proofs of the following results, are in the Appendix. The
intuition behind Proposition 1.3 is as follows. In equilibrium, since Γαˆ1 ⊆ Γα˜1 , Player 2
cannot statistically distinguish commitment type from normal type, so Player 2’s posterior
belief about Player 1 being normal is bounded by her prior belief. Then, if Player 2’s prior
belief about Player 1 being normal is sufficiently strong, no matter the history, she always
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chooses a best response to α˜1; therefore, Player 1 also has no incentive to deviate. The
following example illustrates the conditions in Proposition 1.3.
Example 1.4. Consider the same “product-choice” game as in Examples 1.1 and 1.2.
Suppose αˆ1 = H, then BR2(αˆ1) = {c} and uαˆ1 = 2. Player 1’s actions are monitored via
a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}. Then d = di represents the following monitoring structure:
ρdi, H(y) =

ρdi1 y = y¯
1− ρdi1 y = y
ρdi, L(y) =

ρdi2 y = y¯
1− ρdi2 y = y
ΓH = {ρd1, H , ..., ρdN , H} and ΓL = {ρd1, L, ..., ρdN , L}. I further assume that monitoring
structure and the type of Player 1 are independently distributed. Then according to Propo-
sition 1.3, if ΓH ⊆ ΓL, there exists a 0 < µˆ < 1, such that for any pi0(ξ0) ≥ µˆ and any δ,
there exists a BNE such that normal type Player 1 always plays L and Player 2 always plays
s. Figure 3 shows three specific examples; the first example is also discussed by Deb and
Ishii (2018).
When the bad equilibrium of the complete information stage game is a mixed strategy
equilibrium, reputation building may fail under different conditions. Let θˆi = (ξ(αˆ1), di) and
θ0i = (ξ0, di).
Proposition 1.4. Suppose there exist α˜1 ∈ △(A1) and α˜2 ∈ △(A2) such that (α˜1, α˜2) is a
Nash equilibrium of the complete information stage game and there exists a permutation of
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Figure 3: Failure of reputation building examples part 1
(a) (ρd11 , ρd12 ) = ( 34 , 14 ) and (ρd21 , ρd22 ) = ( 34 , 34 )
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(b) (ρd11 , ρd12 ) = ( 34 , 14 ), (ρd21 , ρd22 ) = ( 34 , 12 ) and
(ρd31 , ρ
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(c) (ρd11 , ρd12 ) = ( 12 , 14 ), (ρd21 , ρd22 ) = ( 34 , 12 ) and
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{1, ..., N}, denoted by µ, such that, for any i:
1. there exist α˜1,i ∈ △(A1) and ei ∈ (0, 1), such that ρdµ(i), α˜1,i = ρdi, αˆ1, α˜1 = eiαˆ1 + (1−
ei)α˜1,i and α˜1,i ∈ BR1(α˜2),
2. pi0(θˆi)
pi0(θ0
µ(i)
)
= ei
1−ei .
Then, for any δ, there exists a BNE such that normal type Player 1 always plays α˜1,i under
monitoring structure dµ(i) and Player 2 always plays α˜2.
The idea is similar to Proposition 1.3. The difference is that normal type Player 1 can
play different actions under different monitoring structures. In some cases this flexibility
can relax dramatically the requirements on monitoring structures, as shown in the following
example.
Example 1.5. Consider the same “battle of the sexes” game as in Example 1.3. Suppose
αˆ1 = H and that Player 1’s actions are monitored via a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}. Then
d = di represents the following monitoring structure:
ρdi, H(y) =

ρdi1 y = y¯
1− ρdi1 y = y
ρdi, L(y) =

ρdi2 y = y¯
1− ρdi2 y = y
Suppose D = {d1, d2} and (ρd11 , ρd12 ) = (34 , 14). The commitment payoff is 3. Let (ρd21 , ρd22 ) =
(γ1, γ2). Proposition 1.3 can be applied only if ΓH ⊆ ΓL ⇐⇒ γ2 = 34 , and γ1 ∈
{
1
4
, 3
4
}
. With
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Proposition 1.4, this set can be dramatically extended. As shown in the Appendix, if γ1, γ2
satisfy
3
4
≤ γ2 < 1
1
4
≤ γ1 < 5
8
and Player 2’s prior belief pi0(·) satisfies
pi0((ξ(H), d2))
pi0((ξ0, d1))
= 5− 8γ1
pi0((ξ(H), d1))
pi0((ξ0, d2))
=
3− γ2 − 3γ1
γ2 − γ1
for all δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a BNE such that normal type Player 1 plays ((2γ1 − 12)H, (32 − 2γ1)L)
when the monitoring structure is d1 and plays ( γ2−
3
4
γ2−γ1H,
3
4
−γ1
γ2−γ1L) when the monitoring struc-
ture is d2, while Player 2 always plays (14c, 34s). It is easy to check that normal type Player
1’s payoff in equilibrium is smaller than the commitment payoff. Figure 4 shows the region
of monitoring structures discussed in this example.
With Proposition 1.2, I can show that the conditions here are (almost) sufficient and
necessary. To be more specific, I can show that:
If γ1 ̸= γ2 and either
γ2 ∈
(
0,
3
4
)
or
γ1 ∈
(
0,
1
4
)
∪
(
5
8
, 1
)
,
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Figure 4: Failure of reputation building examples part 2
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then for any monitoring structure di and any ε > 0, there exists δ∗ such that for any δ > δ∗,
normal type Player 1’s payoff under monitoring structure di is greater than or equal to uαˆ1−ε
in any BNE.
1.4 Many Commitment Types
In this section, I consider the case in which there is more than one commitment type. Let
Υ =
{
ξ(αˆ1,1), ξ(αˆ1,2), ..., ξ(αˆ1,Nˆ)
}
be the set of commitment types. Then Ξ = {ξ0}∪Υ is the
set of types. Further, let ξ(αˆ1,i) represent a commitment type who always plays αˆ1,i ∈ △(A1).
Next, let θˆi,k = (ξ(αˆ1,i), dk). Other settings and notations are the same as before.
I consider the case in which commitment types satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1.1. For any i ̸= j, Γαˆ1,i ∩ Γαˆ1,j = ￿.
Γα is the set of distribution of signals induced by α, so this assumption means that Player
2 can statistically distinguish different commitment types. To deal with many commitment
types, I start with the following proposition. Let G˜(ε, θ) = {t ∈ N; pit(θ) < ε}.
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Proposition 1.5. For any game satisfying Assumption 1.1, there exist an M and e such
that, for any i ̸= j, any k, l, ε > 0,
Qθˆi,k
({
|N\G˜(ε, θˆj,l)| ≥M
})
≤ eε
in any BNE.
The idea follows the intuition I discussed in relation to Proposition 1.1. When normal
type Player 1’s mimics commitment type ξ(αˆ1,i) under the monitoring structure dk, Player
2 eventually learns that the true distribution is ρdk, αˆ1,i . Since Γαˆ1,i ∩ Γαˆ1,j = ￿, Player 2 can
statistically distinguish different commitment types; hence Player 2 eventually learns that
she is not facing a commitment type αˆ1,j.
This proposition implies that Player 2’s posterior belief eventually will be almost the
same with or without these additional commitment types. Player 2’s behavior, therefore,
will also be the same eventually, as will be Player 1’s payoff.
1.5 Infinite Set of Monitoring Structures
So far, I have only analyzed the case in which the set of monitoring structures is finite. In
this section I consider the case in which the set is a continuum.
Since the game becomes much more complicated, I only focus on the “product-choice”
game discussed in Examples 1.3 and 1.2. The payoffs are shown in the following payoff
matrix:
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Player 2
c s
Player 1
H 2,3 0,2
L 3,0 1,1
Suppose that αˆ1 = H, then BR2(αˆ1) = {c} and uαˆ1 = 2. Player 1’s actions are monitored
via a public signal: y ∈ {y¯, y}. Any d ∈ D represents the following monitoring structure:
ρd,H(y) =

ρd1 y = y¯
1− ρd1 y = y
ρd, L(y) =

ρd2 y = y¯
1− ρd2 y = y
Then there is a bijection from D to (0, 1)2:
f(d) = (ρd1, ρ
d
2).
Abusing notation, in this section I will sometimes use (ρd1, ρd2) to represent d. For expositional
clarity, I further assume that the monitoring structure and Player 1’s type are independently
distributed.
Suppose that the prior density for the monitoring structures (ρ1, ρ2) is given by pi0(ρ1, ρ2).
Assume that the marginal distributions of ρ1 and ρ2 both exist and are denoted by pi01(ρ1)
and pi02(ρ2). The following proposition discusses the conditions under which the classical
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results do not hold.
Proposition 1.6. If supp(pi01) ⊆ supp(pi02) and sup
ρ
pi01(ρ)
pi02(ρ)
< ∞, then, there is a 1 > µˆ > 0,
such that for any pi0(ξ0) ≥ µˆthere exists a Nash equilibrium such that normal type Player 1
always chooses L and Player 2 always chooses s.
The proof duplicates that of Proposition 1.3. The intuition is also similar. In equilibrium,
since supp(pi01) ⊆ supp(pi02), Player 2 cannot statistically distinguish a commitment type from
a normal type. When Player 2’s prior belief about Player 1 being normal is sufficiently strong,
she will always believe that Player 1 is a normal type with high probability no matter the
history. Therefore she always chooses a best response to L, and Player 1 also has no incentive
to deviate.
Figure 5 illustrates some possible sets that satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1.6. The
distributions in Figure 5 are all uniforms.
I now discuss the conditions under which the classical results can be extended. The
techniques I used before cannot be applied here. For example, in Proposition 1.1, if the set
of monitoring structure is infinite, then M approaches infinity. Since
lim
M→∞
[
(1− ε)δMvw,dαˆ1 (ε) + (1− (1− ε)δM) min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2)
]
= min
(α1,α2)
u1(α1, α2),
it is no longer a good lower bound. To overcome this challenge, I use techniques similar to
those of Gossner (2011).
Given D, define the d-weak-ε-entropy-confirming best response as follows.
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Figure 5: Infinite set of monitoring structure example 1
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Definition 1.2. α2 ∈ ∆(A2) is a d-weak-ε-entropy-confirming best response to α1 ∈ ∆(A1)
if there exist {α′1(d′)}d′′∈D ⊆ ∆(A1) and {pi′(d′)}d′∈D ⊆ R+ such that
1. pi′(d′) > 0 if and only if d′ ∈ D;
2. ∫∫
D
pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 = 1;
3. α2 is a best response to
∫∫
D
α′1(d
′)pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 ;
4. d
(
ρd, α1||
∫∫
D
ρd′′, α′1(d′′)pi
′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
)
< ε .
The set of d-weak-ε-entropy confirming best responses to α1 is denoted by Bˆw,dε (α1). Let
vˆw,dα1 (ε) = min
α2∈Bˆw,dε (α1)
u1(α1, α2)
wˆw,dα1 be the largest convex function below vˆw,dα1 . Further, let Dρd1,ε1 = {(ρ1, ρ2)|ρd1− ε1 < ρ1 <
ρd1 + ε1}. I start with the following proposition.
Proposition 1.7. Suppose 0 < µ < 1. If d satisfies
1. d ∈ D,
2. for any ε1 > 0, ε2 =
∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
pi0(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 > 0,
then, for any ε1 > 0, normal type of Player 1’s payoff in any BNE under the monitoring
structure d is greater than or equal to
wˆw,dH
(
−(1− δ)log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
)
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Figure 6: Infinite set of monitoring structure example 2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
According to the definition of Bˆw,dε (α1), as proven in this proposition, I can still show that
when normal type Player 1 mimics the commitment type, Player 2 eventually learns that
the real distribution is ρd,H but nothing further. In some cases, this is enough to guarantee
that there is a good lower bound for normal type Player 1’s payoff, as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.8. Suppose 0 < µ < 1. If d satisfies that
1. d ∈ D,
2. for any ε1 > 0, ε2 =
∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
pi0(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 > 0,
3. ρd1 > 12 sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2 ,
then, for any ε > 0, there exists a δ∗ > 0 such that for any δ > δ∗ normal type Player 1’s
payoff under the monitoring structure d is greater than or equal to uH − ε in any BNE.
Let d = (3
4
, 1
4
). Figure 6 illustrates one possible D that satisfies the conditions in Propo-
sition 1.8.
This is a subset of the set discussed in Example 1.2 which still covers a lot of cases.
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1.6 Conclusion
I examine how the information structure affects reputation effects in long-run relationships.
Formally, I study a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run
opponents. There is incomplete information about the type of long-run player playing the
game. He can either be of a simple commitment type who plays a fixed (possibly mixed)
action at every period or of a normal type who acts strategically. The reputation effect that
I focus on is the lower bound of the equilibrium payoffs to the normal type long-run player.
The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring
structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to
reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution
of signals and the long-run player’s strategy. Thus, the long-run player may not have the
ability to establish a reputation for commitment.
I first provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s
payoffs can be extended to the current framework. I introduce the set of “well-behaved”
monitoring structures. I show that, if the short-run players’ prior belief about the monitoring
structures belonging to this set is sufficiently large, then reputation effects are robust. I give
an example to show that these conditions cover most cases. I also show that when the
commitment payoff is the highest payoff Player 1 can get, the conditions can be relaxed.
I also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of “bad” equilibria in which the payoff
of the long-run player is strictly lower than the commitment payoff. I show that, when the
short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the
standard reputation results break down.
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Last, I investigate two variations of this model. First, I relax the assumptions to allow
more than one commitment type and show that this does not affect the main results. Second,
I investigate a case in which the set of monitoring structures is a continuum. I only consider
a very simple setting and show that Negative results can be extended easily, in contrast,
positive results are much harder to extend.
There are two interesting directions for future research. First, I only consider a specific
game when I investigate the case in which the set of monitoring structures is a continuum. It
would be interesting to analyze whether the results can be extended to other games. Second,
it would also be interesting to combine this paper with Pei (2018) to investigate a model in
which there is uncertainty about both the monitoring structure and Player 2’s payoffs.
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Chapter 2: Opinion Manipulation and Disagreement in
Social Networks
2.1 Introduction
In many cases, individuals form opinions through a process of social learning, in which
they update their opinions based on both their own experiences and the information they
receive from others, including friends, family, and coworkers, as well as media sources. One
interesting and puzzling fact about this process is that individuals remain divided in their
opinions even when they consistently communicate with each other. Disagreements are
ubiquitous on economic and political phenomena such as whether a politician is competent,
whether gun control is a solution to gun violence and other crimes, climate change and
its causes, and so on. A survey conducted by Gallup in 2015 found that 40 percent of
conservative Republicans thought that global warming would never happen, compared with
only 3 percent of liberal Democrats (Dugan 2015). Given this, it is essential to understand
why disagreement among individuals in a society can persist and how disagreement is affected
by the structure of social networks.
I base my study on the model of DeGroot (1974). In this classical framework, there
are N agents in the society. Agent i has an initial opinion x0i ∈ R. A weighted directed
network describes the social structure of the society in which the weight represents the
degree to which an agent trusts another agent. At each date, the agents receive information
from their friends/neighbors in the social network and update their opinions. An agent’s
new opinion is simply the weighted average of the information he/she receives. In DeGroot
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(1974), the agents report their opinions truthfully. If the network is strongly connected and
aperiodic, agents will eventually reach consensus. However, as some researchers (Acemoglu
et al. 2013, Bindel et al. 2015) have argued, this emphasis on consensus can only describe
a particular type of opinion dynamics and is unable to explain the persistent disagreement
among individuals in a society.
I study a model of opinion dynamics in which, generically, there is no consensus. I
analyze how the extent of disagreement is affected by the network structure and derive a
new measure of social influence. The crucial difference between this model and that of
DeGroot (1974) is that some agents can lie. More specifically, there are two types of agents
in society: sophisticated and naive. Sophisticated agents have different personal biases and
are willing to persuade others to believe in their biases. These biases are exogenous. They
can lie to naive agents, but there is a cost to lying, scaled by the parameter α > 0, which
represent the intensity of lying cost. To ensure tractability, I assume that the sophisticated
agents are myopic and the utility is quadratic. Naive agents behave the same as the agents
in DeGroot (1974), and they can not infer the accuracy of the signals.
To illustrate this approach, consider, for example, the 2016 presidential election. We can
think of naive agents as the public and sophisticated agents as media sources. During the
campaign, people regularly updated their opinions about which candidate is better. They
received information from the media, and they also communicated with their family and
friends. The media may have been biased and may have sought to advance candidates they
favored by strategically disseminating information. In fact, recent evidence shows that some
news providers created fake news to advance the candidates they preferred (Allcott and
Gentzkow 2017). When news providers don’t report their opinions truthfully, there is a cost
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to lying, whether a psychological cost or a real one.
Since the sophisticated agents are myopic, the equilibrium can be calculated for each
period separately. First, I show that, in each period, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
in which the signals sent by sophisticated agents can be represented by linear combinations
of the opinions of all agents in the previous period and the biases of the sophisticated agents.
When the intensity of lying cost (α) is large, the results are more clear and intuitive. The
signals are perturbation of the real opinions of the sophisticated agents. The perturbation
has the order 1
α
. It is negatively associated with the opinions of other agents in the previous
period and positively correlated with the agents’ biases.
Second, I investigate the opinion dynamics. I show that, when the network is strongly
connected and aperiodic, and the intensity of lying cost is larger than a constant, the opinions
converge but, generically, do not converge to a consensus. The asymptotic opinions are
proved to be determined by the sophisticated agents’ bias and the structure of the network
and are not affected by the initial opinions. Then I provide a more detailed analysis of the
asymptotic opinions. I find that the asymptotic opinion vector equals to a vector of same
value cˆ plus the vector representing disagreement. Disagreement also has the order of 1
α
. It
is positively correlated with the inverse of the spectral gap (the difference between the two
largest eigenvalues) of the network. There is a vast literature of probability theory devoted
to studying the relation between the spectral gap and other properties of the social network.
Details can be found in Jackson (2008), Levin et al. (2009), Golub and Sadler (2016). The
primary takeaway is that the spectral gap is small if the society is segregated. Therefore,
the result indicates that, when the society is more segregated, disagreement is greater.
Third, I study the social influence. As the intensity of lying cost approaches infinity,
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disagreement vanishes and the asymptotic opinions are all close to cˆ, which is a weighted
average of the bias of the sophisticated agents. This weight can be interpreted as a measure
of social influence. It can be decomposed into two separate factors: direct influence and
indirect influence. The direct influence is simply a summation of the weights that naive
agents place on the sophisticated agent. The indirect influence is a summation of these
weights multiplied by the eigenvector centrality of respective naive agents.
I next examine the opinion dynamics in a slightly different environment, in which the
sophisticated agents assign varying degrees of importance to different naive agents. The
results are almost the same as before. The only significant difference is that the direct
influence now is the summation of the weights that naive agents place on the sophisticated
agent multiplied by the respective degree of importance.
Finally, I investigate the case in which the sophisticated agents are forward-looking. The
model then becomes so complicated that I can only solve a particular case in which there
are only two stubborn sophisticated agents, who never change their opinions, and one naive
agent who places weight only on these two sophisticated agents. I show that, in comparison
with the case of myopic agents, the agent who has more influence gains even more influence,
and the utility of both sophisticated agents is larger due to a reduction in lying cost. I also
examine comparative statics on the discount factor. I prove that these two effects become
more significant when the discount factor is greater.
My analysis shows that one reason why disagreement persists is that individuals with
diverging interests misrepresent opinions for their own benefit. Moreover, I demonstrate
that, when the cost of lying is low, and the spectral gap is small, the opinion variance is
high. This may provide one explanation for the polarization of public opinions: the growth of
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social media. Since the last decade, social media use has risen sharply. A recent survey shows
that 62 percent of U.S. adults get their news on social media (Gottfried and Shearer 2016).
There two reasons to think that this change in media technology increases the divergence
in public opinions. First, social media providers face a much lower cost of a bad reputation
than mass media, which means a lower intensity of lying cost. Second, the exposure to
ideologically diverse news and opinions on social media is limited by both individual choices
and algorithmic recommendation systems (Baskshy, Messing and Adamic 2015). This leads
to a small spectral gap of the social networks.
My paper is related to an extensive body of literature on non-Bayesian learning. 1 In
this literature, the classical result is that, if the network is strongly connected and aperiodic,
agents will eventually reach consensus (DeGroot 1974, DeMarzo et al. 2003, Golub and Jack-
son 2010). Besides this paper, several other models have been proposed to explain persistent
disagreements. One approach is provided by models incorporating some homophily, which
means that opinions that are too far from one’s own are given little or no weight. Opinions
in this kind of model eventually converge to a limit opinion profile, in which agents are par-
titioned into several groups and agents have the same limit opinion if and only if they are in
the same group. A survey of this approach is provided by Lorenz (2007). Another method is
provided by models in which some agents are stubborn, which means that they always put
some weight on their initial opinion. This updating rule was first proposed by Fiedlin and
Johnsen (1990). Bindel et al. (2015) used this framework to quantify the inherent social cost
of this lack of consensus. Acemoglu et al. (2013) also investigated a model with stubborn
1There is also a significant body of literature on Bayesian learning, see Golub and Sadler (2016) for a
survey.
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agents. They used an inhomogeneous stochastic gossip model and showed that the presence
of stubborn agents leads to persistent opinion fluctuations and disagreement.
The model most similar in structure to this paper is by Buechel et al. (2015). They
also studied a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks in which agents can
lie (misrepresent their opinion). We both use a quadratic utility function. The difference is
that, in their paper, an agent’s motive for distorting a true opinion is conformity or counter-
conformity, which means that the agent states an opinion either closely aligned with or far
from the group opinion. The characteristics of their model are also entirely different. In their
paper, when the opinion dynamics converge, agents reach consensus. They focus on how the
long-run group opinion is affected by conformity and whether information aggregation is
undermined by misrepresentation of opinions.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Description of the Environment
A finite set of agents, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, interact in a social network. The social
network structure is captured through a non-negative matrix V , where vij ≥ 0 represents
the trust that agent i places in agent j. The matrix V is row stochastic, so that∑Nj=1 vij = 1
for any i. I study a discrete-time dynamic model. Each agent i starts with an initial opinion
x0i ∈ R and then exchanges information with their neighbors at t = 1, 2, 3, ... At time t, the
opinions of all agents are collected in X t = (xt1, xt2, ..., xtN)′ ∈ RN . In the classical DeGroot
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(1974) framework, agents report their opinions truthfully and the updating rule is:
X t+1 = V X t
DeMarzo et al. (2003) provide one microfoundation for this updating rule: agents are bound-
edly rational in the sense that they treat all information they receive as new and fail to adjust
for possible repetition.
In this model, I assume that some agents can state an opinion different from their true
opinion. There are two kinds of agents: naive and sophisticated. Without loss of generality,
the first d agents are sophisticated. I denote the set of sophisticated agents by S(d) =
{1, 2, ..., d} and the set of naive agents by A(d) = {d + 1, ..., N}. Naive agents report their
opinions truthfully; in contrast, sophisticated agent i can express an opinion sti that can
be different from his/her true opinion xti. Naive agents only observe stated opinions. On
the other hand, I assume that sophisticated agents know the true opinions of others. This
assumption is not important for the results but simplifies the analysis.
Therefore, the opinions of sophisticated agents are updated according to:
xti =
N∑
j=1
vijx
t−1
j
and the opinions of naive agents are updated according to:
xti =
∑
j∈S(d)
vijs
t
j +
∑
j∈A(d)
vijx
t−1
j
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Let X t−11 =

xt−11
xt−12
...
xt−1d

and X t−12 =

xt−1d+1
xt−1d+2
...
xt−1N

. Let me partition matrix V into 4 blocks as
follows:
V =
d
N−d

d
V1
N−d
V2
V3 V4
 (1)
in which, V1 and V2 represent how sophisticated agents trust sophisticated agents and naive
agents; V3 and V4 represent how naive agents are influenced by sophisticated agents and
naive agents. The updating rules can be written in matrix form:
X t1 = V1X
t−1
1 + V2X
t−1
2 (2)
X t2 = V3S
t + V4X
t−1
2 (3)
Sophisticated agent i has an exogenous ideal point bi ∈ R and tries to convince naive
agents to believe in bi. For simplicity, I use quadratic preference and assume that sophisti-
cated agents are myopic. A sophisticated agent i’s utility function at time t is:
ui(X
t−1, sti, bi) = −
∑
j∈A(d)
(xtj − bi)2 − α(sti − xt−1i )2
−α(sti − xt−1i )2 represents the cost of lying, where α > 0 displays the intensity of lying cost.
The costs may arise from probabilistic ex post facto verification that results in penalties if
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misreporting is detected. They can also be purely physiological. Numerous experimental
studies have provided evidence that people have an intrinsic aversion to lying even if lying
cannot be detected at all (e.g, Abeler et al. 2014).
2.2.2 Equilibrium
Since sophisticated agents are all myopic, I can analyze the equilibrium for each period
separately. In each period, sophisticated agents play a static game, in which they simultane-
ously choose sti to maximize their utility. Given other sophisticated agents’ strategies, agent
i ∈ S(d) solves:
max
sti
ui(x
t−1, sti, bi) = −
∑
j∈A(d)
(xtj − bi)2 − α(sti − xt−1i )2
in which xtj =
∑
k∈S(d) vjks
t
k +
∑
k∈A(d) vjkx
t−1
k . The FOC is:
−2∑j∈A(d) vji(xtj − bi)− 2α(sti − xt−1i ) = 0
⇐⇒ ∑j∈A(d) vji(∑k∈S(d) vjkstk) + αsti = αxt−1i −∑j∈A(d) vji(∑j∈A(d) vjkxt−1k ) +∑j∈A(d) vjibi
Then the equilibrium strategies of all sophisticated agents are the solutions to the following
simultaneous equations:
∑
j∈A(d) vj1(
∑
k∈S(d) vjks
t
k) + αs
t
1 = αx
t−1
1 −
∑
j∈A(d) vj1(
∑
k∈A(d) vjkx
t−1
k ) +
∑
j∈A(d) vj1b1∑
j∈A(d) vj2(
∑
k∈S(d) vjks
t
k) + αs
t
2 = αx
t−1
2 −
∑
j∈A(d) vj2(
∑
k∈A(d) vjkx
t−1
k ) +
∑
j∈A(d) vj2b2
...∑
j∈A(d) vjd(
∑
k∈S(d) vjks
t
k) + αs
t
d = αx
t−1
d −
∑
j∈A(d) vjd(
∑
k∈A(d) vjkx
t−1
k ) +
∑
j∈A(d) vjdbd
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Let
B =

∑
j∈A(d) vj1b1∑
j∈A(d) vj2b2
...∑
j∈A(d) vjdbd

and St =

st1
st2
...
std

. Then, this system of equations can be written
as:
(αId + V
T
3 V3)S
t = αX t−11 − V T3 V4X t−12 +B
Proposition 2.9. For any α > 0, and any social network, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in each period. The signals sent by sophisticated agents, in equilibrium, satisfy
that
St = α(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1X t−11 − (αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 V4X t−12 + (αId + V T3 V3)−1B (4)
The proof of Proposition 2.9 as well as all proofs of the following results are in the
Appendix. The proof works by showing that αId+V T3 V3 is positive definite, thus, invertible.
Proposition 2.9 shows that in each period there exists a unique Nash equilibrium such that
the sophisticated agents report their opinions as a linear combination of the true opinions,
the opinions of the naive agents and their biases. When α is large, I can rewrite St as follows:
St =α(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1X t−11 − (αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 V4X t−12 + (αId + V T3 V3)−1B
=(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1X t−11 −
1
α
(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3 V4X
t−1
2 +
1
α
(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B
=X t−11 +
1
α
(−V T3 V3X t−11 − V T3 V4X t−12 +B) +O(
1
α2
)
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Figure 7: Network example 1
1 3 4 2
The opinions expressed by sophisticated agents are perturbation of their real opinions. The
perturbation has the order 1
α
. When the intensity of lying cost (α) is large, the difference
between stated opinions and true opinions is small. This deviation is positively associated
with the agent’s bias and negatively correlated with the opinions of other agents in the
previous period. The intuition is straightforward. First, when sophisticated agent i has a
higher ideal point (bi), he/she express a higher opinion to make sure that the naive agents
also have higher opinions. Second, V4X t−12 represents how naive agents are affected by
other naive agents and V3X t−11 represents approximately how naive agents are affected by
sophisticated agents. When these two parts are high, agent i either has no need to express
a high opinion or may even have to express a low opinion to dilute the influence of other
agents. The following example also illustrates this expression.
Example 2.6. Consider a network consisting of four agents. Agents 1 and 2 are both
sophisticated agents while the others are naive. The network is shown in Figure 1. Then
V T3 = V3 =
 v31 0
0 v42

and
(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1 =
 1α+v231 0
0 1
α+v242

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so
st1
st2
 =
 αα+v231 0
0 α
α+v242

xt−11
xt−12
−
 1α+v231 0
0 1
α+v242

 v31 0
0 v42

 v33 v34
v43 v44

xt−13
xt−14

+
 1α+v231 0
0 1
α+v242

v31b1
v42b2

=
 αα+v231xt−11
α
α+v242
xt−12
+
 v31α+v231
(
b1 − v33xt−13 − v34xt−14
)
v42
α+v242
(
b2 − v43xt−13 − v44xt−14
)

sti is decreasing in xt−13 and xt−14 and increasing in xt−1i and bi.
2.3 Opinion Dynamics
2.3.1 Convergence
opinions in a given period as a function of true opinions and the ideal points of sophisticated
agents. By combining Proposition 2.9 and updating rules 2, 3, I can derive the dynamics of
true opinions. Let
U =
 V1 V2
αV3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1 (IN−d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )V4

Bˆ =
 0d
V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1B

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and X t =
X t1
X t2
, then the transformation from X t−1 to X t is represented by the following
matrix equation:
X t = UX t−1 + Bˆ
Then,
X t =UX t−1 + Bˆ
=U2X t−2 + UBˆ + Bˆ
...
=U tX0 +
t−1∑
i=0
U iBˆ
in which U tX0 displays the influences of initial opinions and∑t−1i=0 U iBˆ represents the effect
of biases.
Now I can discuss the condition for convergence of opinions. In order to describe the
results, I need to introduce some standard graph-theoretic definitions. In this paper, I use
the same definitions employed by Golub and Jackson (2010).
Definition 2.3. A walk in V is a sequence of nodes i1, i2, ..., iK , not necessarily distinct,
such that Vikik+1 > 0 for each k ∈ 1, . . . , K − 1. The length of the walk is defined as K − 1.
Definition 2.4. A path in V is a walk consisting of distinct nodes.
Definition 2.5. The matrix V is strongly connected if there is path in V from any node to
any other node.
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Definition 2.6. A cycle is a walk i1, i2, ..., iK such that i1 = iK . The length of a cycle with
K (not necessarily distinct) entries is defined as K − 1. A cycle is simple if the only node
appearing twice in the sequence is the starting (and ending) node.
Definition 2.7. The matrix V is aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of the lengths of
its simple cycles is 1.
Let me begin with the simple case where all sophisticated agents have the same ideal
point:
b1 = b2 = . . . = bd = b
Lemma 2.1 shows that, without loss of generality, I can assume that b = 0.
Lemma 2.1. When all sophisticated agents have the same ideal point b, let Zt =

xt1 − b
xt2 − b
...
xtN − b

,
then Zt = UZt−1.
Then
X t =UX t−1
...
=U tX0
In DeGroot’s model, if V is aperiodic and strongly connected, then for anyX0,
(
lim
t→∞
V tX0
)
i
=
lX0, where l is the unique left eigenvector of V corresponding to eigenvalue 1, whose entries
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sum to 1. Proposition 2.10 shows that the opinion dynamics here are quite different from
those in the DeGroot model, even though the expressions look the same and lim
α→∞
U = V .
Proposition 2.10. If V is strongly connected and aperiodic, then there exists an αˆ > 0 such
that for any α > αˆ and any vector X0 ∈ RN , lim
t→∞
U tX0 = 0
In the proof of this Proposition, I show first that there exists an αˆ > 0 and M ∈ N+
such that, for any α > αˆ, UM is a positive matrix. Then I demonstrate that fUM f∞ < 1
by calculating UM1N . Therefore, lim
k→∞
f
UM∗k
f
∞ = 0 and limt→∞U
tX0 = 0. The condition
presented here is fairly weak. In addition to the standard requirements regarding network
structure, I only need α to be large. Since the sophisticated agents are myopic, if α is small,
they may send some extreme signals, which leads to divergence of opinions.
Proposition 2.10 shows that, if all sophisticated agents have the same ideal point, sophis-
ticated agents can perfectly manipulate the asymptotic opinions. The sophisticated agents
do not need to be at special locations in the network or have substantial direct influence.
A special case occurs when there is only one sophisticated agent. Agents eventually believe
what that agent wants them to believe. .
I now turn to the general setting in which sophisticated agents have different ideal points.
Then X t = U tX0 +∑t−1i=0 U iBˆ. Now Proposition 2.10 can be interpreted in a different
way: the influences of initial opinions vanish in the long run. If lim
t→∞
∑t−1
i=0 U
iBˆ exists, then
lim
t→∞
X t = lim
t→∞
∑t−1
i=0 U
iBˆ; the asymptotic opinion vector is completely characterized by the
second term. Therefore, whether the opinions converge is determined by this Neumann series∑t−1
i=0 U
i. It turns out that the condition for convergence is the same as Proposition 2.10.
Proposition 2.11. If V is strongly connected and aperiodic, then there exists an αˆ > 0 such
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that for any α > αˆ and any vector X0 ∈ RN , lim
t→∞
X t = (I − U)−1Bˆ.
The proof of Proposition 2.11 follows from Proposition 2.10. Since there exists an αˆ > 0
and M ∈ N+ such that for any α > αˆ fUM f∞ < 1 , the Neumann series∑t−1i=0 U i converges
to (I − U)−1. Therefore, X t converges to (I − U)−1Bˆ.
2.3.2 Disagreement
In this subsection, I study the properties of the long-term opinions. Proposition 2.11 shows
that the long-term opinion vector is (I−U)−1Bˆ. It is determined by α (the intensity of lying
cost), the structure of the network, and the biases of sophisticated agents. Since there are
two inverses in (I −U)−1, it is not easy to analyze what this indicates. The following result
shows that, generically, there is no consensus.
Proposition 2.12. If the opinions converge, rank(V3) = d and sophisticated agents don’t
have the same ideal point, then there is no consensus.
The intuition behind Proposition 2.12 is as follows. If there is a consensus c, then
X t2 = V3S
t + V4X
t−1
2 =⇒
∑
j∈S(d)
vijc = (1−
∑
j∈A(d)
vij)c =
∑
j∈S(d)
vijsj for any i ∈ A(d)
Since rank(V3) = d, the stated opinions must be the same as the consensus c. However,
sophisticated agents have different ideal points, so they should not express the same opinion.
Proposition 2.12 shows that, since sophisticated agents with diverging interests misrepre-
sent opinions to influence the opinions of naive agents, disagreement persists in the society.
The condition rank(V3) = d in this Proposition represents that the weights that naive agents
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assign to sophisticated agents are linearly independent. It also indicates that all sophisti-
cated agents can gain the attention of some naive agents. The other result that can be
derived from this formula (I − U)−1Bˆ is that, when the difference between ideal points of
sophisticated agents is small, the long-run opinion variance is also small.
Proposition 2.13.
max
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
−min
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
≤ c1 (V, α) (bmax − bmin)
The proof of Proposition 2.13 is directly derived from Lemma 2.1. This Proposition
shows that, given the network structure and the intensity of lying cost, the range of long-run
opinions is bounded by the range of ideal points of sophisticated agents multiplied by a
constant. When the network is very simple, I can derive a simple expression for c1 (V, α), as
shown in the following example.
Example 2.7. Consider the same network as in Example 2.6. Then
I − U =

1− v11 0 −v13 0
0 1− v22 0 −v24
− αv31
α+v231
0 1− αv33
α+v231
− αv34
α+v231
0 − αv42
α+v242
− αv43
α+v242
1− αv44
α+v242

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and
Bˆ =

0
0
v231b1
α+v231
v242b2
α+v242


1− v11 0 −v13 0
0 1− v22 0 −v24
− αv31
α+v231
0 1− αv33
α+v231
− αv34
α+v231
0 − αv42
α+v242
− αv43
α+v242
1− αv44
α+v242


x∞1
x∞2
x∞3
x∞4

=

0
0
v231b1
α+v231
v242b2
α+v242

so
x∞1 = x
∞
3 and x
∞
2 = x
∞
4
then v231 + αv34 −αv34
−αv43 v242 + αv43

x∞1
x∞2
 =
v231b1
v242b2

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and
x∞1
x∞2
 = 1v231 + v242 + α(v34v242 + v43v231)
v242 + αv43 αv34
αv43 v
2
31 + αv34

v231b1
v242b2

=
v242v
2
31
v231 + v
2
42 + α(v34v
2
42 + v43v
2
31)
b1
b2

+
α (v43v
2
31b1 + v34v
2
42b2)
v231 + v
2
42 + α(v34v
2
42 + v43v
2
31)
1
1

so
c1 (V, α) =
v242v
2
31
v231 + v
2
42 + α(v34v
2
42 + v43v
2
31)
c1 is decreasing in α, v34 and v43.
When the network is more complicated, the expression of c1 (V, α) becomes messy and
difficult to interpret. However, when α is large, I can rewrite (I − U)−1Bˆ to obtain some
insights. There is a need for a further assumption: V is diagonalizable. This assumption
is fairly weak. One sufficient condition is that V has n distinct eigenvalues. Since a ran-
domly chosen stochastic matrix almost certainly has n distinct eigenvalues, V is generically
diagonalizable. Suppose V = GΛG−1 , where
Λ =

λ1 0 · · · 0
0 λ2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · λN

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G−1 =

l1
l2
...
lN

and
G =
(
r1 r2 · · · rN
)
{λi} are the eigenvalues listed in descending order by modulus, li and ri are the respective
left and right eigenvectors. Since V is a row stochastic matrix, λ1 = 1,l1 = l, r1 = 1N . Now
it is possible to rewrite the long-run opinion vector (I − U)−1Bˆ.
Proposition 2.14. If V is strongly connected, aperiodic and diagonalizable, then there exists
an αˆ > 0 such that, for any α > αˆ , there exists a constant cˇ such that
Xˆ = cˇ1N +
1
α
(
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
)
ˆˆ
B +O(
1
α2
)
in which
ˆˆ
B =

I − 1
l
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 1N
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 1N l

 0d
V3B

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For the proof, I consider the inverse of G−1(I − U)G. Since
G−1(I − U)G
=
 0 0
0 IN−1 − Λ22
+ 1αG−1
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V G
=
 0 0
0 IN−1 − Λ22
+ 1αG−1
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
GΛ
=
 0 0
0 IN−1 − Λ22
+ 1αG−1
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
GΛ
− 1
α2
G−1
0 0
0 V3V
T
3 V3V
T
3
GΛ+O( 1α3 )
It is then possible to calculate the inverse of G−1(I − U)G by applying the block matrix
inverse formula. The rest is just algebra.
This Proposition shows that, given any strongly connected, aperiodic and diagonalizable
network, when α is large, the long-run opinion vector can be rewritten as a vector with
the same value plus a vector representing disagreement among agents. The disagreement
vector is O( 1
α
), so disagreement vanishes as α approaches infinity, as shown in the following
example.
Example 2.8. Consider a network consisting of six agents. Agents 1 and 2 are both sophis-
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ticated agents, while the others are naive, and
V =

0.2 0 0.4 0.4 0 0
0 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.4
0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0 0
0.4 0 0.2 0 0 0.4
0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.4
0 0.4 0 0.4 0.2 0

The network is shown in Figure 8. The ideal point of agent 1 is 1, the ideal point of agent
2 is −1. The relation between the range of (I − U)−1Bˆ and α is presented in Figure 9. The
range of long-term opinions decreases from 1.241 to 0.002 as α increases from 1 to 1000.
Proposition 2.14 also shows that the variance of long-term opinions is affected by 1− λi,
which represents the difference between the largest eigenvalue and the ith largest eigenvalues.
The variance of long-term opinions is likely to be large when at least one of them is small.
This does not mean that disagreement approaches infinity as the difference goes to 0 because
this approximation works only when α is the dominant factor. If λi (i ̸= 1) is close to 1,
then it must be true that the spectral gap (the difference between the module of the two
Figure 8: Network example 2
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Figure 9: Range of Long-run Opinions vs Intensity of Lying Cost
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Figure 10: Network example 3
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largest eigenvalues) is also small. In fact, when λ2 ∈ R+, the spectral gap is 1− λ2.
There is a large literature in both applied mathematics and economics devoted to studying
the spectral gap (Jackson 2008, Levin et al. 2009, Golub and Sadler 2016). In the framework
of DeGroot, researchers have proven that this gap determines the speed of convergence.
The relation between the spectral gap and the geometric structure of the graph is also
investigated. The basic idea is that the spectral gap is small when the society is segregated,
for instance, there exist some bottlenecks in the graph. The following example illustrates
this insight.
Example 2.9. Consider a network similar to the network in Example 3. The only difference
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is how much Agent 4 trusts agent 6, and vice versa. The matrix is
V =

0.2 0 0.4 0.4 0 0
0 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.4
0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0 0
0.4 0 0.2 e 0 0.4− e
0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.4
0 0.4 0 0.4− e 0.2 e

It is shown in Figure 10. If e = 0, then it is the same as the network in Example 3.
Suppose that α = 10.The relation among the range and variance of long-term opinions,
λ2 and e is presented in Figure 11. As e increases from 0 to 0.4, the bottleneck gets tighter
and tighter, so λ2 increases from 0.8 to 1, which means that the society is more and more
segregated. As a result, both the range and the variance of long-term opinions increase.
2.3.3 Social Influence
I am now left to address the influence of each agent on the long-term opinions of other
agents given his/her network position. As discussed above, the long-term opinion vector is
(I − U)−1Bˆ and disagreement generically persists. Therefore, it is much harder to analyze
the influence, in comparison to the DeGroot model. To simplify the discussion, let us restrict
our attention to the case where α is large. Let l =
(
l(1) l(2) · · · l(N)
)
and
lˆ(i) =
(∑
j∈A(d) vji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
∑
k∈S(d)
(∑
j∈A(d) vjk
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjkl(j)
)
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Figure 11: Long-term Opinions
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for every i ∈ S(d). The following result shows how opinion leadership is determined by the
structure of the social network when α is large.
Proposition 2.15. For any i,
(
lim
α→∞
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
= cˆ, in which cˆ =∑i∈S(d) bilˆ(i).
When V is diagonalizable, the proof of Proposition 2.15 is directly derived from the proof
of Proposition 2.14. If V is not diagonalizable, it is much harder to prove this result. In the
proof, I first show that
lim
α→∞
[
max
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
−min
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
]
= 0
Then I multiply both sides of the equation (I − U)X = Bˆ by l to calculate cˆ.
This Proposition shows that, when α is large, long-term opinions are all close to one
point, which is a weighted average of the ideal points of sophisticated agents. Let lˆ =(
lˆ(1) lˆ(2) · · · lˆ(d)
)
; then lˆ is the new centrality vector. lˆ(i) is determined by
(∑
j∈A(d) vji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
.
The first part
(∑
j∈A(d) vji
)
is the total trusts that all naive agents assign to i, thus, this can
be viewed as the direct influence. On the other hand, the second part
(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
is
the summation of the product of how much a naive agent trust i and how much influence this
naive agent has on other agents. The second part can be viewed as the indirect influence.
The following example shows that this new centrality measure can be very different from
the eigenvector centrality.
Example 2.10. Consider a network consisting of four agents. Agents 1 and 2 are both
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Figure 12: Network example 4
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sophisticated agents, while the others are naive, and
V =

0.1 0 0.3 0.6
0 0.8 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3
0.5 0.1 0.4 0

The network is shown in Figure 12. The eigenvector centrality vector is
l =
(
0.117 0.529 0.177 0.177
)
and the new centrality vector is
lˆ =
(
0.500 0.500
)
In the DeGroot model, the influence of Agent 2 is much bigger than that of Agent 1. However,
the new centralities of these two agents are the same.
Proposition 2.15 can also be written as:
(
lim
α→∞
lim
t→∞
X t
)
i
= cˆ. Since lim
α→∞
U = V , it is easy
to check that
(
lim
t→∞
lim
α→∞
X t
)
i
= lX0. Generically, cˆ ̸= lX0, which means that, even though
58
disagreement vanishes as α approaches infinity, the long-term opinions are not close to the
consensus in the DeGroot model. Mathematically, this is because different orders of limiting
operations lead to different results. These two different limits actually determine the opinion
dynamics when α is large. The opinions first approach lX0, then move together from lX0
to cˆ, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.11. The network here is the same as the network in Example 3. Suppose
X0 = (0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9) , b1 = −0.5, b2 = 0.5 and α = 10. Then lX0 = 0.424 and cˆ = 0.
Figure 13 compares the dynamics of opinions in the DeGroot Model with those in my
model. As shown in the graph, in the first several periods, these two dynamics are almost
identical. That is because, when the cost of lying is large, the influences of initial opinions
dominate the first several periods. After that, these influences gradually disappear and the
influence of bias slowly becomes the dominant factor. The opinions eventually approach cˆ.
Figure 13: Opinion dynamics
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2.4 Extension
2.4.1 Different Degrees of Importance
In the previous section, I considered the case in which sophisticated agents care equally
about the naive agents. Now, I try to extend the model to a more general setup where
the sophisticated agents assign different degrees of importance to different naive agents. I
assume that the utility function of sophisticated agent i at time t is:
ui(x
t−1, sti, bi) = −
∑
j∈A(d)
βji(x
t
j − bi)2 − α(sti − xt−1i )2 (5)
in which βji > 0 represents how important naive agent j is to sophisticated agent i. βji
satisfies that, for any i, ∑j∈A(d) βji = 1. The FOCs now are
∑
j∈A(d) βjivji(
∑
k∈S(d) vjks
t
k) + αs
t
i = αx
t−1
i −
∑
j∈A(d) βjivji(
∑
j∈A(d) vjkx
t−1
k ) +
∑
j∈A(d) βjivjibi
(6)
let
V˜3 =

βd+1,1vd+1,1 · · · βd+1,dvd+1,d
... . . . ...
βN,1vN,1 · · · βN,dvN,d

B˜ =

∑
j∈A(d) βj1vj1b1∑
j∈A(d) βj2vj2b2
...∑
j∈A(d) βjdvjdbd

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U˜3 = αV3(αId + V˜
T
3 V3)
−1, U˜4 =
[
IN−d − V3(αId + V˜ T3 V3)−1V˜ T3
]
V4, U˜ =
U1 U2
U˜3 U˜4
 and
B˜1 =
 0d
V3(αId + V˜
T
3 V3)
−1B˜
 . Following the same steps as set out in the previous sections,
I can show that the opinion dynamics are characterized by the following matrix equation:
X t = U˜X t−1 + B˜1 (7)
The results are almost the same as before, except that there is a different centrality
vector. Let
l˜(i) =
(∑
j∈A(d) βjivji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
∑
k∈S(d)
(∑
j∈A(d) βjkvjk
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjkl(j)
)
for every i ∈ S(d), and l˜ =
(
l˜(1) l˜(2) · · · l˜(d)
)
. As I illustrate below, l˜ is the new
centrality vector.
Proposition 2.16. For any i,
(
lim
α→∞
lim
t→∞
X t
)
i
= c˜, in which c˜ =∑i∈S(d) bil˜(i).
Proposition 2.16 shows that, when the sophisticated agents assign different degrees of
importance to different naive agents, the centrality vector is different. The indirect influence
remains the same as before but the direct influence is now∑j∈A(d) βjivji. The trust that all
naive agents place in i is weighted according to the degrees of importance.
2.4.2 Farsighted Sophisticated Agents
So far, I have examined the case where the sophisticated agents are myopic. In this section, I
attempt to extend the model to a case in which the sophisticated agents are forward-looking.
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I only consider the simplest case due to tractability considerations.
Suppose there are two sophisticated agents and one naive agent. The sophisticated agents
are stubborn, which means that they never change their minds (v11 = v22 = 1). Without
loss of generality, I assume that the initial opinions of the sophisticated agents are -1 (Agent
1) and 1 (Agent 2). The sophisticated agents try to convince the naive agent to believe what
they believe. (b1 = −1, b2 = 1). I also assume that v33 = 0. Then the stage payoffs are given
by
Π1 = −(v31xt + v32yt + 1)2 − α(xt + 1)2
Π2 = −(v31xt + v32yt − 1)2 − α (yt − 1)2
in which xt and yt are signals sent by sophisticated agents.
I follow the method proposed by Maskin and Tirole (1987) to solve this model. I also
assume that in odd period 2t+1, Agent 1 chooseS x2t+1, which will remain unchanged until
period 2t+3; and in even period 2t+2, Agent 1 chooses y2t+2, which will remain unchanged
until period 2t + 4. I also focus on Markov perfect equilibrium. Since v33 = 0, the state
in each period is the action of the other sophisticated agent in the last period. Denote the
pairs of dynamic reaction functions by (R1,R2). (R1,R2) is an MPE if and only if there exist
valuation functions {(V1,W1) , (V2,W2)} such that for any {xˆ, yˆ}:
V1(yˆ) = max
x
{Π1(x, yˆ) + δW1(x)}
R1(yˆ) ∈ argmax
x
{Π1(x, yˆ) + δW1(x)}
W1(xˆ) = Π1(xˆ, R2(xˆ)) + δV1(R2(xˆ))
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As in Maskin and Tirole (1987), the solution should satisfy that
dR2
dx
(xˆ) =
−Π11(xˆ, R−11 (xˆ))− δΠ11(xˆ, R2(xˆ))
δΠ21(xˆ, R2(xˆ)) + δ
2Π21(R1(R2(xˆ)), R2(xˆ))
dR1
dy
(yˆ) =
−Π22(R−12 (yˆ), yˆ)− δΠ22(R1(yˆ), yˆ)
δΠ12(R1(yˆ), yˆ) + δ
2Π12(R1(yˆ), R2(R1(yˆ)))
I also assume that Ri are linear functions:
R1(y) = a1 + γ1y
R2(x) = a2 + γ2x
Then
γ2 = −α(x+ 1) + v31(v31x+ v32R
−1
1 (x) + 1) + αδ(x+ 1) + δv31(v31x+ v32R2(x) + 1)
δv32(v31x+ v32R2(x) + 1) + δ2v32(v31R1(R2(x)) + v32R2(x) + 1)
γ1 = −α(y − 1) + v32(v31R
−1
2 (y) + v32y − 1) + αδ(y − 1) + δv32(v31R1(y) + v32y − 1)
δv31(v31R1(y) + v32y − 1) + δ2v31(v31R1(y) + v32R2(R1(y))− 1)
Then it must be true that
(1 + δ)(α + v231) +
1
γ1
v31v32 + δv31v32γ2 + δv31v32γ2 + δv
2
32γ
2
2 + δ
2v31v32γ1γ
2
2 + δ
2v232γ
2
2 = 0
⇐⇒δ2v31v32γ21γ22 + δ(1 + δ)v232γ1γ22 + 2δv31v32γ1γ2 + (1 + δ)(α + v231)γ1 + v31v32 = 0 (8)
δ2v31v32γ
2
1γ
2
2 + δ(1 + δ)v
2
31γ
2
1γ2 + 2δv31v32γ1γ2 + (1 + δ)(α + v
2
32)γ2 + v31v32 = 0 (9)
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and
− (δv32γ2 + v31 + α)(1 + δ) + v31v32a1
γ1
=δv31v32a2 + δ(1 + δ)v
2
32a2γ2 + δ
2v31v32a1γ2 + δ
2v31v32a2γ1γ2 (10)
(δv31γ1 + v32 + α)(1 + δ) + v31v32
a2
γ2
=δv31v32a1 + δ(1 + δ)v
2
31a1γ1 + δ
2v31v32a2γ1 + δ
2v31v32a1γ1γ2 (11)
Let p = v31, then v32 = 1− p. I first prove the existence of real roots:
Lemma 2.2. Given 0 < p < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, there exists an α∗ > 0, such that for any
α > α∗,
1. there exist real solutions to the system of equations (3.7) and (3.8), denoted by γ∗1 and
γ∗2 ,
2.
γ∗1 =−
p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + p2)
+O(
1
α3
)
γ∗2 =−
p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
Lemma 2.2 shows that, when α is large, there exists real solutions and the solutions are
represented by simple formulas. We can then begin to calculate a1 and a2.
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Lemma 2.3. Given 0 < p < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, there exists an α∗ > 0, such that for any
α > α∗, if γi = γ∗i , then a∗1 = ∆2∆1 and a∗2 =
∆3
∆1
, where
∆1 =1− 3δ
2p2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
∆2 =− 1− p(1− p)
α + p2
− δp(1− p)α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
+ [−3p+ 1 + δ] δp(1− p)
2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
∆3 =1 +
p(1− p)
α + (1− p)2 +
δp(1− p)α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
+ [3(1− p)− (1 + δ)] δp
2(1− p)
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
By lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, I can show that, when α is large, there are always real solutions
to the system of equations such that γ∗1 , γ∗2 are both negative numbers close to 0 and
a∗1 ≈ −a∗2 ≈ −1. It is easy to check that Π1(x, yˆ) + δW1(x) is concave, so there exists
an MPE where γi = γ∗i , ai = a∗i , and the strategies are
R1(y) = a
∗
1 + γ
∗
1y
R2(x) = a
∗
2 + γ
∗
2x
It is also easy to check that the linear system is stable.
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When α is large, the state will quickly converge to the steady state:
(x∗, y∗) = (
a∗1 + γ
∗
1a
∗
2
1− γ∗1γ∗2
,
a∗2 + γ
∗
2a
∗
1
1− γ∗1γ∗2
)
What follows are some properties of the steady state. The steady state will be compared
with the case where the sophisticated agents are myopic. Denote the opinion of the naive
agent in a steady state and in a myopic case by z∗ and zˆ, respectively.
Proposition 2.17. There exists an α∗ > 0, such that for any α > α∗, z∗ > zˆ if and only if
1− p > p
Proposition 2.17 shows that, when the sophisticated agents are forward-looking instead
of myopic, the agent who has more influence when all agents are naive gains even more
influence. The stage payoff in these two different cases can also be compared. Denote the
stage payoffs of the sophisticated agents in a steady state and in a myopic case by Π∗i and
Πˆi, respectively.
Proposition 2.18. Given 0 < p < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, there exists an α∗ > 0, such that for
any α > α∗, Π∗i > Πˆi.
Proposition 2.18 shows that, when the sophisticated agents are forward-looking instead
of myopic, the stage payoffs of both sophisticated agents increase, even though one has more
influence while the other has less. This is because the cost of lying is smaller.
The last proposition discusses some comparative statics with respect to δ.
Proposition 2.19. Given 0 < p < 1 and 0 < δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1, there exists an α∗ > 0, such that
for any α > α∗,
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1. Π∗i (δ2) > Π∗i (δ1)
2. z∗(δ2) > z∗(δ1) if and only if 1− p > p
Proposition 2.19 shows that, when the sophisticated agents are more patient, the effects
I discuss in Propositions 2.17 and 2.18 become more significant.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a possible explanation for the persistent disagreement among individuals
in a society and studies the relation between the extent of disagreement and the structure
of social networks. It considers a bounded rationality model of opinion formation. I show
that, when the network is strongly connected and aperiodic, and the intensity of lying cost
is sufficiently large, the opinions converge but, generically, do not converge to a consensus.
The paper further characterizes the asymptotic opinions. These are determined by the
sophisticated agents’ biases and the structure of the network and are not affected by initial
opinions. The extent of disagreement is negatively correlated with the intensity of lying
cost and the spectral gap, which represents the degree of segregation. I then study social
influence. I find that social influence can differ significantly from eigenvector centrality and
that it can be decomposed into two separate factors: direct influence and indirect influence.
Finally, I investigate two variations of this model. First, I relax the assumptions to allow
the sophisticated agents to assign different degrees of importance to various naive agents.
I show that this only changes the direct influence. Second, I investigate a case in which
the sophisticated agents are forward-looking. I only consider a very simple network and
show that, in comparison with the case of myopic agents, wherein the agent who has more
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influence gains even more influence, the utility of both sophisticated agents is larger. I also
examine comparative statics on the discount factor. I prove that these two effects grow in
significance as the discount factor enlarges.
To ensure tractability, I focus on the case in which the sophisticated agents are myopic.
Moreover, when the sophisticated agents are forward-looking, I only analyze the simplest
network. An interesting question is whether we can extend these results to a more general
setting in which agents are forward-looking and communicate with each other through an
arbitrary network. It would also be interesting to see whether these results remain valid
when the network is endogenously formed.
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Chapter 3: Informal Lending and Entrepreneurship
3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship can yield a path to economic independence, boost job creation, raise in-
comes, and help consumers to make a living. Unfortunately, it is stifled by restricted access
to credit, equity, or payment services. A World Bank survey2 found that most entrepreneurs
faced difficulty accessing capital from banks and ended up resorting to borrowing from
informal resources; an outcome that concerns many because it is believed to negatively cor-
relate with entrepreneurial growth and performance. For reasons such as lack of capital,
excessive red taping, and inability to perfectly monitor applicants, loans which could spur
entrepreneurial activity cannot be allocated to consumers (Field et al., 2013). While finan-
cial access is a pressing issue in many developing parts of the world, it is also a critical issue
in the United States. The Obama Administration, in a June 2016 briefing3, reported that
financial inclusion is a problem for 20% of the US population. These consumers cannot ob-
tain the approval to use reliable and affordable financial products and use alternate services,
such as same day loans, borrowing at pawn shops, and borrowing informally.4
Given the impact of financial inclusion on consumers, it is startling to find that the liter-
ature in entrepreneurship largely ignored the reasons behind lack of access. In this paper, we
address this gap by studying the impact of formal and informal borrowing opportunities on
2http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/05/msme-finance-expanding-opportunities-and-
creating-jobs
3https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/06/10/financial-inclusion-united-states
4Consequentially, the U.S. Department of the Treasury initiated a program to improve access to financial
services for all, particularly for the low and moderate income households. Among the initiatives set up by the
Obama administration were Financial Inclusion Forum, the Financial Empowerment Innovation Fund, and
participation in the G-20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion. The Administration has also proposed
in its 2017 Budget pilots for new approaches that provide shorter and longer term financial assistance and
savings tools, to help workers build up “rainy day” reserve funds.
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consumer entrepreneurship. Most consumer entrepreneurship happens in the form of invest-
ment into small and medium micro enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are particularly important for
emerging economies as they account for the largest share of employment and GDP5. They
help families to pay bills, build wealth, and attain social mobility in the long term (Dem-
triades and Hussein, 1996). We investigate how terms of borrowing alter entrepreneurial
investment in a market. Specifically, our paper answers the following research questions:
How does the availability of informal borrowing influence financial inclusion (access to credit
for all consumers) and terms of borrowing from formal resources? What is the impact of
informal lending on the volume and innovativeness of entrepreneurial output?
We build a model that considers how financial inclusion (or, the lack of it) endogenously
rises as opportunities of informal borrowing emerge in a market. We focus on those who
are in need of a loan to create an SME, and assume that borrowers are heterogeneous with
respect to their existing wealth and the lucrativeness of their entrepreneurial idea. While
the bank would like to screen for an applicant’s risk of default and prefers to fund more
innovative ideas, it can assess risk only imperfectly. To hedge its risk, it can ask consumers
for a non-cash collateral. As a result, consumers with productive ideas and enough wealth to
pledge a collateral can signal their low risk and gain access to financial products. Consumers
without wealth are either excluded of financing opportunities, or are extended a loan without
a collateral at a high interest rate. As a result, some of these consumers may have an
incentive to borrow in the informal market. Informal borrowing markets suffer less from the
information asymmetry problem that a bank faces because those lending to friends, family,
or other social contacts are usually better informed about the nonpayment risk associated
5According to World Bank statistics.
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with these individuals. Thus, they have a better assessment of each other’s risk compared
to the bank (de Meza et al., 1987).
Our model focuses on two problems that emerge in entrepreneurial markets due to im-
perfect ability to screen consumer risk of default. First, consumers with productive ideas
but no wealth are pooled with others with unproductive ideas because neither can put down
a collateral. This results in an underinvestment problem such that the creditworthy en-
trepreneurs are deprived of loans that would yield positive expected returns for them and
the bank. On the other hand, if the bank provides loans that do not require a collateral,
it assumes the risk of losses from lending to those with unproductive ideas; thus faces an
overinvestment problem.6 Banks try to balance the overinvestment and underinvestment
problems in designing their loan contracts and the contract terms determine who gets to
borrow, and which entrepreneurial projects end up being realized.
We find that in a market where there are few informal borrowing opportunities, the lender
offers unsecured loans at a more attractive (lower) rate to entrepreneurs without wealth.
Therefore some informal activity can be beneficial for the entrepreneurs. But if there are
plenty of opportunities to borrow informally, this motivates banks to take advantage of the
informal activity in the market. The bank finds it more attractive to limit credit access
and increases the rates of secured loans so that it can motivate these consumers to lend
informally and earn higher profits that way. The bank is financially better off in markets
with high informal economy if it restricts access and offers only secured loans at high rates.
This results in a severe underinvestment problem where deserving productive entrepreneurs
6Existence of informal lending leads to two types of underinvestment problems. The first is exclusion of
the consumers with productive ideas but no wealth to pledge for a collateral. The second underinvestment
problem is the reduced investment by the wealthy consumers who would otherwise invest into a project but
find it more profitable to lend in the informal lending market.
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are forced to borrow informally because there are no unsecured loans offered. Moreover,
instead of borrowing and investing into their ideas, some consumers find it more attractive
to lend to contacts and some other consumers receive no access to credit and cannot realize
their entrepreneurial project. So low levels of informal borrowing opportunities catalyze
entrepreneurship, but high levels of it incentivize banks to restrict access to credit and earn
rents from the high rates charged to a small group of the wealthy who have the ability to
earn money through informal loans.
In the extensions, we first consider how introduction of joint liability contracts influences
entrepreneurial activity. Because lenders cannot perfectly assess the risk associated with a
consumer, they hedge against risk by joint loan contracts. In joint contracts, borrowers who
belong to the same group can co-sign a loan together by assuming partial liability on the
loan of a friend. When one defaults on the loan, the co-signer has to cover for his debt.7
Consumers who are friends know each others’ risk types better than the bank (Ghatak,
2000), and individuals self-select to form loan groups with low risk friends. So lender’s risk
of non-payment is reduced in joint lending contracts. We find that joint lending can miti-
gate the under and overinvestment problems while improving the volume of entrepreneurial
investment. Therefore they are desirable from managerial and policy perspectives.
Second, we extend the model to consider heterogeneity in ties, and additional motivations
for lending such as helping friends or investing in personal relationships, rather than earning
rent. Consumers may borrow from others who they have weaker ties with, who may want to
help them to succeed financially. We show that these additional factors which can increase
7The attractiveness of the joint lending programs can come from various number of factors, including
social pressure to keep up with their payments because of the consequences associated with default, whose
severity may vary from humiliation to ostracism by the group Wei et al. (2016)
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the strength of relationships and outside borrowing opportunities can limit financial access
further.
Our study makes several distinct contributions to several strands of the literature. First,
we contribute to the consumer finance literature by studying how informal borrowing oppor-
tunities influence financial inclusion and terms of borrowing for consumers. A large number
of banks, fintech startups, and consulting firms in the US are interested in developing finan-
cial products to improve the lives of the low and middle income consumers. While there is
a rich literature focusing on a variety of issues in the consumer finance domain, including
behavioral responses to the characteristics of financial products(e.g., Feinberg et al., 1986;
Soman, 2003; Soman and Cheema, 2002; Christen and Morgan, 2005; Gourville and Soman,
1998), attitudes towards saving(Benartzi and Thaler, 1999; Hershfield et al., 2011; McKen-
zie and Liersch, 2011; Karlan et al., 2016), and financial literacy (e.g., Bolton et al., 2011;
Gaurav et al., 2011; Hadar et al., 2013), to our knowledge no study analyzed the conditions
that create inequality in consumers’ access to financing.
Second, we contribute to the studies focusing on new product introduction and en-
trepreneurship. While there is a significant research body in diffusion of new products and
innovation (e.g., Mahajan et al., 1990; Mahajan and Muller, 1998; Hauser et al., 2006; Sood
and Tellis, 2009), there are very few studies on entrepreneurship of low-income consumers
who has to resort to informal borrowing. This study is the first to focus on the relationship
between borrowing opportunities and entrepreneurial outcomes. It is also the first to study
this relationship from the perspective of social ties.
Third, we make a contribution to the literature on emerging markets (e.g., Anderson-
Macdonald et al., 2015; Anderson-Macdonald and Thomson, 2015; Bollinger and Yao, 2016).
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In business and economics, there is a growing interest in emerging markets (Sancheti and
Sudhir, 2014; Sudhir and Talukdar, 2015; Sudhir et al., 2015; Anderson-Macdonald et al.,
2015; Anderson-Macdonald and Thomson, 2015; Kishore et al., 2015). Nevertheless the
number of studies focusing on lack of finance and its reasons is small. Wei et al. (2016)
list some of the reasons for the difficulty of accessing credit as lack of capital, insufficient
consumer history to demonstrate creditworthiness and imperfect screening of consumer ap-
plications by financial institutions. We contribute to this literature by showing how these
challenges may also result in informal borrowing.
Fouth, we contribute to the literature on the coexistence of formal and informal finance
(Bose, 1998; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998; Jain, 1999; Karaivanov and Kessler, 2018; Lee and Pers-
son, 2016; Madestam, 2014, among others). While these papers have discussed the cases in
which the informal lenders are either bank competitors or channels of bank funds, to our
knowledge no study analyzed how the density of social connections affect the interaction
between formal and informal finance. Finally, the paper relates to the literature on develop-
ment and incomplete financial markets (e.g., Ahlin and Jiang 2008; Banerjee and Newman
1998; also see Buera et al., 2015 for a survey of studies on macro side), and informal transfers
in social networks (e.g., Ambrus et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we develop a model to
study the financial inclusion in the context of formal and informal lending and summarize
the results. We present several extensions in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we discuss our
conclusions along with managerial and policy insights.
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3.2 Model
We consider a market with a bank (also referred to as the “lender” throughout the text)
and a community with N consumers (referred to as the “borrowers”). The bank provides
individual or group loans8 and assumes limited liability: It can only collect assets pledged as
collateral for a loan. Borrowers are endowed with one unit of labor9 and have the opportunity
to earn a return from an investment into a risky project10. This investment represents the
idea of developing a micro-enterprise (i.e., entrepreneurial investment).
We assume that entrepreneurs are interested in borrowing a loan and they are heteroge-
neous with respect to their risk of defaulting on a loan. Conditional on their risk level, each
applicant belongs to one of three risk segments: Ω1, Ω2, and Ω3. Without loss of generality,
let borrowers in Ω3 have high risk, and borrowers in segments Ω1 and Ω2 have low risk of
default. Let the number of consumers in Ωi be Ni, with
∑3
i Ni = N . For simplicity, we
denote the entrepreneurial idea consumers in Ωi can invest in by project i and the likelihood
of success of the project with pi. Conditional on being successful, project i generates a re-
turn of Ri. We will assume that the innovativeness of ideas is correlated with their average
financial return, that is, a more innovative project yields a higher expected return (Ri) on
average.11 If individuals choose not to invest into an entrepreneurial idea, they can keep an
outside option of earnings u¯.12
The risk of a consumer is unobservable to the lender. The inability to screen consumer
8Group lending is the practice of lending to multiple consumers through a single, joint contract where
the risks and returns of borrowers are linked. Group loans are common practice in developing economies.
9Equivalently, this implies that the investment required by each project is 1 unit of a capital resource.
10The project represents an idea or a business.
11Otherwise there is little incentive for any entrepreneur to invest into the project.
12This income, for instance, may correspond to income from farming for an individual who is considering
opening a small store in a village. We assume that all consumers and the lender are risk neutral and care
only about the expected profit.
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risk is a defining issue in developing markets due to lack of data on the financial history of
thin-file or no-file loan applicants.13 As a screening device for high risk borrowers, the lender
can ask the consumers to pledge a collateral before giving any loans. The collateral serves
as an upfront payment and we assume the lender takes it in non-cash forms. Examples of
collateral in developed economies include household goods, or livestock and land in emerging
economies. It is lost if the borrower defaults.
The bank offers a menu of contracts with (i) a low interest loan with a collateral, or (ii)
a high interest loan with no collateral. Let the interest rates the lender sets for loans with
and without collateral be r1 and r2, respectively, where r2 > r1 must be maintained for the
contracts to be functional in screening. Consumers with low risk ideas and wealth self-select
into loans with collateral to signal low risk. Those who lack sufficient wealth have to take
a loan without collateral even though they may be creditworthy. They borrow at a higher
interest rate since they are pooled with the high risk applicants and are at a disadvantage
in obtaining credit. We assume, without loss of generality, that only consumers in Ω1 have
the resources to put down a collateral, and normalize the price of the collateral to 1. To
distinguish between these consumers, we will refer to this group as the wealthy and the
remaining consumers as the unwealthy consumers. Here, the term wealth should be read as
relative wealth since in reality most of these consumers may be in need of capital.
A borrower’s risk is jointly represented by the probability of success and the rate of
return associated with their projects. First, without loss of generality, we assume that the
entrepreneurial projects of consumers in the first two segments have a higher likelihood of
13Many countries today still lack credit history or other financial transactions data on consumers either
due to limited number of non-cash financial transactions taking place or due to high cost of recording data
from consumers (Wei et al., 2016).
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Table 1: Consumer Segments
Segment Description
Ω1 Low risk segment with some wealth and productive ideas. These borrowers can
signal their low risk type by pledging a collateral and borrow at a lower rate. If
they invest in their idea, the expected return is nonnegative.
Ω2 Low risk segment without wealth and productive ideas. These borrowers take on
loans without collateral and at the higher rate. If they invest in their idea, the
expected return is nonnegative.
Ω3 High risk consumers without wealth and with non-productive ideas. These
borrowers borrow loans without collateral and at the higher rate. If they invest in
their idea, the expected return is negative.
success compared to those in the third segment:
p1 = p2 ≡ p > p3 ≡ pˆ. (A1)
Second, we assume that the ideas of each segment vary in their innovativeness and thus their
financial return. While those in segments Ω1, Ω2 have productive ideas (i.e., ideas which
yield a nonnegative expected return when invested in), the ideas of the consumers in Ω3 are
unproductive and yield an expected return that is lower than their outside option:
pR1, pR2 − 1 > u¯
pˆR3 − 1 < u¯. (A2)
The characteristics of the three borrower segments are summarized in Table 1. The
segments allow us to study the issues relevant to financial inclusion, entrepreneurship and
social networks. Notice that a lender would like to fund productive borrowers, namely,
consumers in Ω1 and Ω2. Ω3 consists of borrowers who should not receive a loan, since
they have high risk and unproductive ideas. The challenge is distinguishing consumers in
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Ω2 from those in Ω3, since none of these consumers can pledge a collateral and the lender
cannot effectively differentiate between them. When loans are extended to the high risk, non-
productive borrowers (Ω3), this leads to an overinvestment problem: consumers who should
not obtain loans receive loans and generate economic losses on average from their borrowing.
If the bank acts conservatively to avoid the overinvestment problem, it can run into the
opposite problem of underinvestment, where productive borrowers (in Ω2, and under some
conditions in Ω1) are excluded from financing. This second outcome is equally undesirable
since it reduces the innovative output and may prevent capital-constrained consumers from
growing economically.
Faced with difficulties to access credit, borrowers in emerging economies often turn to
informal sources, friends, family, or other lenders. We will consider a market where due to
their ability to borrow at low rates, consumers in Ω1 lend to their contacts with productive
ideas in Ω2. In this scenario, the borrowers in Ω1 lend to friends instead of investing in their
ideas. The magnitude of this “leak” will depend on the social structure and the degree of
mixing among the segments: if the individuals who are unwealthy have more contacts in
Ω1, they have more informal borrowing opportunities. By extending credit to the low risk
segment Ω1, the lender creates a competition for itself in the informal lending market. We
will explore how the presence of this outside informal market influences the innovativeness
of ideas realized.
3.2.1 Individual Loan Contracts
First we consider lending via individual contracts without consideration of leaks (i.e., assum-
ing no monetary transfers between consumer segments). The expected payoff for borrowers
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in segment Ω1 from borrowing and investing in a microenterprise respectively is:
p(R1 − r1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. return if successful
+ (1− p)(−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. loss if unsuccessful
− u¯︸︷︷︸
Loss of other income
(12)
The first term in the expression is the expected payoff if the project is successful. The second
term indicates the loss of the collateral if the project fails. Additionally, investment into an
enterprise implies the loss of the outside option.
For consumers in Ω2, a similar expression for the expected payoff can be written by
plugging in the corresponding rate terms and expected loss of outside income:
p(R2 − r2)− u¯. (13)
The lender is profit maximizing by setting the interest rates to extract consumer surplus.
The rates for the two segments are obtained by solving the following two equations:
p(R1 − r1) + (1− p)(−1) = u¯ (14)
p(R2 − r2) = u¯
This defines the optimal interest rates:
r1 =R1 − 1
p
− u¯
p
+ 1, (15)
r2 =R2 − u¯
p
. (16)
The rates depend on the innovativeness of ideas, probability of success, and the outside
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option of the borrower. The lender incentivizes borrowers to put down a collateral if the
return on borrowing with a collateral is higher than borrowing without it. Formally, the
incentive compatibility condition should satisfy
p(R1 − r1) + (1− p)(−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. return from the secured contract
> p(R1 − r2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. return from the unsecured contract
(17)
The LHS in this expression is the expected return on borrowing a loan with and the RHS is
the expected return on borrowing a loan without a collateral. Solving the inequality yields
that for secured loans to be offered, r2−r1 > 1p−1 must hold. Otherwise, consumers in group
Ω1 would benefit from not revealing their low risk-type and would borrow the zero-collateral
loan, pooling with other borrowers. The financial firm would be worse off in this condition
since it would lose its ability to detect low-risk consumers. Proposition 3.20 formally states
the condition for the lender to effectively screen applicants, i.e., to satisfy r2 − r1 > 1p − 1.
Proposition 3.20. (Condition for Screening Consumer Risk) For financial firms
to effectively screen consumer risk and offer secured contracts, the productive but unwealthy
consumers’ ideas must be more innovative than those of the wealthy. Formally,
R2 > R1 (A3)
should hold. When this condition holds, the interest rates for the secured and unsecured
contracts are r1 = R1 − 1p − u¯p + 1 and r2 = R2 − u¯p , respectively.
We have a separating equilibrium when the low risk entrepreneurs can signal their type
by putting down a collateral. When R2 > R1 holds, consumers in Ω1 have an incentive to
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reveal their low-risk type. While consumers in Ω2 would benefit from pretending to be a
borrower in segment Ω1, they cannot do so without putting down a collateral. To realize
their investment, they need banks to offer unsecured loans which do not require a collateral.
To offer an unsecured loan, a bank’s expected return must be higher when offering both
contracts. Proposition 3.21 below describes the conditions under which a profit-maximizing
lender offers secured and unsecured loans.
Proposition 3.21. (Full Financial Inclusion)When the lender is offering secured loans,
it will also offer unsecured loans if ideas of the middle segment are innovative such that:
R2 ≥ u¯
p
+
1
p¯
(A4)
where p¯ ≡ N2
N2+N3
p + N3
N2+N3
pˆ. Under this case, full financial inclusion can be achieved since
all the consumers in the market can find a product offering that is targeted at them.
Proposal 3.21 shows a condition that results in full financial inclusion, or the condition
for the bank to offer both types of contracts. Key insight is that financial access relies on
the innovativeness of the ideas of those in relative poverty who cannot signal their credit-
worthiness by pledging a collateral, and are indistinguishable from those with high risk. The
term p¯ on the RHS of the condition (A4) is a weighted average of the success rates of these
two segments, p and pˆ, where the weights are their proportion in the market. The higher the
weighted average success, the more likely a market is to reach full financial inclusion. This
is desirable from a policy maker’s perspective. If the productive segment has ideas that are
financially more attractive (higher R2) or of lower risk (higher p), this compensates for the
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expected losses from the unproductive segment. Markets in which the ratio of productive
unwealthy is higher (higher N2
N2+N3
) or in which the productive ideas have a higher likelihood
of success (higher p) are more likely to have unsecured loans.
Full financial inclusion, as condition (A4) demonstrates, implies a loss on average from the
unproductive consumers in segment Ω3 and is resulting in an overinvestment problem. The
losses associated with lending to Ω3 are cross-subsidized by the return from the productive
entrepreneurs. In particular, whenever the rates associated with unsecured loans are low,
this may contribute to the adverse selection problem where high risk consumers have an
incentive to borrow because
pˆ(R3 − r2) ≥ u¯ (18)
is more likely to hold (Ghatak, 2000; de Meza et al., 1987). Corollary 3.1 formalizes the
conditions that feed into the overinvestment problem with individual loan contracts.
Corollary 3.1. (Overinvestment Problem) The overinvestment problem arises when
high risk consumer’s ideas are sufficiently more innovative compared to that of the unwealthy
low risk consumers:
R3 −R2 ≥ u¯
(
1
pˆ
− 1
p
)
. (A5)
The corollary emphasizes a trade-off. On the surface, it may seem like the bank would
prefer all entrepreneurs in the market to have highly innovative ideas. But if the unpro-
ductive borrowers have innovative projects, they are incentivized to borrow and cannot be
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distinguished from those in Ω2. The return from their investment increases their income
although it wastes the resources of the bank. This creates undesirable results for the lender,
although may be preferable from the perspective of a policy maker.
3.2.2 Impact of Informal Lending on Entrepreneurial Activity
When unsecured loans are not available or lending rates are very high, borrowers may use
alternate financial products. A common alternative is informal lending, where wealthy con-
sumers borrow and lend to others. The emergence of informal lending is endogenous to the
conditions of formal lending. In this section, we study what conditions motivate informal
lending and how it shapes entrepreneurial output in a market.
Consider a consumer who can borrow from a friend instead of the bank. We assume
that if two individuals are friends, they know each other’s risk type, in line with Wei et al.
(2016). Informal lending takes place when the consumers in segment Ω1 (i.e., those who
borrow at a lower rate) lend to their friends in segment Ω2 instead of investing in their
project. A necessary condition for exchange is that the middle segment’s projects must be
more innovative than those of the first segment (i.e, R2 ≥ R1). In this case, consumers in
Ω1 can expect higher returns from lending to Ω2 compared to that from their investment.
If R2 < R1 holds, the highest interest rate that borrowers in Ω2 are willing to borrow at is
R2 − u¯p . And even if the bank offers the same interest rate (as in the case with no leaks),
those in segment Ω1 will not lend to segment Ω2.14
Via informal lending, consumers in Ω1 earn rent from the ideas of the productive un-
14In reality, the reasons for lending to friends may not be financial. For example, individuals may lend to
their friends for reasons such as altruism, desire to help a friend or a family member, or due to utility from
betterment of friendship. In the current section, we make the conservative assumption that the only reason
for lending to others is financial gains, but we consider alternate motivations in Section 3.3.2.
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wealthy. So there is some social arbitrage taking place, where consumers who know their
friends better than the bank knows them take advantage of this informational friction. For
banks, consequences of informal lending is ambiguous. On the surface, it generates losses
from to consumers borrow from friends. At the same time, it can charge the wealthy higher
rates, since they can earn higher returns by lending to friends. A consequence of informal
lending is that it results in a decline in the entrepreneurial activity of the first segment (Ω1).
Recall that informal transfers can only happen if R2 ≥ R1. So the bank (indirectly) funds
more innovative borrowers. As some of these borrowers turn to earn rents from informal
lending, the number of individuals who are investing in a microenterprise is lower. So the
average funded project is more innovative (have a higher return associated with it when
there is informal activity). This may explain why venture capital investment is flooding to
emerging economies, which typically hold informal activity (Kho, 2011).15
To model informal lending, we denote the probability that a consumer in Ω1 is friends
with a consumer in Ω2 by q.16 This parameter also represents the degree of mixing between
the segments or the social classes according to wealth levels, and is common knowledge. We
assume that each borrower in Ω2 can be friends with one consumer in Ω1, but this is not a
restricting assumption.17 Let’s denote the borrowers in Ω1 (Ω2) who have friends in Ω2 (Ω1)
by Ω∗1 (Ω∗2) and their friends by Ω∗2(Ω∗1). Let’s represent the remaining consumers in Ω1(Ω2)
by Ω∗∗1 (Ω∗∗2 ). Formally, Ω1 = Ω∗1∪Ω∗∗1 and Ω2 = Ω∗2∪Ω∗∗2 . The connections of the consumers
in Ω3 do not influence our analysis qualitatively. This is because if a consumer i ∈ Ω3 is
15According to a report by World Economic Forum, in 2015 the countries that made a big jump in
attracting venture capital were the emerging economies, doubling their total investment in a year (Vanham,
2015).
16Although we use the term friend, a broader category of social ties is considered.
17With more than one social contacts, the key results would still hold qualitatively.
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connected to another consumer, then her friend knows that i has a high default risk and an
unproductive idea, so he will not lend to her. So borrowers in Ω3 can only obtain loans from
the bank.
The lender can follow various strategies each of which is associated with a different
payoff: (1) offer only the secured loan, (2) offer only the unsecured loan, and (3) offer both
the secured and the unsecured loans. We will analyze each one of these strategies next. We
will compare when the lender earns higher profits after studying all strategies.
Lender Offers Only Secured Loans. If the lender chooses to offer only the secured
loan, it can only serve wealthy consumers (Ω1). But it can adjust the terms to (1) serve all
consumers in Ω1 or to (2) only serve consumers in Ω∗1. By choosing the latter, the lender
is capitalizing on the relationships between these consumers and sets the borrowing rate
higher.
If the lender wants to serve all consumers in Ω1, he can set the interest rate to r1 =
R1 + 1− 1p − u¯p . Its expected payoff is
Π11 = N1p(r1 − 1) = N1(pR1 − u¯− 1).
Alternatively, the lender can only lend to Ω∗1 at a higher rate, and earn rent through
informal lending. In this case, it sets the interest at r1 = R2 + 1 − 1p − u¯p . Thus only
borrowers in Ω∗1 find it worthwhile to take a loan. Then the expected payoff is
Π12 = qN1p(r1 − 1) = qN1(pR2 − u¯− 1).
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Lender Offers Only Unsecured Loans. If the lender chooses to offer only unsecured
loans, he also has two options, (1) serve all consumers, or (2) only serve those in Ω2 and Ω3.
(As we will show, it is not profitable to serve only Ω1). If the lender chooses to serve all
consumers, it would set the interest rate low at r2 = R1− u¯p to attract the entire market. In
this case, the expected profit is:
Π21 = (N1 +N2)(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1).
If it chooses to exclude Ω1, it can set the interest rate higher at r2 = R2− u¯p . In this case, it
is not profitable for consumers in Ω1 to borrow because p(R1 − r2) = p(R1 − R2 + u¯p ) < u¯.
So the profit of the lender is:
Π22 = N2(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1).
Lender Offers Both Secured and Unsecured Loans. If the lender chooses to offer
both secured and unsecured loans, he has three options: (1) serve all consumers, (2) serve
all consumers in Ω1, or (3) to serve a portion of consumers in Ω1. Before we can calculate
the expected profits of these three options, we analyze how the lender sets interest rates.
As long as the borrowers in Ω1 lend to their friends at a rate lower than the bank’s rate,
their contacts in Ω2 will borrow informally. To eliminate informal lending, the bank must
set its rates such that customers in Ω1 prefer not to lend to their friends. If the bank chooses
to offer secured and unsecured contracts together, to incentivize borrowing of both groups,
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it should ensure a nonnegative expected return:
r1 ≤ R1 + 1− 1
p
− u¯
p
, (19)
r2 ≤ R2 − u¯
p
. (20)
Under these conditions, if borrowers in Ω1 expect lower returns from lending to their contacts
compared to that from investing, there will not be an informal market. Since the highest
rate a borrower in segment Ω1 can charge to a borrower in Ω2 is r2 (otherwise the borrower
would opt for the unsecured loan offered by the bank), consumers in Ω1 would prefer not to
lend to friends if:
p(r2 − r1)− (1− p) + u¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. return from lending to a friend
≤ p(R1 − r1)− (1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp. return from entreprenial activity
(21)
If the inequality holds, informal lending will not exist. The left hand side of the inequality is
the expected return from lending to social contacts taking into consideration the collateral
and the ability to keep outside income. The right hand side is the expected return from
investing in the entrepreneurial idea taking into account the loss of outside income. Com-
bining the constraints in Equations (19)–(21), the interest rates which maximize the lender’s
payoff while eliminating informal lending are:
r1 = R1 + 1− 1
p
− u¯
p
, (22)
r2 = R1 − u¯
p
. (23)
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In this case, the expected payoff becomes
Π31 = N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N2(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1).
If the lender does not want to compete with informal market, he can raise the interest
rate of unsecured loans to r2 = R2 − u¯p . Then consumers in Ω∗2 will borrow from their social
contacts and the expected payoff for the lender is
Π32 = N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) + (N2 − qN1)(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
If the lender further does not try to serve customers in Ω∗∗1 , he can raise the interest rate
of secured loans to r1 = R2+1− 1p − u¯p so that he can get all surplus from Ω∗1. The expected
payoff is
Π33 =qN1(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) + (N2 − qN1)(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
=N2(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
Let q∗1 ≡ N2+N3N1
p¯(R2− u¯p )−1
p(R2− u¯p )−1
, q∗2 ≡ pR1−u¯−1pR2−u¯−1 , q∗3 ≡
pR1−u¯−1
pR2−u¯−1+
N2+N3
N1
p¯(R1− u¯p )−1
p(R2− u¯p )−1
and q∗4 ≡ N2+N3N1
p¯(R2−R1)
p(R2− u¯p )−1
.
Then the lender’s optimal strategy can be summerized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.22. The density of social connections determines the degree of financial
inclusion and the segments served by the lender. Specifically, when conditions (A1)-(A5)
hold, the contracts offered and the coverage in the market are laid out in Table 2.
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Proposition 3.22 shows that the density of social connections will influence informal
activity, which in turn influences financial inclusion, types of loan contracts offered, and
the rates at which individuals can borrow. In Figure 14 we demonstrate the relationship
between the innovativeness of projects, density of social connections and the lender’s optimal
strategy.
Proposition 3.23. (Informal Lending and Volume of Entrepreneurial Activity)
In a market with informal lending, the volume of entrepreneurial activity is lower compared to
that in a market without informal lending. The average innovativeness of the entrepreneurial
ideas, however, is higher.
With informal lending, the overall volume of entrepreneurial activity of the first segment
is reduced. On the upside, informal lending corrects for the inefficiencies in screening of
innovative ideas. Borrowers in Ω1 provide loans to those in segment Ω2 only if the return
on their own ideas is lower than their contacts. As a consequence, the projects which are
funded are, on average, more innovative. Thus informal lending facilitates transfers from the
less innovative to the more innovative ideas. Higher innovation may result in higher quality
services and products to be offered to consumers. We next highlight the conditions for the
lender to eliminate the informal market in Proposition 3.24.
Proposition 3.24. (Preventing Informal Lending) If R1 ≥ u¯p+1p¯ , R2−R1 < N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
and q∗4 ≤ q < q∗3, the lender can offer both secured and unsecured contracts at rates
r1 = R1 + 1− 1p − u¯p and r2 = R1 − u¯p and prevent informal lending.
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Figure 14: Lender’s Optimal Strategy vs. Density of Social Connections
R2 = 1.41, R3 = 1.425, p = 0.95, pˆ = 0.8, u¯ = 0.2, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = 2
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If R1 < u¯p + 1p¯ , or R1 ≥ u¯p + 1p¯ and R2 − R1 ≥ N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
, the relation
between financial inclusion and the density of social ties can be summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.25. (i) If R1 < u¯p+ 1p¯ , or R1 ≥ u¯p+ 1p¯ and R2−R1 ≥ N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
,
financial inclusion becomes more restricted as the density of social ties, q, increases.
(ii) If R1 ≥ u¯p + 1p¯ and R2 − R1 < N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
, the relation between financial
inclusion and the density of social ties is ambiguous.
Part (i) of Proposition 3.25 states that as the density of social connections (q) increases,
access to financial services from formal lenders can become more restricted in an economy.
In particular, if q ≤ q∗1,q∗2, only the middle class (i.e., unwealthy productive consumers) with
social connections to productive unwealthy (Ω∗2) are not served by the formal lender. When
the density increases such that q∗2 ≤ q < q∗1 or q∗1 ≤ q < q∗2, the lender gives up on more
consumers (Ω∗∗1 , Ω∗∗2 , and Ω3, respectively). If q ≥ q∗1 and q ≥q∗2, only Ω∗1 obtains financial
products. So in markets with higher density of social connections, formal financial access is
granted to a smaller segment of the society. This implies a loss on entrepreneurial volume,
since a total investment of ((1− q)N1 +N2) is wasted.
Restricting access to financial services results in an underinvestment problem, for two
reasons. Firstly, some productive unwealthy consumers (Ω∗∗2 ) are deprived of loans. These
are the individuals without social connections to obtain informal loans. If the conditions in
Proposition 3.25 hold, then the lender does not want to compete with the informal market
and offers a pooling contract to Ω∗∗2 and Ω3. When q is large, the number of consumers in
Ω∗∗2 is small, so the profit from lending to Ω∗∗2 is not sufficient to compensate for the loss
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from lending to Ω3. The lender then gives up on both segments. Second, consumers in
Ω∗∗1 lose their funding altogether, since the lender is fully aware that it can charge a higher
interest if it gives up on these consumers. When the density of social connections q is high,
it is profitable to choose this strategy. In both cases, the volume of innovative activity goes
down, because there are fewer individuals who borrow to invest in ideas.
It is important to clarify the role of the consumers in group Ω3 and how they influence
the entrepreneurial investment opportunities of the other two segments. Recall that Ω3
represents the consumers with unproductive ideas. These are the consumers whom the
lender would want to avoid, if it could, in lending. However, the lender cannot distinguish
between the consumers in Ω2 and Ω3. When some individuals in Ω1 lend to their contacts
in Ω2, the lender attains a lower profit from offering unsecured loans. As a result, it is not
willing to offer unsecured contracts when there is strong informal lending activity. A model
that omits the existence of this group would falsely conclude that the bank’s payoff from
offering unsecured loans would not change in the existence of informal lending.
Part (ii) of the Proposition 3.25 states that when R1 is large but R2 − R1 is small, the
relationship between financial inclusion and the density of social ties is ambiguous. If the
density is small such that q < q∗4 < q∗3 , only the productive unwealthy with social connections
(Ω∗2) are not served by the formal lender. When q is larger (q∗4 ≤ q < q∗3), the lender will
compete and prevent informal lending. When q is even larger (q∗4 < q∗3 ≤ q), only Ω∗1 obtains
service.
Why is the relationship between density and financial inclusion different between parts
(i) and (ii)? It is because the subjects of comparison are different in the two corollaries.
When R1 is large, serving all borrowers is more attractive than serving only Ω1, even at a
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low interest rate (R1 − u¯p ). When the difference between R2 and R1 is small, lender prefers
to serve all borrowers, charging a lower interest rate rather than giving up on N1 borrowers.
Thus an increase in the density of social connections results in two effects. First, the cost
of giving up on consumers in Ω∗2 increases. Second, the profit from only serving Ω∗1 at a
higher interest increases. When q is small, the first effect dominates, but when q is large,
the second effect takes over. So, as q increases, the bank first serves more consumers (Ω∗2)
but then serves only Ω∗1.
3.3 Extensions
In this section, we consider other characteristics of markets in which access to credit is a
problem. First we consider the use of joint liability contracts and how it alters financial
inclusion as well as the over and underinvestment problems, compared to individualized
contracts. Second, we consider heterogeneity in the strength of ties and motivations for
lending to see how robust our qualitative findings are to these factors. To focus on markets
with challenges to credit access, we will make the following assumption:
R1 <
u¯
p
+
1
p¯
(A6)
This assumption eliminates the trivial cases where the lender serves all consumers charging
a low interest rate.
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3.3.1 Joint Liability Contracts and Entrepreneurial Activity
As an alternative to individual contracts, banks may offer joint liability contracts, which are
also known as “group loans”. These contracts ask borrowers to form a group such that they
are jointly liable for each others’ loans. As such, when individuals’ borrowing risks are joined
through the terms of the loan, these contracts alleviate risk by addressing adverse selection
and moral hazard issues introduced by informal lending. With joint liability contracts, the
task of screening applicants is delegated to borrowers who have private information about
their contacts’ risk types. They screen candidates with low risk and prefer to borrow with
them. We represent a joint liability contract with (r, c). The term r represents the individual
liability or the interest which the borrower must pay back to the bank. The contract is
structured such that if the project of the borrower succeeds, he agrees to pay an additional
joint liability fee of c per member of his group whose project has failed. If his own project
fails, then he pays nothing.
Subsequently, we study the conditions for when joint liability contracts can improve
consumers’ access to loans and can improve entrepreneurial activity.
We first consider a market in which the lender offers joint loans instead of an unsecured
loan to screen for risk, and assume no informal lending. The analysis we carry out will hold
the conditions the same with those assumed in Section 3.2.1 ((A1)-(A5)). Joint loans screen
the risk the consumer risk through friends selection of choosing to undersign the contract
with another person. Since consumers hold private information about their social contacts
and their financial health, they would rationally choose to borrow with others who have at
worst the same risk with them (Ghatak, 2000). Since a low risk consumer would not want
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to group with a high risk consumer, groups cannot be formed unless two borrowers of the
same risk come together. Otherwise, one party will not be willing to undersign the loan. So
consumers in Ω2 will form groups with only consumers in Ω2 and not with the consumers
in Ω3. As such, joint liability contracts lead to positive assortative matching in borrowing
groups and help the lender to indirectly sort the market in risk groups.
Similar to our benchmark model, the terms of the optimal joint liability contract is
determined such that consumers in Ω2 can be served while those in Ω3 are driven out of
the market. We will solve the model for a group of two consumers, but the intuition and
modeling approach hold for groups of more than two people as well. For consumers in Ω2,
the participation constraint to undersign a joint liability contract implies that their expected
return should exceed their outside option:
p2(R2 − r2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. return when both borrowers are successful
+ p(1− p)(R2 − r2 − c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. return when co-borrower fails
≥ u¯︸︷︷︸
outside option
(24)
To reduce the overinvestment problem, the lender sets the rates such that the unproduc-
tive borrowers are discouraged. For the entrepreneurs in Ω3, the expected return falls short
of outside option if:
pˆ2(R3 − r2) + pˆ(1− pˆ)(R3 − r2 − c) < u¯. (25)
Moreover, limited-liability constraints require return from an investment to be nonnegative:
R2 − r2 − c ≥ 0,
R3 − r2 − c ≥ 0.
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When (A5) holds, R3 > R2 and the constraint R3−r2−c ≥ 0 is satisfied anytime R2−r2−c ≥
0 is satisfied.
Compared to individual liability contracts, joint liability contracts work in two additional
ways for the lender to screen out those with high risk. First, a borrower’s expected return
from borrowing under joint liability depends not only on his, but also on his peer’s success
(i.e., jointly p2 or pˆ2). Altogether, the probability of success is lower. Second, if the project of
the co-borrower is not successful, a borrower incurs a cost of c. These increase the lender’s
ability to screen applicants since only those with sufficiently high return and probability
of success choose to borrow. Thus joint lending is more stringent compared to individual
liability contracts. With joint lending, the conditions to resolve overinvestment problem is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.26. (i) Joint liability contracts prevent overinvestment problem iff
R3 −R2 < pˆu¯( 1
pˆ2
− 1
p2
). (A7)
(ii) Joint liability contracts are more effective than individual liability contracts in preventing
the overinvestment problem if
R2 + pˆu¯(
1
pˆ2
− 1
p2
) > R3 ≥ R2 + u¯(1
pˆ
− 1
p
).
Proposition 3.26 sets a condition comparable to Corollary 3.1 about preventing the over-
investment problem. Similar to the condition defined for individual contracts, the difference
in the returns of the ideas of the productive and unproductive unwealthy applicants should
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be sufficiently small. Suppose conditions (A1)-(A4) hold and that all parameters, except
for R3, are given. Even though the risky borrowers’ projects are unproductive, they can be
sufficiently innovative, implying that R3 can still be high. When R3 is small (i.e., when it is
smaller than R2 + u¯(1pˆ − 1p)), these projects are unattractive, and individual or joint liabil-
ity contracts are not useful for the individuals in Ω3 because neither contract is profitable.
When R3 is greater than or equal to (R2+ pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 )), contracts are not useful for the bank
to prevent overinvestment problem, because neither joint nor individual contracts can drive
the consumers in Ω3 out of market. When the return R3 is intermediate (i.e., in the range
R2 + u¯(
1
pˆ
− 1
p
) and R2 + pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 )), joint liability contracts are more efficient than the
individual liability contracts in preventing the overinvestment problem due to the additional
benefits in screening.
How does joint liability change the borrowing rates, compared to individual liability
contracts? When there are no leaks, for borrowers in Ω1, the rates remain identical in
joint and individual contracts. But for borrowers in Ω2 and Ω3, the rates may vary. When
R3 ≥ R2 + pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 ), the bank cannot prevent the overinvestment problem and therefore
these consumers borrow at the same rate they did with individual contracts, r2 = R2 − u¯p .
If R3 < R2 + pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 ), the bank can drive the applicants in Ω3 out of the market with a
joint liability contract with the following terms:
r2 =R2 − u¯
p2
,
c =
u¯
p2
.
So when R3 < R2+ pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 ), the borrowing rate r2 for the unwealthy consumers is lower.
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The bank can still extract all of the surplus of Ω2, and they do not need to compensate for
those in Ω3.
3.3.2 Strength of Ties and Other Motivations for Lending
In our benchmark model, we assumed that all informal lenders are identical, independent
of the type of social relationship with the borrower. In reality, the strength of ties of social
connections may matter and change the formal and informal lending environment. Our main
model focuses on the density of social connections (the degree of mixing between classes)
when studying informal loans. It is natural to consider that informal borrowing ability
is determined not only by the proportion of other segment consumers, but also how one
knows these consumers. For instance, close family and friends may extend loans with zero
interest. Alternatively, some may lend for reasons like altruism or investing into a personal
relationship. In this section, we explore how the strength of ties influences informal lending.
We also formulate individuals’ additional utility from social capital when their friends and
family gain wealth.
For formal lending only the strength of ties between the consumers in Ω1 and Ω2 matter.
Suppose i ∈ Ω1 is linked to j ∈ Ω2. Let the returns from lending be joint for these two
individuals, that is, i cares not only about his personal payoff but also about the expected
payoff of his friend, j. We denote the strength of tie ij by tij ∈ {0, 1}, where tij = 1 implies
that the tie between i and j is strong and otherwise the tie is weak. Consequently, connected
consumer subsegments can be separated into two groups conditional on the strength of their
tie. Ω∗1 is divided into Ωˆ∗1 and Ω˜∗1; and Ω∗2 is divided into Ωˆ∗2 and Ω˜∗2 where borrowers Ωˆ∗1
(Ω˜∗1) have strong (weak) ties with friends in Ωˆ∗2 (Ω˜∗2). Let α be the probability that a tie is
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strong. Then, the probability that a consumer in Ω1 is strongly (weakly) linked to another
consumer in Ω2 is αq ((1− α)q).
We assume that borrowers with weak ties still only care about the expected return and
we represent the utility of borrower i from lending to a friend j at rate rˆ with strong ties as
a composite term of the expected return from lending to his friend (Ei) and the return of
his friend on her investment f(Ej):
Ui(rˆ) = Ei + f(Ej).
Similar to our benchmark model, the individual return of customer i depends on the proba-
bility of success of the friend’s investment, keeping the outside option:
Ei = p(rˆ − r1)− (1− p) + u¯
or,
Ei = p(rˆ − r2) + u¯
This expression represents the case in which customer i borrows the unsecured loans and
then lends to his friend. p(rˆ− r2) is the expected return if the project of his friend succeeds.
The return of j from her entrepreneurial investment is:
Ej = p(R2 − rˆ).
For simplicity, we assume that dUi(rˆ)
drˆ
< 0 and f(Ej) is large enough, so the borrowers with
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strong ties are always willing to lend to their friends with the lowest interest rate. It is easy
to check that the lowest interest rate is r1 − u¯ or r2 − u¯ because customer i can use other
income u¯ to help his friend pay interest.
The lender still has three different kinds of strategies: (1) to offer only the secured loan,
(2) to offer only the unsecured loan, and (3) to offer both the secured and the unsecured
loans. We discuss the lender’s optimal strategy in Proposition 3.27.
Proposition 3.27. Let α∗1 ≡ pR1−u¯−1pu¯+pR2−u¯−p , α∗2 ≡
pR2−u¯−1
pu¯+pR2−u¯−p , α∗3 ≡
pR1−u¯−1
pu¯+1−p and α∗4 ≡ pR2−u¯−1pu¯+1−p .
When conditions (A1)-(A7) hold and consumers with strong ties are willing to offer the lowest
interest rate, the optimal strategies of the lender and the resulting financial inclusion outcomes
are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Density of Social Connections and Financial Inclusion with non-financial Utility
Density of Social Connections Segments Served
q ≥ q∗1, q ≥ q∗2
α ≥ α∗2 and α ≥ 1q q∗1 Ωˆ∗1
α ≥ α∗2 and α < 1q q∗1, or α < α∗2 and α ≥ (1− 1q q∗1)α∗3 Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3
α < α∗2 and α < (1− 1q q∗1)α∗3 Ω∗1.
q ≥ q∗1, q < q∗2
α ≥ 1
q
q∗1 and α ≥ 1qα∗1 Ωˆ∗1
α ≥ 1
q
α∗1 and α < 1q q∗1, or α < 1qα∗1 and α ≥ 1qα∗4(1− q∗1) Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3
α < 1
q
α∗1 and α < 1qα∗4(1− q∗1), Ω1
q < q∗1
α ≥ 1
q
α∗3 − α∗4 Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3
α < 1
q
α∗3 − α∗4 Ω1, Ω∗∗2 and Ω3
We can see that when the proportion of consumers with strong ties (Ωˆ∗1) are large enough
(αq ≥ q∗1 and αq ≥ α∗1 = q∗2α∗2 ), the lender will choose to give up on all other consumers and
only serve Ωˆ∗1. When the density of social connections decreases (through either α or q), the
lender will choose to lend to more consumers. Eventually, when α < 1
q
α∗3 − α∗4 and q < q∗1,
the lender will only give up on Ω∗2.
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So how do alternative motives influence financial inclusion? Motives such as helping
a friend create additional competition for the lender, creating the pressure at first to cut
down on rates, and thereby helps consumers to access credit. If the utility from other
motives increases further, it reduces the attractiveness of investing into income-constrained
consumers, resulting in the bank pulling out of these markets and an overall limitation in the
access to financial products. As a consequence, the entrepreneurial opportunities decrease
in this market. Strength of ties, on the other hand, creates an additional condition which
influences the availability of funds. For the same level of mixing between the segments, if
individuals generally hold stronger ties, financial access will be more limited with the same
intuition.
3.4 Conclusions and Key Insights
Few sectors serve as vital a purpose as financial services do for the well-being of consumers;
enabling their everyday transactions as well as life-long investments. Unfortunately, a sig-
nificant number of consumers around the world lack access to financial services to realize
any significant investments into their future. The World Bank estimates this number to be
around 2 billion18. These consumers lack the ability to obtain loans for an entrepreneurial
investment, even though some of them are perfectly creditworthy. Among top reasons for
the lack of credit is imperfect information of lenders about consumers risk and inability to
screen applicants. As these consumers cannot borrow from banks, they end up borrowing in-
formally from other resources, and it is not how it influences access to financing from formal
sources and entrepreneurial output. Informal credit is easy to access since it can be provided
18Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview
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by anyone without any formal screening process, or having to comply with any regulations.
There is often no legal process to be a loan provider. Moreover informal loans do not require
a collateral.
In this paper, we study how the availability of informal opportunities influences the type
of contracts offered in a market as well as the borrowing terms for consumers. Studying
the reasons behind the success of entrepreneurial investment is particularly important when
consumers face stagnant poverty. As the available contracts change, the volume and innova-
tiveness of the entrepreneurial activity also change in a market. A number of earlier studies
pointed out to the problems resulting from the existence of informal markets (Aleem, 1990;
Karlan and Zinman, 2008; Ayyagari et al., 2010). Our findings show that while informal
borrowing can reduce the volume of entrepreneurial activity, it also increases the quality
of funded ideas. This is because informal lending takes place only when the wealthier con-
sumers find it worthwhile to lend to others if they find arbitrage opportunities. As a result,
surviving and funded ideas are more innovative and are associated with higher returns.
To study how financial inclusion changes with informal lending opportunities, our model
uses a parameter indicating the density of connections in a society, or the degree of mix-
ing between the (relatively) wealthy and the unwealthy consumers. When formal lending
fuels informal exchanges as opposed to investment in microentreprises, the volume of en-
trepreneurial activity by the wealthy is reduced, but indirectly, these informal funds support
the entrepreneurial activity of those with lesser wealth. Through informal lending, con-
sumers with productive ideas can obtain loans. So banks indirectly fund the entrepreneurial
ideas associated with higher returns. When the volume of informal lending is small to mod-
erate, it helps to reduce the cost of entrepreneurship since lenders are in competition with
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the informal market. As the informal borrowing opportunities increase further, however,
the lender pulls out of the unsecured lending market and restricts credit access. This is
because it can earn higher profits if it lends to the wealthy at a higher rate. By restricting
the credit access of the unwealthy, the bank creates opportunities for the wealthy to lend
to these consumers. So some of the wealthy low risk consumers choose not to invest in an
SME and only a portion of the unwealthy who can borrow informally can pursue their ideas.
Entrepreneurial activity is reduced. Despite the low volume of entrepreneurial activity, in
this case, the average investment is more innovative and is associated with a higher return.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to study financial inclusion and the impact of
informal lending. Our results in part explain the low financial inclusion observed in emerging
countries with collectivist cultures where informal lending is common practice. It predicts
that a more active informal market will discourage banks from extending loans to the overall
population. As a result, small business investment in these countries remain low and many
individuals face permanent poverty.
Policy Relevance. Expansion of financial inclusion is a priority for many NGOs. The
Obama White House also declared that access to safe and affordable financial instruments is
a high priority. Governments such as the one in India battles through their Central Bank to
prevent informal money lending to spread access to the formal banking system (Parussini,
2015).
One important consequence of lack of credit access in both United States and around
the world is the reduced investment into activities which can help low income consumers to
move permanently out of poverty, such as investment into a small family owned business.
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While there has been some improvement in the past decades, financial inclusion is still low
in many countries. We show that the underlying reasons behind low financial access have
to do with the outside borrowing options. In a tight community, the informal opportunities
created can incentivize firms to pull out of markets.
Surveys from developing countries show that informal lenders generally charge interest
rates that are higher than the interest rates charged by institutional lenders. This difference
raised interest from the managers and policy makers. Our study explains precisely why it is
rational to expect such a gap in the interest rates. It is because the banks close their doors
to those who cannot borrow without a collateral, and further increase the interest rates on
the wealthy who can. As some of the wealthy choose to lend to others at a higher interest
rate (than their borrowing rate), interest rates are elevated for all consumers.
One consideration for managers and policy makers to reduce informal lending activity is
to improve the ability of the banks to screen candidates, and thereby reduce the information
asymmetry problem. Alternate contracts (such as group borrowing opportunities) and use
of new and big data methods to evaluate consumer risk more precisely (Wei et al., 2016￿
can reduce the adverse consequences of information asymmetry. We saw in the analysis that
because of the imperfections in screening, the lender did not always have an incentive to cut
interest rates even though it could increase its market share. But if the lender could increase
its screening power, it could try to serve a larger portion of the market and can cut down
on the interest rates without having to worry about the overinvestment problem.
Moreover, on the demand side, borrowers are generally not well-informed about the
problems about screening applicants. By voluntarily providing more information about
themselves - through opening of savings accounts, borrowing and repaying small amounts
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- consumers can help to resolve some of the information asymmetry problems and improve
their chance of attaining credit when they need it.
Future Research. Since they have such wide consequences for a consumer’s quality of
living, issues related to access to finance are at the heart of entrepreneurship. Considering
the importance of both consumer finance and innovation, it is surprising that in literature,
the studies focusing on these topics, particularly the relationship between them are relatively
rare (Hauser et al., 2006). Recent studies are focusing on expanding credit access and its
outcomes (Wei et al., 2016), but given the importance of improving financial access, there
is a need for additional analytical and empirical studies which can expand the scope of
the literature. Future studies can focus on other key aspects of the developing economies
and their challenges, focusing on stagnant gender or racial discrimination issues. Difficulty
in accessing credit could well be the reason for the lower innovative output observed in
developing economies. There is a need for future research which can address these additional
problems. Moreover, while our study captures the benefits of joint lending about overcoming
information asymmetry, the literature (e.g., Ghatak, 2000) argued that there are some other
benefits such as monitoring or enforcement of repayment. We do not study these issues in
this study and future studies may also consider these benefits.
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Appendix
5.1 Chapter 1
5.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.1.
The proof follows the classical argument of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Sorin (1999).
I start with several lemmas.
Lemma 5.4. Fix σ and pi0. For any ε, ψ > 0 and θ ∈ Θ, there exists a positive integer K,
such that
Qθ
(|{t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθ) ≥ ψ} | ≥ K) ≤ ε
where
dt(P,Qθ) = sup
C∈Fˆ t+1
|P (C|Fˆ t)(ω)−Qθ(C|Fˆ t)(ω)|
Lemma 5.5. Fix σ and pi0. For any η > 0, θ ∈ Θ and K ≥ 1,
P
(|{t ≥ 1 : V tθ ≥ η} | ≥ K) ≤ 1Kη2
where V tθ = EP (|pit+1(θ)− pit(θ)|Fˆ t)(ω)
Lemma 5.6. For any θ ∈ Θ, V tθ ≥ pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ).
These three lemmas are very similar to Lemma 15.4.3-15.4.5 in Mailath and Samuelson
(2006) so I omit the proofs here.
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Let Gε,θˆ(ω) = {t ∈ N; ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆ)(ω) ≥ ε}.
Lemma 5.7. For any ε > 0, and any θˆ ∈ Θ, there existsM > 0 such that Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣G ε2 ,θˆ
∣∣∣∣ ≥M}) ≤
ε
Proof. Let
dt(Qθˆ, Qθ) = sup
C∈Fˆ t
|Qθˆ(C|Fˆ t−1)(ω)−Qθ(C|Fˆ t−1)(ω)|
According to Lemma 5.4, for any ε > 0 , there exists a positive integer K∗, such that for
any K ≥ K∗,
Qθˆ
(∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ K) ≤ ε2
According to Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6, for any η > 0 and θ ∈ Θ,
P
(|{t ≥ 1 : pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η} | ≥ K) ≤ P (|{t ≥ 1 : V tθ ≥ η} | ≥ K) ≤ 1Kη2
Since |Θ| = 2N ,
{
ω : |{t ≥ 1 : ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η}| ≥ 2NK
}
⊆{ω : ∃θ s.t. |{t ≥ 1 : pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η}| ≥ K}
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so
P
(|{t ≥ 1 : ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η}| ≥ 2NK)
≤P (|{t ≥ 1 : pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η} | ≥ K)
≤ 1
Kη2
Since P =∑θ pi0(θ)Qθ ≥ pi0(θˆ)Qθˆ,
Qθˆ
(|{t ≥ 1 : ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η}| ≥ 2NK)
≤ 1
pi0(θˆ)
P
(|{t ≥ 1 : ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ η}| ≥ 2NK)
≤ 1
Kη2pi0(θˆ)
For any t, pit(θ)dt(Qθˆ, Qθ) ≤ pit(θ)dt(P,Qθˆ) + pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ), so
pit(θ)dt(Qθˆ, Qθ) ≥
ε
2
=⇒pit(θ)dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥
ε
4
or pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ ε
4
=⇒dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥
ε
4
or pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ ε
4
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Therefore, let M = (2N + 1)K and K = max
{⌈
32
ε3pi0(θˆ)
⌉
, K∗
}
Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣G ε2 ,θˆ
∣∣∣∣ ≥M})
=Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣G ε2 ,θˆ
∣∣∣∣ ≥M} ∩{∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ K})
+Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣G ε2 ,θˆ
∣∣∣∣ ≥M} ∩{∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ < K})
≤Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ K})
+Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) < ε4 and∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆ)(ω) ≥ ε2}
∣∣∣∣ ≥M −K})
≤Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : dt(P,Qθˆ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ K})
+Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣ {t ≥ 1 : ∃θ s.t. pit(θ)dt(P,Qθ) ≥ ε4}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2NK})
≤ε
2
+
16
Kε2pi0(θˆ)
≤ε
I can now prove this Proposition.
Proof. Fix θˆ = (ξ(αˆ1), d). I also try to provide a lower bound on the payoff to Player 1 of
normal type mimicking commitment type. Since the true monitoring structure is d, the true
distribution is Qθˆ. The payoff of Player 1 of normal type mimicking commitment type is
EQθˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
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According to Lemma 5.7,
Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣G ε2 ,θˆ
∣∣∣∣ < M}) ≥ 1− ε
which means when the true monitoring structure is d and Player 1 mimics commitment
type, with probability greater than or equal to 1 − ε
2
, the number of periods that ∃θ s.t.
pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆ)(ω) ≥ ε2 is at mostM . For the rest of the time, for any θ, pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆ)(ω) <
ε
2
.
The next thing I want to prove is that, if for any θ, pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆ)(ω) < ε2 , then Player
2’s strategy is a d-weak-ε-confirming best response to αˆ1. For any di,
pit(di) = pi
t((ξ0, di)) + pi
t((ξ(αˆ1), di))
dt(Q(ξ0,di), Qθˆ) = ||ρdi, αt1 − ρd, αˆ1||∞
and
dt(Q(ξ(αˆ1),di), Qθˆ) = ||ρdi, αˆ1 − ρd, αˆ1||∞
120
Then
pit(di)||pi
t((ξ0, di))
pit(di)
ρdi, αt1 +
pit((ξ(αˆ1), di))
pit(di)
ρdi, αˆ1 − ρd, αˆ1 ||∞
≤pit((ξ0, di))||ρdi, αt1 − ρd, αˆ1||∞ + pit((ξ(αˆ1), di))||ρdi, αˆ1 − ρd, αˆ1||∞
≤ε
so Player 2’s strategy is a d-weak-ε-confirming best response to αˆ1. Therefore,
EQθˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
=Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ < M})EQθˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
∣∣∣∣ {∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ < M}
)
+
(
1−Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ < M}))EQθˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
∣∣∣∣ {∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ ≥M}
)
≥Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ < M})(δMvw,dα1 (ε) + (1− δM) min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2)
)
+
(
1−Qθˆ
({∣∣∣∣Gε,θˆ∣∣∣∣ < M})) min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2)
Since vw,dα1 (ε) ≥ min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2),
EQθˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
≥ (1− ε) δMvw,dα1 (ε) + (1− (1− ε)δM) min(α1,α2)u1(α1, α2)
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5.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.1 part 1.
Proof. Let Adi1 (αˆ1) = {α1 ∈ △(A1) : ∃d ∈ D s.t. ρdi, αˆ1 = ρd, α1}. Then
D ⊆ D˜1i ⇐⇒ for any α1 ∈ Adi1 (αˆ1), BR2(α1) = BR2(αˆ1)
It is easy to check that BR2(αˆ1) ⊆ Bw, dε (αˆ1). I only need to show that there exists ε∗,
such that for any ε < ε∗, Bw, dε (αˆ1) ⊆ BR2(αˆ1).
Fix any a2 /∈ BR2(αˆ1), and aˆ2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1). Let β = inf
α1∈Adi1 (αˆ1)
[u2(α1, aˆ2)− u2(α1, a2)] .
Since Adi1 (αˆ1) is compact, β > 0. For any
(
α′1,1, ..., α
′
1,N
)
and (pi’(d1), ..., pi′(dN)) satisfying
the conditions in the definition of di-weak-ε-confirming best response and any k, , if ||ρd, α′1,k−
ρdi, αˆ1 ||∞ >
√
ε , then pi′(d) < √ε. According to the definition of Adi1 (αˆ1), when ε is small
enough,
||ρd, α′1,k − ρdi, αˆ1||∞ ≤
√
ε =⇒ ∃αˆ1,k ∈ Adi1 (αˆ1) s.t. ||α′1,k − αˆ1,k||∞ = O(
√
ε)
Let D√ε = {dk ∈ D : ||ρd, α′1,k − ρdi, αˆ1||∞ ≤
√
ε}. Since aˆ2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1,k) = BR2(αˆ1) and
a2 /∈ BR2(αˆ1) = BR2(αˆ1,k), u2(αˆ1, aˆ2) > u2(αˆ1, a2) , and, for any k such that dk ∈ D√ε,
u2(αˆ1,k, aˆ2) > u2(αˆ1,k, a2).
∑
dk∈D√ε pi
′(dk) [u2(αˆ1,k, aˆ2)− u2(αˆ1,k, a2)] ≥ β(1−
∑
dk∈D√ε pi(dk)) >
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0. Since u2 is continuous,
∑
dk∈D√ε pi
′(dk)
[
u2(α
′
1,k, aˆ2)− u2(α′1,k, a2)
] ≥ β +O(√ε) . Then
u2(
∑
dk∈D
pi′(dk)α′1,k, a2)
=
∑
dk∈D
pi′(dk)u2(α′1,k, a2)
=
∑
dk∈D√ε
pi′(dk)u2(α′1,k, a2) +O(
√
ε)
≤
∑
dk∈D√ε
pi′(dk)u2(α′1,k, aˆ2) + β +O(
√
ε)
=
∑
dk∈D
pi′(dk)u2(α′1,k, aˆ2) + β +O(
√
ε)
=u2(
∑
dk∈D
pi′(dk)α′1,k, aˆ2) + β +O(
√
ε)
β does not depend on the choice of
(
α′1,1, ..., α
′
1,N
)
and (pi′(d1), ..., pi′(dN)). Therefore, there
exists ε∗, such that for any ε < ε∗, a2 /∈ Bdiε (αˆ1). Then Bw, diε (αˆ1) ⊆ BR2(αˆ1).
5.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.1 part 2.
Let τi(θ, ε)(ω) = inf{t ≥ 0 : pit(θ)pit(θˆi) > ε}, C
t
i (θ, ε) = {ω : τi(θ, ε) ≤ t}, C∞i (ε) = {ω :
there exists θ ∈ Θ˜1−i and t, such that pi
t(θ)(ht2)
pit(θˆi)(ht2)
> ε} and Cˆ∞i (ε) = {ω : there exists θ ∈
Θ˜1−i and t, such that pi
t(θ) > ε} . I start with several lemmas.
Lemma 5.8. Qθˆi(Cˆ∞i (ε)) <
∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
εpi0(θˆi)
.
Proof. For any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i, using the observation that pi
t(θ)(ht2)
pit(θˆi)(ht2)
is a martingale under the
probability measure Qθˆi , accourding to the Optional Stopping Theorem,
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pi0(θ)
pi0(θˆi)
≥EQθˆi
(
pimin{τi(θ, ε), t}(θ)(hmin{τi(θ, ε), t}2 )
pimin{τi(θ, ε), t}(θˆi)(h
min{τi(θ, ε), t}
2 )
)
≥Qθˆi(Cti (θ, ε))EQθˆi
(
pimin{τi(θ, ε), t}(θ)(hmin{τi(θ, ε), t}2 )
pimin{τi(θ, ε), t}(θˆi)(h
min{τi(θ, ε), t}
2 )
∣∣∣∣Cti (θ, ε)
)
=Qθˆi(C
t
i (θ, ε))EQθˆi
(
piτi(θ, ε)(θ)(h
τi(θ, ε)
2 )
piτi(θ, ε)(θˆi)(h
τi(θ, ε)
2 )
∣∣∣∣Cti (θ, ε)
)
>εQθˆi(C
t
i (θ, ε))
Since Cti (θ, ε) ⊆ Ct+1i (θ, ε), Qθˆi(C∞i (θ, ε)) <
pi0(θ)
εpi0(θˆi)
. Then
Qθˆi(Cˆ
∞
i (ε)) ≤ Qθˆi(C∞i (ε)) ≤
∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
Qθˆi(C
∞
i (θ, ε)) <
∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
εpi0(θˆi)
.
Lemma 5.9. Fix any di ∈ D. There exists ε∗ > 0 such that for any t, if for any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i,
pit(θ) < ε∗, and for any θ ∈ Θ, pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆi) < ε∗, then at2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1).
Proof. In period t, Player 2’s utility is
EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
P ({θ}|h2,t)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t, θ
)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t, θ
)
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For any θ ∈ Θ, pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆi) < ε, so either pit(θ) <
√
ε or dt(Qθ, Qθˆi) <
√
ε . Let
Θt√
ε
= {θ ∈ Θ : pit(θ) < √ε}. Then
EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t
)
=
∑
θ∈Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t, θ
)
+
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a
t
2) | h2,t, θ
)
For any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i, pit(θ) < ε <
√
ε, so Θ˜1−i ⊆ Θt√ε. For any θ ∈ Θ\Θt√ε, either θ ∈ Θˆ or
θ ∈ Θ˜1i . If θ ∈ Θˆ , then EP (αt1 | h2,t, θ) = αˆ1. According to the definition of D˜1i , if d ∈ D˜1i
and ρdi, αˆ1 = ρd, α1 , then BR2(α1) = BR2(αˆ1). Therefore, if θ ∈ Θ˜1i and dt(Qθ, Qθˆi) <
√
ε ,
when ε is small enough, there exists αθ ∈ △(A1) such that ||EP (αt1 | h2,t, θ)−αθ||∞ = O(
√
ε),
ρdi, αˆ1 = ρd, αθ and BR2(αθ) = BR2(αˆ1).
Fix any a2 /∈ BR2(αˆ1), and aˆ2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1). Let β = inf
α1∈{α1∈△(A1): ∃d∈D˜1i , s.t. ρdi, αˆ1=ρd, α1}
[u2(α1, aˆ2)− u2(α1, a2)] .
Since {α1 ∈ △(A1) : ∃d ∈ D˜1i , s.t. ρdi, αˆ1 = ρd, α1} is compact, β > 0. Thus, for any
θ ∈ Θ\Θt√
ε
, there exists αθ ∈ △(A1) such that ||EP (αt1 | h2,t, θ) − αθ||∞ = O(
√
ε) and
u2(αθ, aˆ2) > u2(αθ, a˜2) + β .
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Therefore,
EP
(
u2(a
t
1, aˆ2) | h2,t
)− EP (u2(at1, a˜2) | h2,t)
=
∑
θ∈Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, aˆ2) | h2,t, θ
)
+
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, aˆ2) | h2,t, θ
)
−
∑
θ∈Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a˜2) | h2,t, θ
)− ∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a˜2) | h2,t, θ
)
=O(
√
ε) +
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)EP
(
u2(a
t
1, aˆ2)− u2(at1, a˜2) | h2,t, θ
)
=O(
√
ε) +
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)
(
u2(EP (α
t
1 | h2,t, θ), aˆ2)− u2(EP (αt1 | h2,t, θ), a˜2)
)
=O(
√
ε) +
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ) (u2(αθ, aˆ2)− u2(αθ, a˜2))
>O(
√
ε) +
∑
θ∈Θ\Θt√
ε
pit(θ)β
so there exists ε∗ > 0, such that ,
EP
(
u2(a
t
1, aˆ2) | h2,t
)
> EP
(
u2(a
t
1, a˜2) | h2,t
)
then at2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1).
Proof. Now I can prove the proposition.
Fix a monitoring structure di and an ε > 0. According to Lemma 5.7, for any ε1 > 0,
there exists M > 0 such that Qθˆi
({∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ ≥M}) ≤ 2ε1. According to Lemma 5.8, for
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any ε2, Qθˆi(Cˆ∞i (ε2)) <
∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
ε2pi0(θˆi)
. Then,
Qθˆi
({∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ < M} ∩ [Ω\Cˆ∞i (ε2)]) ≥ 1− 2ε1 − ∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
ε2pi0(θˆi)
Therefore,
EQ
θ0
i∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
≥EQθˆi
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(αˆ1, at2)
)
≥Qθˆi
({∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ < M} ∩ [Ω\Cˆ∞i (ε2)])
∗ EQθˆi
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(αˆ1, at2)
∣∣∣∣ {∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ < M} ∩ [Ω\Cˆ∞i (ε2)]
)
≥
1− 2ε1 − ∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
ε2pi0(θˆi)

∗ EQθˆi
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(αˆ1, at2)
∣∣∣∣ {∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ < M} ∩ [Ω\Cˆ∞i (ε2)]
)
Fix any di ∈ D. There exists ε∗ > 0 such that for any t, if for any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i, pit(θ) < ε, and
for any θ ∈ Θ, pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆi) < ε, then at2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1).
According to Lemma 5.9, there exist ε∗1 > 0 such that for any ε1 < ε∗1,
EQθˆi
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(αˆ1, at2)
∣∣∣∣ {∣∣∣∣Gε1,θˆi∣∣∣∣ < M} ∩ [Ω\C∞i (ε∗1)]
)
≥δMuαˆ1 +
(
1− δM) min
(α1,α2)
u1(α1, α2)
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If pi0(θ) < η, then
EQ
θ0
i∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
≥
1− 2ε1 − ∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
pi0(θ)
ε∗1pi0(θˆi)
 ∗ [δMuαˆ1 + (1− δM) min
(α1,α2)
u1(α1, α2)
]
≥
1− 2ε1 − ∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
η
ε∗1min
j
{pi0(θˆj)}
 ∗ [δMuαˆ1 + (1− δM) min
(α1,α2)
u1(α1, α2)
]
Since
lim
δ→1
ε1, η→0
1− 2ε1 − ∑
θ∈Θ˜1−i
η
ε∗1min
j
{pi0(θˆj)}
 ∗ [δMuαˆ1 + (1− δM) min
(α1,α2)
u1(α1, α2)
]
= uαˆ1
there exists δ∗and η∗ such that if for any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i, pi0(θ) < η∗, and δ > δ∗, then normal type
of Player 1’s payoff in any BNE under monitoring structure di is greater than or equal to
uαˆ1 − ε.
5.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.2.
Let G˜(ε, θ) = {t ∈ N; pit(θ) < ε}. I start with several lemmas.
Lemma 5.10. For any γ ∈ (0, 1] and θ ∈ Θ, Qθ(∪t≥1 {pit(θ) ≤ γpi0(θ)}) ≤ γP (∪t≥1 {pit(θ) ≤ γpi0(θ)})
This lemma is very similar to Lemma 15.4.6 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) so I omit
the proofs here.
Lemma 5.11. For any θ, θˆ ∈ Θ, and any t,
Qθˆ
(
{pit(θˆ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θ) ≥ ε1}
)
≥ ε2Qθ
(
{pit(θˆ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θ) ≥ ε1}
)
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Proof. Let Hˆ t2 = {ht2 : pit(θˆ)(ht2) ≥ ε2 and pit(θ)(ht2) ≥ ε1}. For any ht2 ∈H t2 , by definition,
pit(θˆ)(ht2)Qθ(h
t
2) = pi
t(θ)(ht2)Qθˆ(h
t
2)
then ∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
pit(θˆ)(ht2)Qθ(h
t
2) =
∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
pit(θ)(ht2)Qθˆ(h
t
2)
so
Qθˆ
(
{pit(θˆ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θ) ≥ ε1}
)
=
∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
Qθˆ(h
t
2)
≥
∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
pit(θ)(ht2)Qθˆ(h
t
2)
=
∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
pit(θˆ)(ht2)Qθ(h
t
2)
≥ε2
∑
ht2∈Hˆ
t
2
Qθ(h
t
2)
=ε2Qθ
(
{pit(θˆ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θ) ≥ ε1}
)
Now I can prove the proposition.
Proof. The proof can be seperated into two parts.
Part 1
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that this proposition is false. And let i∗ be the
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smallest i that the statement is false. Then there exists ε∗ > 0 and an increasing sequence
{δ∗m}∞ such that lim
m→∞
δ∗m = 1 and given any δ∗m, there exists a BNE such that normal type of
Player 1’s payoff in this equilibrium under monitoring structure di∗ is strictly smaller than
uαˆ1 − ε∗:
EQ
θ0
i∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
< uαˆ1 − ε∗
Consider the deviation in which Player 1 always plays aˆ1. Then
ε∗ <uαˆ1 − EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(αˆ1, at2)
)
=EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
])
Then for any ε1, ε2 > 0
ε∗ <EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
])
=EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )(t)
)
+ EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1
(N\G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ ))∩
(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)(t)
)
+ EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1
(N\G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ ))∩
[
N\
(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)](t)
)
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According to Lemma 5.10, Qθˆi∗ (∪t≥1
{
pit(θˆi∗) ≤ γpi0(θˆi∗)
}
) ≤ γP (∪t≥1
{
pit(θˆi∗) ≤ γpi0(θˆi∗)
}
) ≤
γ, so
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )(t)
)
≤uαˆ1EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−11G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )(t)
)
≤uαˆ1Qθˆi∗ (∪t≥1
{
pit(θˆi∗) ≤ ε1
}
)
≤ uαˆ1
pi0(θˆi∗)
ε1
The second term:
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1
(N\G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ ))∩
(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)(t)
)
≤EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)(t)
)
According to Lemma 5.7, for any ε2 > 0 there exists M such that
Qθˆi∗
({∣∣∣∣Gε2,θˆi∗
∣∣∣∣ ≥M}) ≤ 2ε2
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so
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)(t)
)
=EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)
∩Gε2,θˆi∗
(t)
)
+ EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)
∩
(
N\Gε2,θˆi∗
)(t)
)
≤2ε2uαˆ1 + (1− δM)uαˆ1
+ EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)
∩
(
N\Gε2,θˆi∗
)(t)
)
in which
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)
∩
(
N\Gε2,θˆi∗
) = 1
⇐⇒for any θ ∈ Θ˜1−i∗ , pit(θ) < ε2, and for any θ ∈ Θ pit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθˆi∗ ) < ε2
According to Lemma 5.9 there exists ε∗2 > 0 such that for any ε2 < ε∗2,
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)
∩
(
N\Gε2,θˆi∗
) = 1
=⇒at2 ∈ BR2(αˆ1).
132
then
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)(t)
)
≤2ε2uαˆ1 + (1− δM)uαˆ1
Then
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1
(N\G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ ))∩
[
N\
(
∩
θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
G˜(ε2, θ)
)](t)
)
>ε∗ − uαˆ1
pi0(θˆi∗)
ε1 − 2ε2uαˆ1 − (1− δM)uαˆ1
There exists ε˜1 = ε
∗pi0(θˆi∗ )
8uαˆ1
> 0, ε˜2 = min{ε∗2, ε
∗
8uαˆ1
} > 0, such that for any ε1 < ε˜1,and any
ε2 < ε˜2, uαˆ1pi0(θˆi∗ )ε1+2ε2uαˆ1 <
ε∗
4
. There also exists δˆ such that for any δ > δˆ, (1−δM)uαˆ1 < ε
∗
4
.
Then
ε∗ − uαˆ1
pi0(θˆi∗)
ε1 − 2ε2uαˆ1 − (1− δM)uαˆ1 >
ε∗
2
Since
(
N\G˜(ε1, θˆi∗)
)
∩
[
N\
(
∩θ∈Θ˜1−i∗ G˜(ε2, θ)
)]
=N\
(
G˜(ε1, θˆi∗) ∪
(
∩θ∈Θ˜1−i∗ G˜(ε2, θ)
))
=N\
(
∩θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
[
G˜(ε1, θˆi∗) ∪ G˜(ε2, θ)
])
= ∪θ∈Θ˜1−i∗
(
N\
[
G˜(ε1, θˆi∗) ∪ G˜(ε2, θ)
])
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Since D−i ⊆ D˜1i and Di ⊆ D˜1i ∪ D˜2i , D˜1−i ⊆ D˜2i . Therefore there exists iˆ < i∗ such that
diˆ ∈ D˜2i∗ and
EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
uαˆ1 − u1(αˆ1, at2)
]
1N\[G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )∪G˜(ε2, θ0iˆ )]
(t)
)
>
ε∗
2N
so
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθˆi∗
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)
=(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1EQθˆi∗
(
1N\[G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )∪G˜(ε2, θ0iˆ )]
(t)
)
=EQθˆi∗
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−11N\[G˜(ε1, θˆi∗ )∪G˜(ε2, θ0iˆ )]
(t)
)
>
ε∗
2Nuαˆ1
in which
N\
[
G˜(ε1, θˆi∗) ∪ G˜(ε2, θ0iˆ )
]
= {t ∈ N; pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
To summarize, in part 1, I have shown that, if i∗ is the smallest i that the statement
is false, then there exists ε∗ > 0, δˆ > 0, and an increasing sequence {δ∗m}∞, such that
lim
m→∞
δ∗m = 1 and given any δ∗m > δˆ, there exists ε˜1 > 0, ε˜2 > 0, iˆ < i∗, and a BNE, such that
diˆ ∈ D˜2i and in equilibrium for any ε1 < ε˜1,and ε2 < ε˜2,
(1− δ∗m)
∞∑
t=1
δ∗m
t−1Qθˆi∗
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)
>
ε∗
2Nuαˆ1
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Part 2
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
=EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
+EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
+ EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1N\{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
According to Lemma 5.7, for any ε3 > 0 there exists Mˆ such that
Qθ0
iˆ
({∣∣∣∣Gε3,θ0iˆ
∣∣∣∣ ≥ Mˆ}) ≤ 2ε3
Then
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
≤
[
2ε3 + (1− δMˆ)
]
u¯1
=
[
2ε3 + (1− δMˆ)
]
uαˆ1
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According to Lemma 5.11,
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθ0
iˆ
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)
≥ε2 (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθˆi∗
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)
>
ε2ε
∗
2Nuαˆ1
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
Let’s consider all the periods such that
1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t) = 1
⇐⇒pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2, pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1, and for any θ ∈ Θpit(θ)dt(Qθ, Qθ0
iˆ
) < ε3
Then dt(Qθˆi∗ , Qθ0iˆ ) <
ε3
ε1
. According to the definition of D˜2i , for any d ∈ D˜2i and any
α1 ∈ △(A1), if ρdi∗ , aˆ1 = ρd, α1 , then for any a2 ∈ A2, uαˆ1 > u1(α1, a2). When ε3ε1 is small
enough,
dt(Qθˆi∗ , Qθ0iˆ
) <
ε3
ε1
=⇒ ∃αθ0
iˆ
s.t. ||EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
at1|{pit(θ0iˆ ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1} ∩ N\Gε3,θ0iˆ
)
−αθ0
iˆ
||∞ = O(ε3
ε1
) and ρdi∗ , aˆ1 = ρdiˆ, αθ0
iˆ
Since {α1 ∈ △(A1) : ∃d ∈ D˜2i , s.t. ρdi∗ , αˆ1 = ρd, α1} is compact and A2 is finite, β =
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inf
α1 ∈ {α1 ∈ △(A1) : ∃d ∈ D˜2i , s.t. ρdi∗ , αˆ1 = ρd, α1}
α2 ∈ △ (A2)
[uαˆ1 − u1(α1, α2)] > 0 and β < uαˆ1 does
not depend on the choice of iˆ. Therefore, there exists an ε˜4 > 0 such that for any ε3ε1 ≤ ε˜4, if
dt(Qθˆi∗ , Qθ0iˆ
) < ε3
ε1
, then EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
u1(a
t
1, a
t
2)|{pit(θ0iˆ ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1} ∩ N\Gε3,θ0iˆ
)
≤ uαˆ1−
β
2
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
=(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθ0
iˆ
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1} ∩ N\Gε3,θ0
iˆ
)
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
u1(a
t
1, a
t
2)|{pit(θ0iˆ ) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1} ∩ N\Gε3,θ0iˆ
)
≤ (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθ0
iˆ
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)(
uαˆ1 −
β
2
)
The last term is
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2) ∗ 1N\{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1} ∗ 1N\Gε3,θ0iˆ (t)
)
≤EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u¯1 ∗ 1N\{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1}
)
=(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1uαˆ1EQθ0
iˆ
[
1− 1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1}(t)
]
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Then
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
≤
[
2ε3 + (1− δMˆ)
]
uαˆ1
+(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Qθ0
iˆ
(
{pit(θ0
iˆ
) ≥ ε2 and pit(θˆi∗) ≥ ε1}
)(
uαˆ1 −
β
2
)
+ (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1uαˆ1EQθ0
iˆ
[
1− 1{pit(θ0
iˆ
)≥ε2 andpit(θˆi∗ )≥ε1}(t)
]
≤
[
2ε3 + (1− δMˆ)
]
uαˆ1
+ uαˆ1 −
β
2
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
1{pit(θˆ)≥ε2 andpit(θ∗)≥ε1}(t)
)
<uαˆ1 + 2ε3uαˆ1 −
βε2ε
∗
4Nuαˆ1
+ (1− δMˆ)uαˆ1
Let ε1 = ε˜12 , ε2 = ε˜22 , ε3 = min
{
ε˜1ε˜4
2
, ε
∗ε˜2β
32N[uαˆ1 ]
2
}
, then there exists δ˜ > δˆ > 0 such that for
any δ > δ˜,
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
<uαˆ1 −
ε∗ε˜2β
32Nuαˆ1
To summarize, I have shown that, if i∗ is the smallest i that the statement is false, then
there exists ε∗ > 0, δ˜ > 0, and an increasing sequence {δ∗m}∞, such that lim
m→∞
δ∗m = 1 and
given any δ∗m > δ˜, there exists ε˜2, β > 0, iˆ < i∗, and a BNE, such that diˆ ∈ D˜2i and in
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equilibrium
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
<uαˆ1 −
ε∗ε˜2β
32Nuαˆ1
in which ε˜2, β, δ˜ do not depend on the choice of BNE and iˆ.
However, i∗ is the smallest i that the statement is false, so there exists δ¯ such that for
any iˆ < i∗ and any δ > δ¯,
EQ
θ0
iˆ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u1(at1, a
t
2)
)
≥uαˆ1 −
ε∗ε˜2β
32Nuαˆ1
a contradiction. Therefore, this proposition is true.
5.1.5 Proof of Example 1.3.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that, for any i > j, ρdi1 ≤ ρdj1 . It is easy to
verify that the stage game payoff satisfies uαˆ1 = u¯1. I only need to check that for any i,
{di, ..., dN} ⊆ D˜1i and {d1, ..., di−1} ⊆ D˜1i ∪ D˜2i .
Fix an i∗, for any j < i∗, ρdi∗1 ≤ ρdj1 . For any α1 = (α1(H), 1− α1(H)) ∈ △(A1), if
ρdi∗ , H = ρdj , α1 , then ρdi∗1 = ρ
dj
1 ∗ α1(H) + ρdj2 ∗ (1− α1(H)). Since ρdj1 > ρdj2 and ρdj1 ≥ ρ
di∗
1 ,
either ρdj1 = ρ
di∗
1 and α1(H) = 1, or ρdj1 > ρ
di∗
1 and α1(H) < 1. It is also possible that for
any α1 ∈ △(A1), ρdi∗ , H ̸= ρdj , α1 . In all cases, dj ∈ D˜1i∗ ∪ D˜2i∗ , so {d1, ..., di∗−1} ⊆ D˜1i∗ ∪ D˜2i∗ .
For any j ≥ i∗, ρdi∗1 ≥ ρdj1 . If ρdj2 < ρdj1 < ρ
di∗
1 , then for any α1 ∈ △(A1), ρdi∗ , H ̸= ρdj , α1 .
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If ρdj2 < ρdj1 = ρ
di∗
1 , then for any α1 ∈ △(A1) such that ρdi∗ , H = ρdj , α1 , α1 = H. In both
cases , dj ∈ D˜1i∗ , so {di∗ , ..., dN} ⊆ D˜1i∗ .
5.1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.3.
Proof. Player 2’s posterior belief in period t that Player 1 is normal type is
pit(ξ0) =
∑
ξ=ξ0
P ({θ}|Fˆ t)
Let
Lt =
∑
ξ=ξ0
P ({θ}, ht2)∑
ξ=ξ(αˆ) P ({θ}, ht2)
=
∑
ξ=ξ0
pi0(θ)P (ht2|{θ})∑
ξ=ξ(αˆ) pi
0(θ)P (ht2|{θ})
Then given any history of Player 2 ht2 ∈H t2,
pit(ξ0)(h
t
2)
=
∑
ξ=ξ0
P ({θ}|ht2)
=
∑
ξ=ξ0
P ({θ}, ht2)∑
P ({θ}, ht2)
=
Lt
Lt + 1
Since Y is a finite set, given any θ, P (ht2|{θ}) is a probability mass function of a multi-
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nomial distribution. Denote these functions by f(ht2, ρd, α). Then
Lt
=
∑
d pi
0(ξ0, d)f(h
t
2, ρd, α˜)∑
d pi
0(ξ(αˆ), d)f(ht2, ρd, αˆ)
=
∑
ρ∈Γα˜1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)f(h
t
2, ρ)∑
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)f(ht2, ρ)
Since Γαˆ1 ⊆ Γα˜1 ,
Lt
≥
∑
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)f(h
t
2, ρ)∑
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)f(ht2, ρ)
≥
∑
ρ∈Γαˆ1
[
min
ρ∈Γα˜1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)
]
f(ht2, ρ)
∑
ρ∈Γαˆ1
[
max
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)
]
f(ht2, ρ)
=
min
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)
max
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)
Since u2(α˜1, a˜2) > u2(α˜1, a2) for all a2 ̸= a˜2, there exists a 0 < εˆ < 1 such that if pit(ξ0)(ht2) ≥
εˆ Player 2 has no incentive to deviate. Let Lˆ = εˆ
1−εˆ . Then
min
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, α˜1 pi
0(ξ0, d)
max
ρ∈Γαˆ1
∑
d∈Dρ, αˆ1 pi
0(ξ(αˆ1), d)
≥ L̂⇒ pit(ξ0)(ht2) ≥ εˆ, ∀ht2 ∈H t2
so Player 2 does not deviate from equlibrium strategy. Player 1 also has no incentive to
deviate.
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5.1.7 Proof of Propositoin 1.4.
Proof. Since α˜1,i ∈ BR2(α˜2), Player 1 has no incentive to deviate.
Given Player 1’s strategy, in any period t, Player 2 play a best response to
∑
θ
pit(θ)E(σ1|θ, ht2)
Since ρdµ(i), α˜1,i = ρdi, αˆ1 , for any t, P (ht2|{θˆi}) = P (ht2|{θ0µ(i)}). Therefore,
pit(θˆi)
pit(θ0µ(i))
=
P ({θˆi}|ht2)
P ({θ0µ(i)}|ht2)
=
P ({θˆi}, ht2)
P ({θ0µ(i)}, ht2)
=
pi0(θˆi)
pi0(θ0µ(i))
P (ht2|{θˆi})
P (ht2|{θ0µ(i)})
=
pi0(θˆi)
pi0(θ0µ(i))
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Then
∑
θ
pit(θ)E(σ1|θ, ht2)
=
∑
i
[
pit(θˆi)αˆ1 + pi
t(θ0µ(i))α˜1,i
]
=
∑
i
[
pit(θˆi) + pi
t(θ0µ(i))
] [ pit(θˆi)αˆ1
pit(θˆi) + pit(θ0µ(i))
+
pit(θ0µ(i))
pit(θˆi) + pit(θ0µ(i))
α˜1,i
]
=
∑
i
[
pit(θˆi) + pi
t(θ0µ(i))
] [ pi0(θˆi)αˆ1
pi0(θˆi) + pi0(θ0µ(i))
+
pi0(θ0µ(i))
pi0(θˆi) + pi0(θ0µ(i))
α˜1,i
]
=
∑
i
[
pit(θˆi) + pi
t(θ0µ(i))
]
(eiαˆ1 + (1− ei)α˜1,i)
=α˜1
Since (α˜1, α˜2) is a Nash equilibrium of the complete information stage game, Player 2 has
no incentive to deviate.
5.1.8 Proof of Example 1.5 part 1.
Proof. ((3
4
H, 1
4
L), (1
4
c, 3
4
s)) is the mixed strategy NE of the complete information stage
game. According to Proposition 1.4, I need to find α˜1,i ∈ △(A1) and ei ∈ [0, 1], such that
ρdµ(i), α˜1,i = ρdi, H and (34H, 14L) = eiH + (1− ei)α˜1,i.
ρd2, α˜1,1 = ρd1, H =⇒ α˜1,1 = (
γ2 − 34
γ2 − γ1H,
3
4
− γ1
γ2 − γ1L)
ρd1, α˜1,2 = ρd2, H =⇒ α˜1,2 =
((
2γ1 − 1
2
)
H,
(
3
2
− 2γ1
)
L
)
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then
e1 =
3− γ2 − 3γ1
3− 4γ1
e2 =
5− 8γ1
6− 8γ1
In order to make ei ∈ (0, 1), γ2−
3
4
γ2−γ1 ∈ [0, 1] and
(
2γ1 − 12
) ∈ [0, 1], it must be true that
3
4
≤ γ2 < 1
1
4
≤ γ1 < 5
8
5.1.9 Proof of Example 1.5 part 2.
Proof. Follow the same steps as in Example 1.2, I can show that
D˜11
=
{(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
: ρd2 <
3
4
and 3ρd1 + ρ
d
2 < 3
}
∪
{(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
: ρd2 >
3
4
and 3ρd1 + ρ
d
2 > 3
}
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and
D˜12
=
{(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
: ρd2 < γ1 and 3ρ
d
1 + ρ
d
2 < 4γ1
}
∪ {(ρd1, ρd2) : ρd2 > γ1 and 3ρd1 + ρd2 > 4γ1}
Since u¯1 = u1(a1, a2) if and only if (a1, a2) = (H, c),
(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
/∈ D˜11 ∪ D˜21 if and only if(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
= (3
4
, 3
4
),
(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
/∈ D˜12 ∪ D˜22 if and only if
(
ρd1, ρ
d
2
)
= (γ1, γ1).
Then
d1 ∈ D˜11, d2 ∈ D˜12
d2 ∈ D˜11
⇐⇒
(
γ2 − 3
4
)
(3γ1 + γ2 − 3) > 0
and
d1 ∈ D˜12
⇐⇒
(
1
4
− γ1
)(
3 ∗ 3
4
+
1
4
− 4γ1
)
> 0
⇐⇒
(
γ1 − 1
4
)(
γ1 − 5
8
)
> 0
⇐⇒γ1 ∈
(
0,
1
4
)
∪
(
5
8
, 1
)
If γ1 ∈
(
0, 1
4
) ∪ (5
8
, 1
)
, then {d1, d2} ⊆ D˜12 and d1 ∈ D˜11. Since γ1 ̸= γ2, d2 ∈ D˜11 ∪ D˜21. I can
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apply Proposition 1.2. If γ1 ∈
[
1
4
, 5
8
]
and γ2 ∈
(
0, 3
4
)
, then 3γ1+γ2−3 < 0, so {d1, d2} ⊆ D˜11.
Since d1 ∈ D˜12 ∪ D˜22 and d2 ∈ D˜12, I can still apply Proposition 1.2.
5.1.10 Proof of Lemma 1.5.
Proof. Since for any i ̸= j Γαˆ1,i ∩ Γαˆ1,j = ￿, there exists a constant eˆ such that for any i ̸= j
, any k, l and any t
dt(Qθˆj,l , Qθˆi,k) ≥ eˆ
Then
pit(θˆj,l) ≥ ε =⇒ pit(θˆj,l)dt(Qθˆj,l , Qθˆi,k) ≥ eˆε
According to Lemma 5.7, for any ε > 0, and any θˆi,k ∈ Θ, there exists M > 0 such that
Qθˆi,k
({∣∣∣∣Geˆε,θˆi,k∣∣∣∣ ≥M}) ≤ 2eˆε
Then
N\G˜(ε, θˆj,l) ⊆ Geˆε,θˆi,k
and {
|N\G˜(ε, θˆj,l)| ≥M
}
⊆
{∣∣∣∣Geˆε,θˆi,k∣∣∣∣ ≥M}
so
Qθˆi,k
({
|N\G˜(ε, θˆj,l)| ≥M
})
≤Qθˆi,k
({∣∣∣∣Geˆε,θˆi,k∣∣∣∣ ≥M})
≤2eˆε
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Let e = eˆ.
5.1.11 Proof of Proposition 1.6.
Proof. Suppose in the first M +N periods, there are M y¯ and N y. Then
pit(ξ(H)) =
pi0(ξ(H))P ({ξ(H)}, ht2)
pi0(ξ(H))P ({ξ(H)}, ht2) + pi0(ξ0)P ({ξ0}, ht2)
in which
P ({ξ(H)}, ht2) =
∫∫
D
ρM1 (1− ρ1)Npi0(ρ1, ρ2)dρ1dρ2
and
P ({ξ0}, ht2) =
∫∫
D
ρM2 (1− ρ2)Npi0(ρ1, ρ2)dρ1dρ2
It is sufficient to show that if supp(pi01) ⊆ supp(pi02) then φH(M,N)φL(M,N) ≤ sup
ρ
pi01(ρ)
pi02(ρ)
.
It is easy to calculate that
∫∫
D
ρM1 (1− ρ1)Npi0(ρ1, ρ2)dρ1dρ2
=
∫
supp(pi01)
ρM1 (1− ρ1)Npi01(ρ1)dρ1
=
∫
supp(pi01)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi01(ρ)dρ
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and
∫∫
D
ρM2 (1− ρ2)Npi0(ρ1, ρ2)dρ1dρ2
=
∫
supp(pi02)
ρM2 (1− ρ2)Npi02(ρ2)dρ2
=
∫
supp(pi02)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi02(ρ)dρ
When supp(pi01) ⊆ supp(pi02),
φH(M,N)
φL(M,N)
=
∫
supp(pi01)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi01(ρ)dρ∫
supp(pi02)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi02(ρ)dρ
≤
∫
supp(pi01)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi01(ρ)dρ∫
supp(pi01)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi02(ρ)dρ
=
∫
supp(pi01)
pi01(ρ)
pi02(ρ)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi02(ρ)dρ∫
supp(pi01)
ρM(1− ρ)Npi02(ρ)dρ
≤sup
ρ
pi01(ρ)
pi02(ρ)
5.1.12 Proof of Proposition 1.7.
Proof. Fix a monitoring structure d ∈ D. For any ε1 > 0, according to the definition of
Dρd1,ε1 , d ∈ D
⋂
Dρd1,ε1 . Let Q
2,t
(ξ,d), P 2,t be the marginal distribution of Q(ξ,d), P on Player
2’s histories h2,t ∈H t2, respectively. Under P , Player 2’s beliefs on the next stage’s signals
are given by p2,t(y) = P (y|Fˆ t) and if Player 2 knew that Player 1 is of type H, and the
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true monitoring structure is d, Player 2’s beliefs on the next stage’s signals are given by
q
ξ(H),d
2,t (y) = Q(ξ,d)(y|Fˆ t) .
Then
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||P 2,t)
=
∑
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)log
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)∑
ξ
∫∫
D
Q2,t(ξ,d′)pi
0(ξ)pi0(d′)dρd′1 dρ
d′
2
≤
∑
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)log
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)
pi0(ξ(H))
∫∫
D
Q2,t(ξ(H),d′)pi
0(d′)dρd′1 dρ
d′
2
≤
∑
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)log
Q2,t(ξ(H),d)
pi0(ξ(H))ε2
∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
Q2,t(ξ(H),d′)
pi0(d′)
ε2
dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
≤− log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+∑Q2,t(ξ(H),d)log Q2,t(ξ(H),d)∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
Q2,t(ξ(H),d′)
pi0(d′)
ε2
dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
Since relative entropy is jointly convex,
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||P 2,t)
≤− log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
(
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||Q2,t(ξ(H),d′))
) pi0(d′)
ε2
dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
Since d ∈ D⋂Dρd1,ε1 , for any d′ ∈ D⋂Dρd1,ε1 , |ρd1 − ρd′1 | < ε1. Apply the chain rule to
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||Q2,t(ξ(H),d′)).
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||Q2,t(ξ(H),d′)) = td((ρd1, 1− ρd1)||(ρd
′
1 , 1− ρd
′
1 )) ≤ t
ε21
min{ρd′1 , 1− ρd′1 }
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so
d(Q2,t(ξ(H),d)||P 2,t)
≤− log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ∫∫
D
⋂
D
ρd1 ,ε1
t
ε21
min{ρd′1 , 1− ρd′1 }
pi0(d′)
ε2
dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
≤− log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ tε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
Conditional on h2,t, Player 2 chooses a best response to
∫∫
D
pit(d′)EP (σ1|h2,t, d′)dρd′1 dρd′2 ,
which is a d-weak-d(qξ(H),d2,t ||p2,t)-entropy-confirming best response to H, so given (ρd1, ρd2),
(1− δ)
∑
t≥1
δt−1EQ(ξ0,d)u1
≥(1− δ)
∑
t≥1
δt−1EQ(ξ(H),d)u1
≥(1− δ)
∑
t≥1
δt−1EQ(ξ(H),d) vˆ
w,d
H (d(q
ξ(H),d
2,t ||p2,t))
≥(1− δ)
∑
t≥1
δt−1EQ(ξ(H),d)wˆ
w,d
H (d(q
ξ(H),d
2,t ||p2,t))
≥wˆw,dH ((1− δ)
∑
t≥1
δt−1EQ(ξ(H),d)d(q
ξ(H),d
2,t ||p2,t))
=wˆw,dH ((1− δ)2
∑
n≥1
δn−1
n∑
t=1
EQ(ξ(H),d)d(q
ξ(H),d
2,t ||p2,t))
=wˆw,dH ((1− δ)2
∑
n≥1
δn−1d(Q2,n(ξ(H),d)||P 2,n))
≥wˆw,dH
(
(1− δ)2
∑
n≥1
δn−1
[
−log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ nε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
])
=wˆw,dH
(
−(1− δ)log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
)
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5.1.13 Proof of Proposition 1.8.
Proof. According to Proposition 1.7, for any ε1 > 0, normal type of Player 1’s payoff in any
BNE under monitoring structure d is greater than or equal to
wˆw,dH
(
−(1− δ)log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
)
Since for any ε > 0, there exists δ* > 0 and ε1 > 0, such that for any δ > δ*,
−(1− δ)log [pi0(ξ(H))ε2]+ ε21
min{ρd1 − ε1, 1− ρd1 − ε1}
≤ ε
Then it is sufficient to show that there is a εˆ > 0 such that for any ε < εˆ, Bˆw,dε (H) = {c}.
d
(
ρd,H ||
∫∫
D
ρd′′, α′1(d′′)pi
′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
)
=ρd1log
ρd1∫∫
D
[ρd
′
1 α
′
1(d
′)(H) + ρd′2 α
′
1(d
′)(L)]pi′(d′)dρd′1 dρ
d′
2
+ (1− ρd1)log
1− ρd1
1− ∫∫
D
[ρd
′
1 α
′
1(d
′)(H) + ρd′2 α
′
1(d
′)(L)]pi′(d′)dρd′1 dρ
d′
2
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∫∫
D
[ρd
′
1 α
′
1(d
′)(H) + ρd
′
2 α
′
1(d
′)(L)]pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
=
∫∫
D
ρd
′
1 α
′
1(d
′)(H)pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 +
∫∫
D
ρd
′
2 α
′
1(d
′)(L)pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
≤α′1(d′)(H)pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 + (1− ρd
′
1 α
′
1(d
′)(H)pi′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2 )sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
≤1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
Since ρd1log ρ
d
1
x
+(1−ρd1)log 1−ρ
d
1
1−x is monotonically decreasing when x < ρd1 and ρd1 > 12 sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2 ,
d
(
ρd,H ||
∫∫
D
ρd′′, α′1(d′′)pi
′(d′)dρd
′
1 dρ
d′
2
)
≥ρd1log
ρd1
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
+ (1− ρd1)log
1− ρd1
1−
(
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
)
>0
Let εˆ = ρd1log ρ
d
1
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
+ (1− ρd1)log 1−ρ
d
1
1−
(
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
1 +
1
2
sup
d′∈D
ρd
′
2
) . According to the defini-
tion of d-weak-ε-entropy-confirming best response, Bˆw,dε (H) = {c}.
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5.2 Chapter 2
5.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.9
Proof. There exists a unique NE if and only if αId + V T3 V3 is invertible. For every non-zero
column vector z of d real numbers, denoted by

z1
z2
...
zd

, zT (αId + V T3 V3)z = αzT z + zTV T3 V3z
. It is easy to check that:
αzT z = α(
d∑
i=1
z2i )
and
zTV T3 V3z =
N∑
i=d+1
(
d∑
j=1
vijzj)
2
Since z is non-zero, α(∑di=1 z2i ) > 0 and∑Ni=d+1(∑dj=1 vijzj)2 ≥ 0. Then zT (αId+V T3 V3)z =
αzT z + zTV T3 V3z > 0. By definition, αId + V T3 V3 is positive definite, thus invertible
5.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Denote

1
1
...
1

of n elements by 1n, then:
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
xt1 − b
xt2 − b
...
xtN − b

− U

xt−11 − b
xt−12 − b
...
xt−1N − b

= X t − UX t−1 − b1N + bU1N
Since V is row stochastic, V11d + V21N−d = 1d and V31d + V41N−d = 1N−d
−b1N+bU1N = b

0
...
0
−1N−d + αV3(αId + V T3 V3)−11d + (IN−d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )V41N−d

−1N−d + αV3(αId + V T3 V3)−11d + (IN−d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )V41N−d
= −1N−d + αV3(αId + V T3 V3)−11d + (IN−d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )(1N−d − V31d)
= αV3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−11d + V3(αId + V T3 V3)
−1V T3 V31d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 1N−d − V31d
= V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1(αId + V T3 V3)1d − V31d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 1N−d
= −V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 1N−d
Then
−b1N + bU1N = b

0
...
0
−V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 1N−d

= −Bˆ
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so

xt1 − b
xt2 − b
...
xtN − b

− U

xt−11 − b
xt−12 − b
...
xt−1N − b

= X t − UX t−1 − b1N + bU1N = X t − UX t−1 − Bˆ = 0
5.2.3 Proof of proposition 2.10
Proof.
U =
 V1 V2
αV3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1 (IN−d − V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )V4

so
U − V =
 0 0
V3((Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1 − Id) (−V3(αId + V T3 V3)−1V T3 )V4

=
 0 0
− 1
α
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3 V3)) − 1αV3(Id + 1αV T3 V3)−1V T3 V4

= − 1
α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V
Then
U =
IN − 1α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3

V
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Since V is strongly connected and aperiodic, there exists aM such that for anym ≥M−1
every element of matrix V m is positive. Denote 1
α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
 by P . Then
UM = [V − PV ]M = V M − V M−1PV + · · ·+ (−PV )M
Since M is finite and lim
α→∞
P = 0, there exists a α1 > 0 such that for any α > α1, every
element of matrix UM is positive.
Now let me prove that fUM f∞ < 1.
UM1N = [V − PV ]M 1N = 1N−V M−1P1N+ · · ·+(−PV )M1N = 1N−V M−1P1N+O( 1
α2
1N)
in which
P1N =
1
α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
 1N = 1α
 0
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3 1N−d

Then
UM1N = 1N− 1
α
V M−1
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
+O( 1α21N) = 1N− 1α
V M−1
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
+O( 1α1N)

Since V is strongly connected, V3 ̸= 0, then all elements of matrix V3V T3 are non-negative
and at least one of them is positive. Then all elements of vector
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
 are also non-
negative and that at least one of them is positive. As proved above, every element of V M−1
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is positive, thus every element of V M−1
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
 is positive. Let r be the minimum
of elements of V M−1
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
. Then there exists a α2 > 0, such that for any α > α2
, every element of matrix V M−1
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d
 + O( 1α1N) is larger than r2 . Then for any
α > αˆ = max{ r
2
, α1, α2}, every element of UM is positive and every element of UM1N is no
larger than 1− r
2α
, so fUM f∞ = maxi ∑j |uij| ≤ 1− r2α .
For any initial opinion vector X0
n
UMX0
n
∞
≤
n
UM
n
∞
n
X0
n
∞
≤ (1− r
2α
)
n
X0
n
∞
Thus, lim
k→∞
UM∗kX0 = 0. SinceM is a finite constant, for any 1 ≤ k1 ≤M−1, lim
k→∞
UM∗k+k1X0 =
Uk1 lim
l→∞
UM∗kX0 = 0, therefore lim
t→∞
U tX0 = 0.
5.2.4 Proof of proposition 2.11
Proof. Since V is strongly connected and aperiodic, then, as I proved in proposition 2.10,
there exist a αˆ > 0 and M ∈ N+ such that for any α > αˆ, fUM f∞ < 1. Then the Neumann
series∑ki=1 U i converge and (I −U)−1 = lim
k→∞
∑k
i=1 U
i . By proposition 2.10, lim
t→∞
U tX0 = 0,
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so lim
t→∞
X t exists and
lim
t→∞
X t =lim
t→∞
U tX0 + lim
t→∞
t−1∑
i=0
U iBˆ
=(I − U)−1Bˆ
5.2.5 Proof of proposition 2.12
Proof. Since rank(V3) = d, I can rearrange the code name of naive agents such that V3 can
be partitioned into 2 blocks as follows:
V3 =
V31
V32

in which V31 is a square matrix (d ∗ d) and rank(V31) = d. This will not change the network
structure, thus does not affect the result of proposition 2.11.
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Suppose that there is consensus, denoted by c. Then it must be true that
Bˆ = (I − U)1Nc
=
1N −
IN − 1α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3

V 1N
 c
=
1N −
IN − 1α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3

 1N
 c
=
c
α
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3 1N−d

Since
Bˆ =
1
α
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B

the equation above is equivalent to
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3 1N−dc = V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B
⇐⇒ V3(Id + 1
α
V T3 V3)
−1(V T3 1N−dc−B) = 0
⇐⇒
V31(Id + 1αV T3 V3)−1(V T3 1N−dc−B)
V32(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1(V T3 1N−dc−B)
 = 0
Then it must be true that
V31(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1(1N−dc−B) = 0
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Since V31 and (Id + 1αV T3 V3)−1 are both invertible, (V T3 1N−dc−B) = 0.
V T3 1N−dc =

∑
j∈A(d) vj1∑
j∈A(d) vj2
...∑
j∈A(d) vjd

c
and
B =

∑
j∈A(d) vj1b1∑
j∈A(d) vj2b2
...∑
j∈A(d) vjdbd

Since rank(V3) = d, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
∑
j∈A(d) vji > 0, then
(V T3 1N−dc−B) = 0
=⇒ b1 = b2 = . . . = bd = c
Contradiction.
5.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.13
Proof. According to the proof of Lemma 2.1,
1N = (I − U)−1
 0d
V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1V T3 1N−d

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so
(I − U)−1Bˆ − bmin1N
=(I − U)−1

0d
V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1

∑
j∈A(d) vj1(b1 − bmin)∑
j∈A(d) vj2(b2 − bmin)
...∑
j∈A(d) vjd(bd − bmin)


=(I − U)−1
 0d×d
V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1


∑
j∈A(d) vj1 0 · · · 0
0
∑
j∈A(d) vj2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · ∑j∈A(d) vjd


b1 − bmin
b2 − bmin
...
bd − bmin

then every element of (I − U)−1Bˆ − bmin1N is a linear combination of bi − bmin. Let
W = (I − U)−1
 0d×d
V3(αId + V
T
3 V3)
−1


∑
j∈A(d) vj1 0 · · · 0
0
∑
j∈A(d) vj2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · ∑j∈A(d) vjd

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then
(I − U)−1Bˆ − bmin1N = W

b1 − bmin
b2 − bmin
...
bd − bmin

so
maxi|((I − U)−1Bˆ)i − bmin|
=
n
(I − U)−1Bˆ − bmin1N
n
∞
≤
n
W
n
∞
maxi|bi − bmin|
=
n
W
n
∞
(bmax − bmin)
Let c1 = 2
f
W
f
∞, then,
max
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
−min
i
(
(I − U)−1Bˆ
)
i
≤2maxi|((I − U)−1Bˆ)i − bmin|
≤c1(bmax − bmin)
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5.2.7 Proof of Proposition 2.14
Proof.
G−1(I − U)G
=G−1(I − V )G+ 1
α
G−1
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V G
=

0 0 · · · 0
0 1− λ2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · 1− λN

+
1
α
H − 1
α2
Hˆ +O(
1
α3
)
=
 0 0
0 IN−1 − Λ22
+ 1αH − 1α2 Hˆ +O( 1α3 )
in which hij = li
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
V rj = λjli
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 rj and hˆij = λjli
0 0
0 V3V
T
3 V3V
T
3
 rj,
then
G−1(I − U)G =
 1αh11 − 1α2 hˆ11 +O( 1α3 ) 1αH12 − 1α2 Hˆ12 +O( 1α3 )
1
α
H21 − 1α2 Hˆ21 +O( 1α3 ) IN−1 − Λ22 + 1αH22 − 1α2 Hˆ22 +O( 1α3 )

Since h11 > 0 and for any k ̸= 1, 1− λk ̸= 0, there exists a αˆ > 0 such that for any α > αˆ,
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1
α
h11 +O(
1
α2
) > 0 and
Σ =IN−1 − Λ22 + 1
α
H22 − 1
α2
Hˆ22 +O(
1
α3
)
− 11
α
h11 +O(
1
α2
)
(
1
α
H12 − 1
α2
Hˆ12 +O(
1
α3
)
)(
1
α
H21 − 1
α2
Hˆ21 +O(
1
α3
)
)
=IN−1 − Λ22 + 1
α
H22 − 1
αh11
H21H12 +O(
1
α2
)
is invertible. Then
1
α
(I − U)−1 =1
α
G
(
G−1(I − U)G)−1G−1
in which
1
α
(
G−1(I − U)G)−1
=
1
α
 1αh11 − 1α2 hˆ11 +O( 1α3 ) 1αH12 − 1α2 Hˆ12 +O( 1α3 )
1
α
H21 − 1α2 Hˆ21 +O( 1α3 ) IN−1 − Λ22 + 1αH22 − 1α2 Hˆ22 +O( 1α3 )

−1
=
 ααh11−hˆ11 + α(αh11−hˆ11)2H12Σ−1H21 +O( 1α2 ) − 1αh11−hˆ11H12Σ−1 +O( 1α2 )
1
αh11−hˆ11Σ
−1H21 +O( 1α2 )
1
α
Σ−1

=
 1h11− 1α hˆ11 + 1α 1(h11− 1α hˆ11)2H12Σ−1H21 +O( 1α2 ) − 1α 1h11− 1α hˆ11H12Σ−1 +O( 1α2 )
− 1
α
1
h11− 1α hˆ11
Σ−1H21 +O( 1α2 )
1
α
Σ−1

Since
1
h11 − 1α hˆ11
=
1
h11
+
1
α
hˆ11
h211
+O(
1
α2
)
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and
1(
h11 − 1α hˆ11
)2 = 1h211 + 2α hˆ11h311 +O( 1α2 )
1
α
(
G−1(I − U)G)−1
=
 1h11 0
0 0
+ 1α
 hˆ11h211 + 1h211H12Σ−1H21 − 1h11H12Σ−1
− 1
h11
Σ−1H21 Σ−1
+O( 1α2 )
Since
Σ−1 = (IN−1 − Λ22)−1 +O( 1
α
)
1
α
(
G−1(I − U)G)−1
=
 1h11 0
0 0
+ 1α
 hˆ11h211 + 1h211H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 − 1h11H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1

+O(
1
α2
)
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1α
(I − U)−1
=
1
α
G
(
G−1(I − U)G)−1G−1
=G
 1h11 0
0 0
G−1
+
1
α
G
 hˆ11h211 + 1h211H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 − 1h11H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
G−1
+O(
1
α2
)
Since
G =
(
1N r2 · · · rN
)
there exists a vector c˜1, such that
G
 hˆ11h211 + 1h211H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 − 1h11H12 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
0 0
G−1
=1N cˇ1
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so
1
α
(I − U)−1
=
1N l
h11
+
1
α
1N cˇ1
+
1
α
G
 0 0
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
G−1 +O( 1α2 )
G
 0 0
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 0
G−1
=G
 0 0
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 0


l1
l2
...
lN

=G
 0
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21l1

=− 1
h11
(
r2 · · · rN
)
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21l1
=− 1
h11
(
r2
1−λ2 · · · rN1−λN
)

l2
...
lN

0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 r1l1
=− 1
h11
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 r1l1
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and
G
 0 0
0 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
G−1
=
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
so
1
α
(I − U)−1
=
1N l
h11
+
1
α
1N cˇ1
+
1
α
G
 0 0
− 1
h11
(IN−1 − Λ22)−1H21 (IN−1 − Λ22)−1
G−1 +O( 1α2 )
=
1N l
h11
+
1
α
1N cˇ1 +
1
α
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
I − 1h11
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 r1l1
+O( 1α2 )
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then
Xˆ =(I − U)−1Bˆ
=
1N lh11 + 1α1N cˇ1 + 1α
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
I − 1h11
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 r1l1
+O( 1α2 )


 0d
V3B
− 1α
 0d
V3V
T
3 V3B
+O( 1α2 )

=cˇ1N +
1
α
N∑
i=2
rili
1− λi
I − 1h11
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
 1N l

 0d
V3B
+O( 1α2 )
5.2.8 Proof of proposition 2.15
Proof. First let me prove that when α is large enough, all limiting opinions are close to each
other. I have proved that
Xˆ = lim
t→∞
X t = (I − U)−1Bˆ
Then as I proved in proposition 2.10 there exists a αˆ > 0 such that for any α > αˆ, there
exists M > 0, such that UM is a positive matrix and fUM f∞ < 1, then
Xˆ =UXˆ + Bˆ
=UMXˆ + Bˆ +
M−1∑
k=1
UkBˆ
=UMXˆ +O(
1
α
1N)
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According to Lemma 2.1, without loss of generality, I can assume that bi > 0. then
l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B
 = l
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V Xˆ
Denote l
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V by w = (w1, ..., wN). Since
lim
α→∞
l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B
 = l
 0d
V3B
 > 0
and
lim
α→∞
N∑
i=1
wi = lim
α→∞
l
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1V T3
V 1N = l
 0d
V3V
T
3
 1N > 0
so there exists a α˜ > 0 such that for any α > α˜,∑Ni=1wi > 0 and l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B
 >
0. Let x¯ = maxi {xˆi} and x = mini {xˆi}, then for any α > α˜
N∑
i=1
wix¯ ≥ l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B

and
N∑
i=1
wix ≤ l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V T3 V3)
−1B

so x¯ > 0 and there exists a constant e > 0 such that x < e. Let UM =
(
uMij
)
and V M =
(
vMij
)
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, then x¯ =∑j uMij xˆj +O( 1α) so
O(
1
α
) =x¯−
∑
j
uMij xˆj
=
(
1−
∑
j
uMij
)
x¯+
∑
j
uMij (x¯− xˆj)
>
∑
j
uMij (x¯− xˆj) =
∑
j
[
vMij +O(
1
α
)
]
(x¯− xˆj) > 0
Then it must be true that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N , xˆj = x¯+O( 1α). Since x is bounded above, all
xˆj are bounded. Then
l
 0d
V3B
+O( 1α) = l
0 0
0 V3V
T
3
V 1Nx+O( 1α)
Take limits of both sides of this equation, then lim
α→∞
Xˆ exist and can be denoted by 1N cˆ in
which
cˆ =
l
 0d
V3B

l
 0
V3V
T
3 1N−d

=
∑
i∈S(d) bi
[(∑
j∈A(d) vji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)]
∑
k∈S(d)
[(∑
j∈A(d) vjk
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjkl(j)
)]
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5.2.9 Proof of proposition 2.16
Proof. The proof is almost the same as the proof of proposition 2.15. The only two differences
are
U˜ =
IN − 1α
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V˜ T3 V3)
−1V˜ T3

V
and
B˜1 =
 0d
V3(αId + V˜
T
3 V3)
−1B˜

so
l
 0d
V3(Id +
1
α
V˜ T3 V3)
−1B˜
 = l
0 0
0 V3(Id +
1
α
V˜ T3 V3)
−1V˜ T3
V Xˆ
l
 0d
V3B˜
+O( 1α) = l
0 0
0 V3V˜
T
3
V 1Nx+O( 1α)
Take limits of both sides of this equation, then lim
α→∞
Xˆ exist and can be denoted by 1N c˜ in
which
l˜(i) =
(∑
j∈A(d) βjivji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
∑
k∈S(d)
(∑
j∈A(d) βjkvjk
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjkl(j)
)
c˜ =
l
 0d
V3B˜

l
 0
V3V˜
T
3 1N−d

=
∑
i∈S(d) bi
(∑
j∈A(d) βjivji
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjil(j)
)
∑
k∈S(d)
(∑
j∈A(d) βjkvjk
)(∑
j∈A(d) vjkl(j)
)
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5.2.10 Proof of lemma 2.2
Proof. I will first prove that there exist α∗, ε > 0, such that for any α > α∗, there always
exist real roots of the system of equations above and 0 > γ∗1 , γ∗2 > − εα
Denote v31 by p, then v32 = 1− p. Then
δ2v31v32γ
2
1γ
2
2 + δ(1 + δ)v
2
31γ
2
1γ2 + 2δv31v32γ1γ2 + (1 + δ)(α + v
2
32)γ2 + v31v32 = 0
⇐⇒δ2p(1− p)γ21γ22 + δ(1 + δ)p2γ21γ2 + 2δp(1− p)γ1γ2 + (1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2)γ2 + p(1− p) = 0
Suppose this equation is a quadratic function of γ2, then the roots are
γ∗2 =
−µ±√µ2 − 8δ2p2(1− p)2γ21
2δ2p(1− p)γ21
=
2p(1− p)
−µ∓√µ2 − 8δ2p2(1− p)2γ21
where
µ = δ(1 + δ)p2γ21 + 2δp(1− p)γ1 + (1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2)
let f(γ1) = 2p(1−p)−µ−√µ2−8δ2p2(1−p)2γ21 , substitute γ2 for f(γ1) in the other equation:
δ2p(1−p)γ21f 2(γ1)+δ(1+δ)(1−p)2γ1f 2(γ1)+2δp(1−p)γ1f(γ1)+(1+δ)(α+p2)γ1+p(1−p) = 0
If there exists a real root of this equation, then there also exists real roots of the system of
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these two equations. Denote the left-hand side by g(γ1). It is easy to check that
g(0) > 0
Then the only thing that I need to check is that there exist ε, α∗ > 0 such that for any
α > α∗, g(−ε
α
) < 0 . When α is large enough,
f(
−ε
α
) =
2p(1− p)
−(1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2) +O( 1
α
)−
√
((1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2) +O( 1
α
))2 −O( 1
α2
)
=− p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
Then
g(
−ε
α
) =O(
1
α2
) + (1 + δ)(α + p2)
−ε
α
+ p(1− p)
=O(
1
α
)− ε(1 + δ) + p(1− p)
let ε = p(1−p)+1
1+δ
, then g(−ε
α
) < 0. Since g(·) is a continuous function, there exists a real root
0 > γ∗1 >
−ε
α
.
Since 0 > γ∗1 > −εα , γ∗2 = f(γ∗1) =
2p(1−p)
−µ−
√
µ2−8δ2p2(1−p)2γ21
= − p(1−p)
(1+δ)(α+(1−p)2) + O(
1
α3
).
Following the same logic, I can also prove that
γ∗1 =−
p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + p2)
+O(
1
α3
)
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5.2.11 Proof of lemma 2.3
Proof. By lemma 2.2
γ∗1 =−
p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + p2)
+O(
1
α3
)
and
(1 + δ)(α + p2)γ1 =O(
1
α3
)− p(1− p)− 2δp(1− p)γ1γ2
=O(
1
α3
)− p(1− p)− 2 δp
3(1− p)3
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
so
− (δv32γ2 + v31 + α)(1 + δ) + v31v32a1
γ1
=δv31v32a2 + δ(1 + δ)v
2
32a2γ2 + δ
2v31v32a1γ2 + δ
2v31v32a2γ1γ2
⇐⇒− γ1(δ(1− p)γ2 + p+ α)(1 + δ)
=
[
δp(1− p)γ1 + δ(1 + δ)(1− p)2γ1γ2 + δ2p(1− p)γ21γ2
]
a2 − (1− δ2γ1γ2)p(1− p)a1
⇐⇒− δ(1 + δ)(1− p)γ1γ2 − (1 + δ)p(1− p)γ1 − (1 + δ)(α + p2)γ1
=
[
− δp
2(1− p)2α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a2
−
[
(1− δ2 p
2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2))p(1− p) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a1
175
⇐⇒1 + p(1− p)
α + p2
+ [2p− (1 + δ)] δp(1− p)
2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
=
[
−1 + δ2 p
2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a1
+
[
− δp(1− p)α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a2
Follow the same steps as above, equation 4.7 is equivalent to
− 1− p(1− p)
α + (1− p)2 − [2(1− p)− (1 + δ)]
δp2(1− p)
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
=
[
− δp(1− p)α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a1
+
[
−1 + δ2 p
2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
a2
It is a system of linear equations. It is easy to calculate that a∗1 = ∆2∆1 and a∗2 =
∆3
∆1
.
5.2.12 Proof of proposition 2.17
Proof. By lemma 2.2 and 2.3
1− γ∗1γ∗2 = 1−
p2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
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a∗1 + γ
∗
1a
∗
2
=
1
∆1
[∆2 + γ
∗
1∆3]
=
1
∆1
[
− 1− p(1− p)
α + p2
− δp(1− p)α
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
+ [−3p+ 1 + δ] δp(1− p)
2
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
− p(1− p)
(1 + δ)(α + p2)
− p
2(1− p)2
(1 + δ)(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
− δp
2(1− p)2α
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)2(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
=
1
∆1
[
− 1− 2p(1− p)α
(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
+
p(1− p)2(p(1− δ)2 − 2(1 + δ))
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
and
a∗2 + γ
∗
2a
∗
1
=
1
∆1
[
1 +
2p(1− p)α
(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)
− p
2(1− p)((1− p)(1− δ)2 − 2(1 + δ))
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
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then
x∗ =
a∗1 + γ
∗
1a
∗
2
1− γ∗1γ∗2
=
1
(1− γ∗1γ∗2)
1
∆1
[
− 1− 2p(1− p)α
(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +
p(1− p)2(p(1− δ)2 − 2(1 + δ))
(1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2) +O(
1
α3
)
]
=
1
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)[
− (1 + δ)2(α + p2)(α + (1− p)2)− 2(1 + δ)2p(1− p)α + p(1− p)2(p(1− δ)2 − 2(1 + δ)) +O( 1
α3
)
]
=
−(1 + δ)2(α2 + α)− 4δp2(1− p)2 − 2(1 + δ)p(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
and
y∗ =
a∗2 + γ
∗
2a
∗
1
1− γ∗1γ∗2
=
(1 + δ)2(α2 + α) + 4δp2(1− p)2 + 2(1 + δ)p2(1− p) +O( 1
α
)
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
the opinion of naive agent in steady state is
px∗ + (1− p)y∗
=
(1− 2p)
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)[
(1 + δ)2(α2 + α) + 4δp2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
When the sophisticated agents are myopic, the opinion of the naive agent in steady state is
pxˆ+ (1− p)yˆ = (1− 2p)(α
2 + α)
α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α
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then
px∗ + (1− p)y∗ > pxˆ+ (1− p)yˆ
⇐⇒
(1− 2p)
[
(1 + δ)2(α2 + α) + 4δp2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
>
(1− 2p)(α2 + α)
α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α
it is easy to check that, when α is large enough
px∗ + (1− p)y∗ ≥ pxˆ+ (1− p)yˆ ⇐⇒ p < 1
2
5.2.13 Proof of proposition 2.18
Proof. In steady state, the stage payoff for agent 1 is
Π∗1 = −(px∗ + (1− p)y∗ + 1)2 − α(x∗ + 1)2
Since
px∗ + (1− p)y∗
=
(1− 2p)
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)[
(1 + δ)2(α2 + α) + 4δp2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
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and
x∗ =
−(1 + δ)2(α2 + α)− 4δp2(1− p)2 − 2(1 + δ)p(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
Π∗1 − Πˆ1
=− (px∗ + (1− p)y∗ + 1)2 − α(x∗ + 1)2 + (pxˆ+ (1− p)yˆ + 1)2 + α(xˆ+ 1)2
=(z∗ + zˆ + 2)(zˆ − z∗) + α(x∗ + xˆ+ 2)(xˆ− x∗)
Let
Γ =
[
α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] [(1 + δ)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α]+ 2δ(1− δ)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
then
xˆ− x∗ = −2δ(1 + δ)p(1− p)
3α2 +O(α)
Γ
zˆ − z∗ = −2δ(1 + δ)(1− 2p)p
2(1− p)2α2 +O(α)
Γ
z∗ + zˆ + 2
=
4(1 + δ)2(1− p)α4 +O(α3)
Γ
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x∗ + xˆ+ 2
=
−4(1 + δ)2p(1− p)α3 +O(α2)
Γ
then
Π∗1 − Πˆ1
=
4(1 + δ)2(1− p)α4 +O(α3)
Γ
−2δ(1 + δ)(1− 2p)p2(1− p)2α2 +O(α)
Γ
+ α
−4(1 + δ)2p(1− p)α3 +O(α2)
Γ
−2δ(1 + δ)p(1− p)3α2 +O(α)
Γ
=
−8δ(1 + δ)3(1− 2p)p2(1− p)3α6 + 8δ(1 + δ)3p2(1− p)4α6 +O(α5)
Γ2
=
8δ(1 + δ)3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)
Γ2
> 0
On the other hand,
Π∗2 − Πˆ2
=− (px∗ + (1− p)y∗ − 1)2 − α(y∗ − 1)2 + (pxˆ+ (1− p)yˆ − 1)2 + α(yˆ − 1)2
=(z∗ + zˆ − 2)(zˆ − z∗) + α(y∗ + yˆ − 2)(yˆ − y∗)
z∗ + zˆ − 2
=
−4(1 + δ)2pα4 +O(α3)
Γ
yˆ − y∗ = 2δ(1 + δ)p
3(1− p)α2 +O(α)
Γ
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y∗ + yˆ − 2
=
4(1 + δ)2p(1− p)α3 +O(α2)
Γ
then
Π∗2 − Πˆ2
=
−4(1 + δ)2pα4 +O(α3)
Γ
−2δ(1 + δ)(1− 2p)p2(1− p)2α2 +O(α)
Γ
+ α
4(1 + δ)2p(1− p)α3 +O(α2)
Γ
2δ(1 + δ)p3(1− p)α2 +O(α)
Γ
=
8δ(1 + δ)3(1− 2p)p3(1− p)2α6 + 8δ(1 + δ)3p4(1− p)2α6 +O(α5)
Γ2
=
8δ(1 + δ)3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)
Γ2
> 0
5.2.14 Proof of proposition 2.19
Proof.
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z∗(δ1)− z∗(δ2)
=
(1− 2p)
[
(1 + δ1)
2(α2 + α) + 4δ1p
2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
(1 + δ1)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ1(1− δ1)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1α)
−
(1− 2p)
[
(1 + δ2)
2(α2 + α) + 4δ2p
2(1− p)2 +O( 1
α
)
]
(1 + δ2)2 [α2 + (p2 + (1− p)2)α] + 2δ2(1− δ2)p2(1− p)2 +O( 1α)
=
1− 2p
Ω(δ1)Ω(δ2)
[
2(1 + δ1)
2δ2(1− δ2)p2(1− p)2α2
+ 4δ1(1 + δ2)
2p2(1− p)2α2 − 2δ1(1− δ1)(1 + δ2)2p2(1− p)2α2
− 4(1 + δ1)2δ2p2(1− p)2α2 +O(α)
]
=
1− 2p
Ω(δ1)Ω(δ2)
[
4(1 + δ1)(1 + δ2)(δ1 − δ2)p2(1− p)2α2 +O(α)
]
Since δ1 < δ2, z∗(δ1) < z∗(δ2) if and only if 1− 2p > 0
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Π∗1(δ1)− Π∗1(δ2)
=
8δ1(1 + δ1)
3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)
Γ2(δ1)
− 8δ2(1 + δ2)
3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)
Γ2(δ2)
=
1
Γ2(δ1)Γ2(δ2)
{[
8δ1(1 + δ1)
3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)]Γ2(δ2)
− [8δ2(1 + δ2)3p3(1− p)3α6 +O(α5)]Γ2(δ1)}
=
1
Γ2(δ1)Γ2(δ2)
[
8δ1(1 + δ1)
3(1 + δ2)
4p3(1− p)3α14
− 8(1 + δ1)4δ2(1 + δ2)3p3(1− p)3α14 +O(α13)
]
=
8(1 + δ1)
3(1 + δ2)
3p3(1− p)3(δ1 − δ2)α14 +O(α13)
Γ2(δ1)Γ2(δ2)
< 0
5.3 Chapter 3
5.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.20
The condition
r2 − r1 > 1
p
− 1
simply follows from solving the inequality (17). Then plugging into this condition the rates
expressed in Equation 14 yields:
(R2 − u¯
p
)− (R1 − 1
p
− u¯
p
+ 1) >
1
p
− 1
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which implies that R2 > R1 must hold for the condition to be satisfied. QED.
5.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.21
If the lender extends credit to entrepreneurs in Ω1, then for each dollar lent, it can earn a
return of p(r1 − 1). So it is willing to offer secured loans iff
r1 ≥ 1⇐⇒ pR1 ≥ 1 + u¯
which is satisfied due to condition (A2). Since the lender cannot distinguish between con-
sumers in Ω2 and Ω3, it is willing to offer unsecured loans iff its overall return from offering
the contract is non-negative. Formally, the condition is:
N2(pr2 − 1) +N3(pˆr2 − 1) ≥ 0,
implying that R2 ≥ u¯p + 1p¯ must hold, where p¯ ≡ N2N2+N3p+ N3N2+N3 pˆ. QED.
5.3.3 Proof of Corollary 3.1
Consumers in the high risk segment invest in their ideas only when pˆ(R3 − r2) ≥ u¯. Substi-
tuting r2 = R2− u¯/p into this expression yields the necessary conditionR3−R2 ≥ u¯
(
1
pˆ
− 1
p
)
.
QED.
5.3.4 Proof of Proposition 3.22
We can derive the lender’s optimal strategy by comparing the seven payoffs laid out in the
document. Notice that Π31 = Π21 and Π33 = Π22. Calculating the differences between the
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profit functions gives:
Π33 −Π12 = Π32 −Π11 = N2(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)− qN1(pR2 − u¯− 1)
Π11 −Π12 = Π32 −Π33 = N1(pR1 − u¯− 1)− qN1(pR2 − u¯− 1)
Π31 −Π11 = N2(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1)
Π31 −Π12 =N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N2(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1)
+N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1)− qN1(pR2 − u¯− 1)
Π31 −Π32 = −N2p(R2 −R1)−N3pˆ(R2 −R1) + qN1(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
Π32 −Π12 = N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) + (N2 − 2qN1)(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
Π31 −Π33 = N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1)−N2p(R2 −R1)−N3pˆ(R2 −R1)
Π31 −Π32 = N2(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1)
When we compare the expressions
1. If R1 < u¯p + 1p , then Π31 < Π11 holds. And
Π33 > Π12 ⇐⇒ Π32 > Π11 ⇐⇒ q < q∗1
186
(a) When q < q∗1 and q < q∗2, Π32 > Π11 > Π31, Π12 and Π32 > Π33. Lender’s optimal
strategy is not to compete with informal market and serve all consumers in Ω1, and the
interest rates are
r1 = R1 + 1− 1
p
− u¯
p
r2 = R2 − u¯
p
.
Consumers in Ω∗2 borrow through their social contacts. So segments with access to
financing are Ω1, Ω∗∗2 and Ω3.
(b) When q < q∗1 and q ≥ q∗2, Π33 = Π22 ≥ Π32 > Π11 > Π31 and Π33 > Π12. Lender’s
optimal strategy is either to only offer an unsecured loan and set r2 = R2 − u¯p or to
offer both secured and unsecured loans and set r1 = R2+1− 1p − u¯p , r2 = R2− u¯p . In the
first case, consumers in Ω1 do not borrow from the lender, so segments with access to
financing are Ω2 and Ω3. In the latter case, only consumers in Ω∗1 with social contacts
find it profitable to borrow from the lender, and consumers in Ω∗2 borrow from social
contacts. So segments with access to financing are Ω∗1, Ω∗∗2 and Ω3.
(c) When q ≥ q∗1 and q < q∗2, Π11 > Π12 ≥ Π33 and Π11 ≥ Π32, Π31. Lender’s optimal
strategy is to only offer secured loans and set r1 = R1 + 1− 1p − u¯p . Only Ω1 is served
by the bank.
(d) When q ≥ q∗1 and q ≥ q∗2, Π12 ≥ Π11 ≥ Π32Π31 and Π12 ≥ Π33. Lender’s optimal
strategy is to only serve secured loans and set r1 = R2 + 1− 1p − u¯p . Only Ω∗1 is served
by the bank.
2. If R1 ≥ u¯p + 1p and R2 − R1 ≥ N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
, then Π33 ≥ Π31 ≥ Π11. We only
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need to compare Π33, Π32 and Π12. Notice that
q∗1 =
N2 +N3
N1
p¯(R2 − u¯p )− 1
p(R2 − u¯p )− 1
=
N2 +N3
N1
p¯(R2 −R1)
p(R2 − u¯p )− 1
+
N2 +N3
N1
p¯(R1 − u¯p )− 1
p(R2 − u¯p )− 1
≥pR1 − u¯− 1
pR2 − u¯− 1 = q
∗
2
Then the results are the same as the case where R1 < u¯p + 1p , with the only difference being
that q∗2 > q ≥ q∗1 can not hold.
3. If R1 ≥ u¯p + 1p and R2−R1 < N1(N2+N3)p¯
[
p(R1 − u¯p )− 1
]
, then Π31 ≥ Π11 and Π31 > Π33. We
compare Π31, Π32 and Π12. Notice
q∗4 =
N2 +N3
N1
p¯(R2 −R1)
p(R2 − u¯p )− 1
<
pR1 − u¯− 1
pR2 − u¯− 1 < q
∗
3
(a) If q ≥ q∗3 > q∗4, then Π12 ≥ Π31 > Π32. Lender’s optimal strategy is to only offer secured
loans and set r1 = R2 + 1− 1p − u¯p . Only Ω∗1 is served by the bank.
(b) If q∗4 ≤ q < q∗3, then Π31 ≥ Π32, Π12. Lender’s optimal strategy is to compete with
the informal market and serve all consumers. It either only serves unsecured loans, or
serves both secured and unsecured loans. The interest rates are r1 = R1 + 1 − 1p − u¯p ,
r2 = R1 − u¯p .
(c) If q < q∗4 < q∗3, then Π32 > Π31 > Π12. Lender’s optimal strategy is not to compete
with informal market and serve all consumers in Ω1, and the interest rates are r1 =
R1+1− 1p − u¯p , r2 = R2− u¯p . Consumers in Ω∗2 borrow from social contacts, so segments
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with access to financing are Ω1, Ω∗∗2 and Ω3.
5.3.5 Proof of Proposition 3.23
When (A1)-(A5) hold and there is no informal market, all borrowers are served by the bank
and all entrepreneurial activity is funded. The average innovativeness of entrepreneurial
ideas is
N1 (pR1 − 1) +N2 (pR2 − 1) +N2 (pˆR3 − 1)
N1 +N2 +N3
.
When there is an informal market, as shown in Proposition 3.22, some borrowers can’t access
to credit. For instance, when R1 < u¯p + 1p and q > q∗1, q∗2, the bank only lends to Ω∗1 and only
the activity of Ω∗2 is funded. The average innovativeness of entrepreneurial ideas is pR2 − 1.
Due to (A2) and (A3):
pR2 − 1
=
N1 (pR2 − 1) +N2 (pR2 − 1) +N2 (pR2 − 1)
N1 +N2 +N3
>
N1 (pR1 − 1) +N2 (pR2 − 1) +N2 (pˆR3 − 1)
N1 +N2 +N3
The average innovativeness of entrepreneurial ideas in the latter case is higher.
5.3.6 Proof of Proposition 3.24 and 3.25
The proofs follow from the Proof of Proposition 3.22.
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5.3.7 Proof of Proposition 3.26
Part (i): First let’s prove sufficiency. Suppose that
R3 −R2 < pˆu¯( 1
pˆ2
− 1
p2
),
and let the bank set the joint liability contract terms to
r2 = R2 − u¯
p2
, c =
u¯
p2
.
It is easy to check that
R2 − r2 − c = 0
p2(R2 − r2) + p(1− p)(R2 − r2 − c) = u¯
and
pˆ2(R3 − r2) + pˆ(1− pˆ)(R3 − r2 − c)
=pˆ(R3 −R2 + u¯
p2
)− pˆ(1− pˆ) u¯
p2
<pˆ
[
pˆu¯(
1
pˆ2
− 1
p2
) +
u¯
p2
]
− pˆ(1− pˆ) u¯
p2
=u¯
Both equations (24) and (25) are satisfied. The bank gets all surplus of consumers in Ω2. So the
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problem is to find the largest r2 and c satisfying:

p(R2 − r2)− p(1− p)c ≥ u¯ (1)
pˆ(R3 − r2)− pˆ(1− pˆ)c < u¯ (2)
R2 − r2 − c ≥ 0 (3)
Notice that either condition (1) or condition (3) should be binding, otherwise the bank can always
increase r2 to charge more from consumers in Ω2. If condition (3) is binding, then R2 − r2 = c,
substituting this expression into the other two conditions yields:
R3 −R2
pˆ
− u¯
pˆ2
+R2 < r2 ≤ R2 − u¯
p2
⇒ R3 −R2 < pˆ( u¯
pˆ2
− u¯
p2
)
This gives the condition in the proof.
Part(ii): Recall that the overinvestment problem is prevented with individual contracts if R3 −
R2 < u¯
(
1
pˆ − 1p¯
)
. From Part (i), the condition for joint liability is R3−R2 < pˆu¯( 1pˆ2− 1p2 ). Comparing
these two regions, u¯
(
1
pˆ − 1p¯
)
≤ R3 −R2 < pˆu¯( 1pˆ2 − 1p2 ). QED.
5.3.8 Proof of Proposition 3.27
We solve for the lender payoff under each strategy and compare the payoffs.
• Lender Offers Only Secured Loans. If the lender chooses to offer only the secured loan,
besides the strategies we discuss in Section 2, it can also choose to forego Ω˜∗1. As we write in
the main text, for simplicity we assume that the the borrowers with strong ties are always
willing to lend to their friends with the lowest interest rate. Besides investments, the only
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income of the consumers in this model is the outside option u¯, so the lowest interest rate the
the borrower can offer to his friend is r1 − u¯. Then their friends are willing to borrow from
them if and only if r1− u¯ ≤ R2− u¯p , because otherwise their friend will prefer outside option
u¯. The lender can raise the interest rate to u¯+R2 − u¯p and the expected payoff is
Πˆ12 = αqN1p(u¯+R2 − u¯
p
− 1) = αqN1(pu¯+ pR2 − u¯− p)
• Lender Offers Both Secured and Unsecured Loans. If the lender chooses to offer both
secured and unsecured loans, the strategies are different from those in Section 2. We first
show that the lender can no longer serve all consumers. Suppose that the lender is trying to
serve all consumers, then it must be true that
rˆ = r1 − u¯ ≥ r2 =⇒ r1 > r2.
However, if r1 > r2 holds, consumers in Ω1 are always willing to pretend to be consumers in
Ω2, and we have a contradiction. The bank then has to give up on Ωˆ∗2. If the bank chooses
to serve all other consumers then the interest rates are r1 = R1+1− 1p − u¯p and r2 = R1− u¯p
and the expected payoff is
Πˆ31 = N1(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) + (N2 − αqN1)(p(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R1 − u¯
p
)− 1).
If the bank does not want to compete with the informal market, it can raise the interest
rate of unsecured loans to r2 = R2 − u¯p . Then consumers in Ω˜∗2 will also borrow from their
social contacts and the expected payoff for the lender is Πˆ32 = Π32. If the lender further
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does not even try to serve customers in Ω∗∗1 , he can raise the interest rate of secured loans to
r1 = R2+1− 1p − u¯p . The expected payoff is Πˆ33 = Π33. The lender now can even give up on
Ω˜∗1 and rise the interest rate of secured loans even higher to r1 = u¯ + R2 − u¯p , the expected
payoff then is
Πˆ34 =αqN1p(u¯+R2 − u¯
p
− 1) + (N2 − αqN1)(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
=αqN1(pu¯+ 1− p) +N2(p(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1) +N3(pˆ(R2 − u¯
p
)− 1)
• Lender Offers Only Unsecured Loans. It is easy to check that if the lender chooses to
offer only the unsecured loans, he will get either the same or lower expected payoff comparing
with other strategies, so, for simplicity, we assume that the lender always prefers not to offer
only unsecured loans. Since (A6) holds, Π11 > Π31 > Πˆ31. It can also be show that
Πˆ34 > Πˆ32, so we only need to compare Π11, Π12, Πˆ12, Π32 and Πˆ34. Notice that
Π11 > Π12 ⇐⇒ q < q∗2
Π11 > Πˆ12 ⇐⇒ α < 1
q
α∗1
Π11 > Π32 ⇐⇒ q > q∗1
Π11 > Πˆ34 ⇐⇒ α < 1
q
α∗4(1− q∗1)
Π12 > Πˆ12 ⇐⇒ α < α∗2
Π12 > Π32 ⇐⇒ q < 1
2
(q∗1 + q
∗
2)
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Π12 > Πˆ34 ⇐⇒ α < (1− 1
q
q∗1)α
∗
3
Πˆ12 > Π32 ⇐⇒ α > (q
∗
1
q
− 1)α∗2 +
1
q
α∗1
Πˆ12 > Πˆ34 ⇐⇒ α > 1
q
q∗1
Comparing these expressions:
1. If q ≥ q∗1, q ≥ q∗2, then Π12 ≥ Π11 ≥ Π32.
(a) In this case, if α ≥ α∗2 andα ≥ 1q q∗1, Π12 ≤ Πˆ12 and Πˆ12 ≥ Πˆ34. The optimal strategy is
only offering secured loans to Ωˆ∗1.
(b) If α ≥ α∗2 andα < 1q q∗1, or α < α∗2 and α ≥ (1− 1q q∗1)α∗3, then Πˆ12 ≤ Πˆ34 and Π12 ≤ Πˆ34,
the optimal strategy is serving Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3. If α < α∗2 and α < (1− 1q q∗1)α∗3, then
Π12 > Πˆ34 and Π12 > Πˆ12, the optimal strategy is only offering secured loans to Ω∗1.
2. If q ≥ q∗1, q < q∗2, then Π11 > Π12 and Π11 ≥ Π32.
(a) In this case, if α ≥ 1q q∗1 andα ≥ 1qα∗1, Π11 ≤ Πˆ12 and Πˆ12 ≥ Πˆ34. The optimal strategy
is only offering secured loans to Ωˆ∗1.
(b) If α ≥ 1qα∗1 and α < 1q q∗1, or α < 1qα∗1 and α ≥ 1qα∗4(1 − q∗1), then Π11 ≤ Πˆ12 and
Πˆ12 < Πˆ34, the optimal strategy is serving Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3.
(c) If α < 1qα∗1 and α < 1qα∗4(1− q∗1), then Π11 > Πˆ12 and Π11 > Πˆ34, the optimal strategy
is only offering secured loans to Ω1.
3. If q < q∗1, then 1− 1q q∗1 < 0, so Π12 < Πˆ34, Πˆ12 < Πˆ34 and Π11 < Π32.
(a) In this case, if α ≥ 1qα∗3 − α∗4, then Π32 ≤ Πˆ34, the optimal strategy is the optimal
strategy is serving Ωˆ∗1, Ω2/Ωˆ∗2 and Ω3.
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(b) If α < 1qα∗3 − α∗4, then Π32 > Πˆ34, the optimal strategy is serving Ω1, Ω∗∗2 and Ω3.
195
